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I. INTRODUCTION 
The taxing power-the "Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts 
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States"1-is plenary, or so we're often told, 
and "plenary" means without significant limits. 2 It's the conventional 
wisdom that a necessarily expansive power to raise revenue shouldn't be-
indeed can't be-subject to serious constitutional restraints. 
It's also the conventional wisdom that the ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment in 1913 did nothing more than remove a temporary, 
illegitimate impediment to the plenary taxing power. In the 1895 Income 
Tax Cases (Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.), 3 the Supreme Court 
struck down an 1894 income tax on the ground that it was a direct tax 
required, under Article I of the Constitution, to be apportioned among the 
states on the basis of population. 4 The Sixteenth Amendment, exempting 
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
2. See, e.g., LoRENP. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1877-
1917, at 154 (HenryS. Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1971) (describing clause as "so 
sweeping that it has seldom been construed as an interference with any tax measure"). 
3. 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (holding unapportioned tax on income from real estate 
unconstitutional); 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (extending principle to income from personal property 
and rejecting entire 1894 tax). 
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (''No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, 
unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken."); U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective 
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free 
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and 
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. 
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"taxes on incomes" from the apportionment requirement, 5 corrected that 
mistake, reestablishing the plenary taxing power. 
This Article attacks the conventional wisdom in a couple of respects. 
Building on earlier work, this Article continues my challenge to the notion 
that the taxing power is plenary (if by "plenary" we mean without 
significant restrictions): the specific limitations on the taxing power in the 
Constitution weren't intended to be trivial.6 Furthermore, this Article 
focuses on the Sixteenth Amendment and challenges the generally held 
notion that the Amendment supports an unlimited taxing power. 
Hardly anyone these days believes that the Sixteenth Amendment 
imposes a substantive limitation on congressional power, and the 
Amendment reads as if it were a grant of, not a restriction on, power: "The 
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any eensus or enumeration."7 In the words of 
Professor Daniel Shaviro, "[I]t is generally agreed that the amendment does 
not significantly constrain how taxable income can be defined by Congress 
and the courts."8 
The conventional syllogism goes like this: Congress can define what 
"income" is, and 1t can therefore define what a "tax on incomes" is. If 
Congress says a tax is on income, that ends the discussion: no 
apportionment is required. Like "general welfare"9 or "public use,"10 the 
term "taxes on incomes" imposes no serious limitations on Congress, and 
it's not a judicially enforceable concept. II 
Victor Thuronyi has put the argument this way: "Because people have 
different views of tax equity, there is no 'true' concept of income.''I2 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see infra text accompanying note 7. 
6. See Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes 
Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997). 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
8. Daniel N. Shaviro, Psychic Income Revisited: Response to Professors Johnson and 
Dodge, 45 TAXL. REv. 707,711 n.17 (1990). 
9. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1; supra text accompanying note 1. 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public' use without just 
compensation"). 
11. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987) ("The level of deference to 
the congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether 'general 
welfare' is a judicially enforceable restriction at all." (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-
91 (1976))); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239 (1984) ("When the legislature 
has spoken [in defining 'public use'], the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh 
conclusive." (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954))). 
12. Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REv. 45, 53 (1990). "[I]ncome 
could mean the same thing as consumption or wealth, or something else, depending on the 
criteria we choose for determining tax equity." Id. at 54. 
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Instead, the concept "is by its nature highly practical, flexible and ad hoc," 13 
and that flexibility has constitutional implications: 
[T]he Constitution allows Congress to provide for the common 
defense. Can a congressional funding of a missile be challenged 
on the basis that, in fact, the missile . . . decreases our 
security? Apart from standing concerns, such a challenge surely 
would be summarily rejected by the courts on the basis that the 
common defense is an inherently malleable term the meaning of 
which must be left to the judgment of Congress. The same should 
apply to the meaning of income in the sixteenth amendment. 14 
Professor Marjorie Kornhauser agrees that "incomes" is an "inherently 
malleable term": 
[T]he Sixteenth Amendment must give Congress a fully vested 
power to tax all income, however Congress defines it, without 
worrying about fine distinctions. Such an interpretation yields a 
meaning of income that is broad and evolutionary. Income's 
meaning is to be determined by Congress, not the Court, and that 
meaning changes over time as congressional conceptions of 
income change and become more sophisticated. 15 
In a recent article, ~Professor Bruce Ackerman bluntly downplays the 
significance of "taxes on incomes." The Amendment was a response to 
Pollock, and "[w]hen the People mobilize to overrule the Court, it seems 
particularly inappropriate for the Justices to respond in a niggling 
fashion." 16 Ackerman concludes that, "[ u] nder the constitutional regime 
inaugurated by the New Deal, there are no significant limits on the national 
government's taxing, spending, and regulatory powers where the economy 
is concerned-other than the requirement that government compensate 
owners if their property is taken for public purposes."17 
In one form or another, those propositions are taken for granted 
today. That's true for constitutional lawyers, who seldom look at tax 
issues, 18 and nearly all tax professionals, if they thought about the matter at 
all, would agree. (Indeed, that most don't think about the matter-Calvin 
13. Id. at 61. 
14. Id. at 101 (footnote omitted). 
15. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income 
Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1, 24 (1992). 
16. Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 55 (1999). 
17. Id. at 3. 
18. Until now, at least. See generally id. I've responded to Ackerman in Erik M. Jensen, 
Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. & POL. 687 (1999). 
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Johnson and Lawrence Zelenak are two important exceptions 19-is 
evidence the propositions are accepted.) 
The conventional wisdom might be a generally correct description of 
things-as-they-are, but it reflects a peculiar theory of constitutional 
interpretation. It doesn't comport with the original understanding of the 
Sixteenth Amendment, as I shall demonstrate, and it doesn't comport with 
any modem theory that takes restrictions on governmental power seriously. 
On its face, the Amendment isn't an unlimited expansion of the taxing 
power. It was, after all, a response to the Income Tax Cases, and it's only 
"taxes on incomes" that the Amendment exempts from apportionment. In a 
famous 1920 dissent, Justice Holmes wrote that "[t]he known purpose of 
this Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what might be direct 
taxes,"20 but Holmes provided no evidence or authority to support that 
proposition. Professor Owen Piss's narrow interpretation comes much 
closer to explaining the Amendment's text: "it simply removed what 
appeared to be a technical objection or impediment that [the Income Tax 
Cases] had posed to the income tax." 21 
In this Article I argue that the term "taxes on incomes" isn't 
meaningless. Even if it's impossible to come up with a precise definition-
certainly it's impossible to come up with a definition that all can agree on-
that's not the same as saying "taxes on incomes" is without content. The 
phrase was intended by the drafters to have a meaning, and it's not up to 
Congress to unilaterally define the constitutional boundaries of its own 
power. 
If "taxes on incomes" is a subset of direct taxes, it follows that the 
Sixteenth Amendment didn't exempt all direct taxes from apportionment. 
As the Fourth Circuit stated in 1954, "[A]n unapportioned direct tax on 
anything that is not income would still, under the rule of the [Income Tax 
Cases], be unconstitutional."22 While the Amendment was moving through 
state legislatures, Professor Edwin Seligman recognized that interpretational 
questions would remain after ratification: "We must not forget that as long 
as the words 'direct taxation' are retained in the constitution, [difficulties in 
19. See Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of 
the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1998); Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Tax 
Reform, the Constitution, and the Conscientious Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 833 (1999). 
20. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 220 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
21. 8 OWENM. FISS, HlSTORYOFTHE SUPREMECOURTOFTHE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED 
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 100 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1993). 
22. Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1954); see also 
HAROLD M. GROVES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS: Two HUNDRED YEARS OF THOUGHT IN GREAT 
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 39 (Donald J. Curran ed., 1974) ("The Sixteenth Amendment 
... left precluded direct taxation on receipts which the Court might notaccept as income."). 
1062 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
interpretation] will arise in the future, even , if the income tax matter is 
disposed of."23 But Seligman was too optimistic about the~ extent to which 
"the income tax matter" would be resolved. To implement the Amendment, 
we need to determine, as well as we can, not only what distinguishes direct 
taxes from indirect taxes, but also what distinguishes income taxes from 
other direct taxes. 
"Income tax, if I may be pardoned for saying so, is a tax on income," 
wrote Lord Macnaghten in London County Council v. Attorney-
General. 24 That sentence, taken from a 1900 English case interpreting an 
English revenue act, obviously can't be direct authority about the meaning 
of the Sixteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. But Lord 
Macnaghten's words suggest an appropriate (and hardly revolutionary) 
method to determine whether a tax is "on incomes": ask whether what is 
being taxed is "income" within the meaning of the Amendment. 
Determining whether the object of taxation is really income or not-
income isn't necessarily easy, to say the least. But in the main part of this 
Article, I argue that the definition of "taxes on incomes" should be informed 
by the time-honored distinction between income taxes and consumption 
taxes. 25 That distinction won't provide easy answers either, of course,26 but 
we can't stop interpreting constitutional language just because difficult 
cases inevitably arise at the margin. 
Historically, income .taxes and consumption taxes have ·been considered 
fundamentally different creatures. The late-nineteenth-, early-twentieth-
century push for an income tax, culminating in the 1913 ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment, was a response to the inadequacies of the 
consumption-tax regime, the tariffs and excise taxes, that had dominated the 
revenue system. Tax policy debates still proceed with the understanding 
there are significant differences between these two types of taxes. 
The distinction between income taxes and consumption taxes is one of 
the reasons this constitutional mumbo-jumbo may be important in the real 
23. EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STuDY OF THE HISTORY, 'THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 594 (1911). (In fact, the words "direct 
taxation" aren't used in the Constitution. See supra text accompanying note 4.). 
24. 1901 A.C. 26, 35 (H.L. 1900) (Lord Macnaghten). 
25. I raised this issue in skeletal form in Erik M. Jensen, Unapportioned Direct-
Consumption Taxes and the Sixteenth Amendment, 84 TAX NOTES 1089 (1999). 
26. No defmition of income (such as Haig-Simons, see infra note 126) decides all issues 
without controversy. But cf R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARv. L. 
REv. 44, 49 (1967) (arguing that, "once the income (as distinct from consumption) view has 
been chosen[,] . . . the accretion plus consumption concept of income follows as a matter of 
consistent thinking"). 
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world of taxation. 27 A reference to "taxes on incomes" shouldn't 
automatically be assumed to include a direct tax on consumption-that is, a 
direct tax that reaches only the consumption component of income 28 (or that 
could, in a particular year, reach more than .current income 29). If the direct-
consumption taxes proposed recently as alternatives to the income tax (the 
so-called "flat tax" 30 and the Unlimited Savings Allowance tax31 ("USA 
tax")) are direct taxes-and I argue they are-they must be "taxes on 
incomes" to be valid in an unapportioned form. And, given that these taxes 
would be consumption taxes, it's not clear they would be characterized as 
taxes on incomes. They aren't what the proponents of the Sixteenth 
Amendment had in ·mind: an income tax and a consumption tax are, as a 
constitutional matter; different kinds of levies. 
This Article begins, in Part II, with an outline of the constitutional 
structure governing the national taxing power, including the uniformity rule 
and the direct-tax apportionment rule. In Part. III, I explain some of the 
basics of income and consumption taxes, including the flat tax and the USA 
tax, and I justify ·two assumptions that apply in the remainder of this 
Article. In Part IV, I tum to the Sixteenth Amendment, arguing that the 
term "taxes on incomes" has content-it was used in contradistinction to 
taxes on consumption-and explaining why a direct-consumption. tax may 
not be exempt from apportionment. Finally, in Part V, I respond to claims 
the sky will fall if, all of a sudden, we take into account constitutional issues 
that have been ignored for decades. 
27. Another reason is that proposals for unapportioned wealth taxes have recently been 
advanced. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999); 
Adam Nagoumey, Trump Proposes Clearing Nation's Debt at Expense of the Rich, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Nov. 10, 1999, at A19. 
28. "[I] ncome is an addition to claims against resources that brings with it the potential to 
consume or to save.".Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAX L. REv. 283, 287 
(1990). 
29. That could happen if the tax reaches consumption from prior years' savings. I'm 
indebted to Steve Land for this point. See Letter from Stephen Land to Erik M. Jensen (Aug. 17, 
1999) (on file with author). 
30. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter 
HALL & RABUSHKA, 1HE FLAT TAX]; Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax: A 
Simple, Progressive Consumption Tax, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 27 (Michael J. Boskin 
ed., 1996) [hereinafter Hall & Rabushka, A Simple Tax]. The idea was promoted by Dick 
Armey and Steve Forbes. See James M. Bickley, Flat Tax: An Overview of the Hall-Rabushka 
Proposal, 72 TAXNOTES 97, 98 (1996). 
31. See Murray Weidenbaum, The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax: Analysis and Comparisons, 
in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 54 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996). These proposals are described 
in Jensen, supra note 6, at 2403-04; see also infra Part III.A. 
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND PLENARY POWER 
Dall Forsythe was right . when he ·wrote that the nationalist founders, 
"anxious that there be no limitations on the kind of taxes the general 
government could le-vy[,] were almost entirely successful, and ( exceEt for 
export duties) no single tax was altogether denied the new Congress." 2 But 
having almost no limits on the· kinds of taxes Congress might impose 
doesn't necessarily translate, in the way some plenary-power proponents 
would have us believe·it should, into no limits on the taxing power. 
Of course, advocates of congressional plenary power have to admit the 
Constitution contains a few specific limitations on the taxing power: the 
uniformity clause33 and the two clauses requiring apportionment of direct 
taxes are most prominent. 34 Furthermore, some general constitutional 
provisions, like the due process clause, may limit the taxing power under 
very special circumstances. 35 
No matter, say plenary-power proponents, those limitations, both general 
and special, have few real-world consequences?6 The limitations become 
subjects, of controversy only in tax protester cases, where frivolous 
constitutional arguments are made by taxpayers and routinely rejected by 
courts. 37 
Despite their unfortunate connection with off-the-wall tax protesters, the 
uniformity and· direct-tax apportionment rules still have, or could have, 
practical relevance, and they're worthy of attention on their own terms. It's 
to those rules that I now tum. 
32. DALL W. FORSYTHE, TAXATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE YOUNG NATION 1781-
1833, at 21 (1977). Export duties are foreclosed by Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the 
Constitution: ''No Tax or Duty shall.be laid on Articles exported from any State." See United 
States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 362-63 (1998); United States v. IBM, 517 
U.S. 843 (1996). 
33. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl.l; see infra text accompanying note 38. 
34. See supra note 4 (quoting direct .. tax clauses). 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law .... "). A tax based on race or sex, for example, would be struck 
down, but no congressman would suggest such a tax. The Supreme Court has yet to find a tax's 
retroactive effects egregious enough to violate due process. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 
512 U.S. 26 (1994) (upholding retroactive addition of qualification for deduction, enacted in 
1987 but effective in 1986). 
36. Cf Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal 
Government, 41 TAX lAW. 3, 9 (1987) ("[T]he federal power to tax income is not free-floating 
or 'plenary' in nature, but is instead subject to numerous constitutional provisions .... [But] 
these constitutional restraints seldom create any serious problems in the day-to-day application 
of the federal income tax."). 
37. See, e.g., United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming 
summary judgment againstprotestors who argued, inter alia, income tax must be apportioned). 
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A. The Uniformity Clause 
The uniformity clause (requiring that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises 
shall be uniform throughout the United States"38) isn't a regular topic of 
constitutional conversation; con law types puf the· Clause right up there in 
importance with the textual. reference to "Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal. "39 That's not to say, however, that the uniformity rule has been 
without effect. Even if, narrowly defined, it precludes only geographical 
discrimination of a very specific sort-taxing items in Utah at rates 
different from those that apply in Ohio, for.· example-that's not a 
meaningless principle. 
We've come to take geographical uniformity-the idea that a duty, 
impost, or excise must operate "with the same force and effect in every 
place where the subject of [the tax] is found" 40-so much for granted that 
we forget it wasn't a given in 1787. The Constitution could have permitted 
national duties, imposts, and excises to vary from state to state, taking into 
account differences in local conditions. If we want excise taxes to affect 
gasoline consumption, for example, why not have the rate depend on usage 
in each state, hitting gas-guzzling populations harder than concentrations of 
tree-huggers? The political difficulties would be immense, of course, and 
that's the main reason no one has seriously promoted a geographically 
variable levy in recent years. But another reason is that the unJformity rule 
would come into play. In Professor Bittker's words, "if a particular item is 
subject to tax, it must be taxed at the same rate throughout the United 
States, wherever it may be found." 41 
Silence can therefore be seen as evidence· of. the rule's force: certain 
forms of taxation aren't on the table for discussion because they'd be 
unconstitutional. But, having said that, I have to adm.it plenary-power 
proponents have a point. However one characterizes· the effects of the 
uniformity rule, they aren't nearly as far-reaching as they might have 
been. Before the Supreme Court limited application of the rule to 
geography, taxpayers used it to challenge other aspects of federal taxation, 
including progressive tates.42 Those chall~nges w~re unsuccessful, 
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 1. 
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl 1. 
40. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884). 
41. Bittker, supra note 36, at 10. 
42. Uniformity challenges were made in Pollock, based on the $4000 exemption and on 
sectional effects. (Taxpayers in four states paid four-fifths of the Civil War income tax. See 
WILLARD L. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER 195 (1950); CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. 
FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 399 (1930).) The uniformity issues weren't resolved in 1895, 
but the Court soon limited the rule to geography. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83-106 
(1900); see also DAVID P. CURRIE', THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: ThE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 
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however, and Professor Bittker ·calls the uniformity rule "a constitutional 
provision that might have dramatically influenced th~ structure of the 
federal income tax, but that has shriveled away to a mere flyspeck.'' 43 Even 
without the rule, it's hard to imagine a tax proposal with overt geographical 
variation surviving the political process in 2001. 
B. The Direct-Tax Apportionment Clauses 
If s possible to see the uniformity rule as having had practical effect, as I 
suggested above, but the other potentially significant limitation on the 
taxing power, the direct-tax apportionment clauses (which require that 
direct taxes be apportioned among the states on the basis of population, 
tying direct-tax apportionment to the same scheme used . for 
representation), 44 seems to have disappeared from the constitutional radar 
screen. That's not entirely true-an. unapportioned tax on real property or 
other wealth probably wouldn't withstand scrutiny45-but it's pretty close 
to the truth. And that's because the original, perfectly legitimate purpose of 
the clauses has been misunderstood or ignored. 
In discussing apportionment, I first describe how the rule is supposed to 
work mechanically. I then discuss what the founders thought the effect of 
the rule would be, an intended effect negated by a cramped judicial 
interpretation of the term "direct taxes." I next tum to the meaning of that 
term, briefly describing the cases that interpreted it narrowly and then 
providing a more coherent interpretation derived from constitutional 
structure, and history. Finally, I explain why a broader definition is 
consistent with the original understanding of the limited scope of the 
national taxing power. 
1789-1801, at 60-61 (1997) (noting assumption in deliberations on early whiskey tax that 
uniformity clause required only geographical uniformity). 
43. Bittker, supra note 36, at 10. Bittker says Congress retains power "to take into 
account differences that [despite the uniformity rule] exist between different parts of the 
country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems." !d. (quoting 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 159 (1974)). In United States v. 
Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983), the Court said Congress had dealt with such a problem in 
exempting "Alaskan oil" (crude oil from wells north of the Arctic Circle or on the northerly side 
of the Alaska-Aleutian Range) from the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (now repealed). Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 76. Alaska wasn't given "an undue 
preference at the expense of other oil-producing States." !d. at 86. 
44. See supra note 4 (quoting direct-tax apportionment clauses). 
45. See infra notes 70, 73, and 77-79 and accompanying text. 
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1. Mechanics of the Apportionment Rule 
When the apportionment rule applies, a state with, say, one-tenth the 
national population must have one..:tenth the aggregate direct-tax liability, 
regardless of respective levels of wealth or income. 46 If the rule were 
invoked today, that requirement would almost necessarily lead to the sort of 
geographical variation that the uniformity rule precludes for duties, excises, 
and imposts. 47 
Imagine state X with twice the population of state Y. For any tax subject 
to apportionment, X's aggregate liability must be twice Y's. Suppose an 
income tax has to be apportioned (something that's no longer the case 
because of the Sixteenth Amendment). If the per capita income in the two 
states is equal, the same rates could apply in both,·and, as required, X's total 
collection would double Y's. But now suppose X's per capita income is 
only one-half Y's. The rates in state X would have to be twice those in state 
Y to satisfy the apportionment requirement. 
If the uniformity rule applied to such a tax, having different rates in the 
two states wouldn't be permitted. But since variations of that sort are 
inevitable with apportionment, it's generally understood that the 
apportionment rule arid the uniformity rule apply to mutually exclusive 
classes of levies.48 A levy is subject to one rule or the other-it has to be 
uniform or it has to be apportioned-but not to both. 49 
2. Intended Effect of the Rule 
For political reasons, the geogra,phical variation that follows from 
apportionment makes direct taxes (other than taxes on incomes which, since 
1913, 'needn't be apportioned) difficult to use. 50 That shouldn't be 
surprising; direct taxation was feared by most founders. Although the 
46. Population was seen as an imperfect surrogate for wealth. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 
2385. 
4 7. In the antebellum period, Congress enacted direct taxes on real estate, with 
mechanisms to ensure apportionment was satisfied. See id. at 2355-56. But apportionment 
hasn't been attempted since 1861. 
48. !d. at 2341-42. 
49. Some commentators used to think there were levies governed by neither rule; see, e.g., 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 473, at 339 
(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833), but no such category has been discovered. See Jensen, 
supra note 6, at 2341. But see Jensen, supra note 18, at 711-13 (suggesting Ackerman article, 
supra note 16, implicitly revives this idea). 
50. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 176 (lOth prtg. 1964) (1913) ("Direct taxes may be laid, but resort to this 
form of taxation is rendered practically impossible, save on extraordinary occasions, by the 
provision that they must be apportioned according to population .... "). 
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Constitution was intended to increase the national taxing power, the 
founders didn't adopt an anything-goes position. ~ 
The Constitution is often characterized as a pro-tax document, ·and it's 
true, as Roger Brown has written, that "[t]he experience with the.breakdown 
of taxation ... drove the constitutional Revolution of 1787."51 But in 
evaluating the revenue power under the Constitution, and in determining 
how seriously we should take limitations like the . apportionment rule, we 
need to remember what the founders were reacting to. The Articles of 
Confederation had been a fiscal disaster, with the purportedly "national" 
government's having absolutely no taxing power over individual 
citizens. Instead, the government was left to rely for revenue on 
requisitions issued to the states, 52 a process that approximated begging: 
Please, states, send us a specified sum of money. Often states didn't 
respond. 53 
With requisitions as the basis for comparison, it didn't take much to 
constitute a dramatic increase in the national revenue power; merely 
permitting duties on imports was a marked enhancement in power. In 
urging ratification of the Constitution, James Wilson (a major participant at 
the Constitutional Convention, arguably second in importance. only to 
James Madison54) noted that 
direct taxation will be lessened, at least in proportion to other 
objects of revenue. In this Constitution, a power is given to 
Congress to collect imposts, which is not given by the present 
Articles of Confederation. A very considerable part of the 
revenue . . . will arise from that source; it is the easiest, most just, 
and most productive method of raising revenue .... 55 
That history is crucial in evaluating the common claim that the founders 
intended few, if any, limits on the taxing power. The Constitution was a 
pro-tax document, but only when measured by late-eighteenth-century 
standards; it was pro-tax compared to the Articles of Confederation. That's 
saying something, but it doesn't mean the power was intended to be 
51. ROGER H. BROWN, REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC: FEDERALISTS, TAXATION, AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1993). 
52. See THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. VIII (1781), reprinted in 1 DoCUMENTS OF 
AMERICANCONSTITUTIONAL& LEGAL HISTORY 72 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1989). 
53. See GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX? A HISTORY OF THE PROPERTY TAX IN 
AMERICA 28-30 (1996); Jensen, supra note 6, at 2380-82. 
54. He was also a member of the Court in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 
(1796). See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2350-63; infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
55. James Wilson, Speech (Pa. Convention, Dec. 4, 1787), in FRIENDS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE "OTHER" FEDERALISTS 1787-1788, at 231, 245 (Colleen A. 
Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998) [hereinafter FRIENDS]. 
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unlimited. Nothing in constitutional text, or in constitutional debates, 
suggests the Constitution's primary limits on the national taxing power, the 
uniformity rule and the direct-tax apportionment rule, were intended to be 
window -dressing. 
No matter how much an individual Federalist like Alexander Hamilton 
favored an unlimited taxing power, no one argued in public for that 
position, with good reason. 56 Such an argument would have been fatal to 
the Constitution. The American population wouldn't have accepted a 
Constitution understood to permit all sorts of taxation without limitation, 
not after the Revolutionary War.57 In the late eighteenth century, 
Americans had every reason to fear an unlimited taxing power. 
How significant apportionment would be depended on the taxes to which 
it would apply. That brings us to the meaning of "direct taxes," a term 
generally given a cramped meaning by the courts, with the result that 
apportionment has become an insignificant limitation on governmental 
power. I argue, however, that the term was originally understood to 
encompass a substantial universe of potential levies. 
3. Meaning of"Direct Taxes": The Historical Background 
The direct-tax apportionment rule could have had an important effect 
over the years, but that turned out not to be the case. Instead, "direct taxes" 
was interpreted to apply to little, and a rule that applies to almost nothing 
isn't much of a constraint on the taxing power. 
The gutting of the direct-tax clauses began shortly after ratification of the 
Constitution. In 1796, in the great case of Hylton v. United States, 58 the 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an unapportioned tax on 
carriages, concluding the tax wasn't direct. 59 The narrow result in Hylton 
was itself important-the carriage tax was intended to be a significant 
revenue measure-and language in some of the opinions came to have even 
more far-reaching effects. 
56. See FORSYTHE, supra note 32, at 24 (characterizing positions in The Federalist that 
reassured taxing-power skeptics as "disingenuous at best," given Hamilton's performance as 
Treasury Secretary). 
57. See JAMES L. HUSTON, SECURING THE FRUITS OF LABOR: TilE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF 
WEALTH DISTRIBUTION, 1765-1900, at 37-38 (1998) (noting "colonial protest over 
parliamentary taxation contained a consistent theme that the powers of government were being 
used to take the fruits of colonial labor to bestow on the undeserving in England"). 
58. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796); see Jensen, supra note 6, at 2350-63 (discussing Hylton). 
59. This wasn't a slam-dunk issue. Congressman James Madison voted against the 
unapportioned tax because he thought it was direct; he was afraid it would "break down one of 
the safeguards of the Constitution." 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1794). 
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As was the custom at the time, the opinions were written seriatim. 
Several Justices suggested the term "direct taxes" should be limited to real-
estate and capitation taxes60-feared taxes at the time, to be sure, but 
nothing like the universe to which apportionment might have applied. It's 
hard to find that definition in constitutional language and structure, nor does 
it jump out from ratification debates.61 But until 1895, courts accepted 
Hylton's dictum, fmding no other forms of taxation to be direct. 62 
In 1895, the Supreme Court briefly revived the direct-tax clauses in the 
Income Tax Cases. 63 The Court concluded that an 1894 income tax, which, 
because of a $4000 exemption amount, affected few taxpayers in few 
states,64 was a direct tax that hadn't been apportioned. 65 (Although the rate 
was only two percent, trivial by today's standards, the tax is generally 
understood as a populistic reaction to tax avoidance by the wealthy under 
the prior consumption tax regimes.)66 Rejecting a century of contrary 
authority, the Court concluded that apportionment was intended to have real 
effect: "Direct taxation was not restricted in one breath, and the restriction 
blown to the winds in another."67 
60. See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (Chase, J.) (stating direct taxes "contemplated by 
the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to 
property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND"); id. at 183 (Iredell, J.); 
id. at 177 (Paterson, J.); see also Jensen, supra note 6, at 2353-54. Hylton also stands for the 
silly proposition that apportionment should apply only where it imposes no serious limitation on 
the taxing power: 
The Constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes, but only 
such as Congress could lay in proportion to the census. The rule of 
apportionment is only to be adopted in such cases where it can reasonably 
apply; and the subject taxed, must ever determine the application of the rule. 
Id. at 174 (Chase~ J.); see also id. at 181 (Iredell, J.) ("As all direct taxes must be apportioned, it 
is evident that the Constitution contemplated none as direct, but such as could be 
apportioned. If this cannot be apportioned, it is, therefore, not a direct tax in the sense of the 
Constitution."); Jensen, supra note 6, at 2352-53. 
61. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2354-63 (discussing infirmities in Hylton analysis). 
62. See, e.g., Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (upholding unapportioned 
income tax); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874) (upholding unapportioned 
inheritance tax); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869) (upholding unapportioned 
tax on state bank notes). 
63. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. ("Pollock I''), 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. 
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. ("Pollock II"), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
64. See Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553. "Of the 12 million American 
households in 1894, only 85,000 had incomes over $4,000, well under 1 percent." JOHN STEELE 
GoRDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSING: THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE AND TiMES OF OUR NATIONAL 
DEBT 86 (1997). Southern states supported the tax because almost all revenue came from a few 
industrialized states. See KING, supra note 42,at 193; SWISHER, supra note 42, at 399. 
65. See Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 583; Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 635-37. 
66. See infra Part IV .B .1. 
67. Pollock IL 158 U.S. at 622. 
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The Income Tax Cases proved to be extremely contentious; it took two 
sets of hearings and opinions for the Court to strike down the entire taxing 
statute, and the Court was divided each time. In the first case (Pollock I), 
the Court, by a 6-2 vote, invalidated the tax only insofar as it was imposed 
on income from real property. 68 The Court accepted the Hylton dictum that 
a tax on real estate is a direct tax and saw no constitutionally significant 
difference between a tax on real estate and a tax on income from real 
estate. 69 Because either tax diminishes the value of property, the 
apportionment rule that applies to one should apply to the other as well.70 
Proponents of the tax didn't like it, but Chief Justice Fuller actually did a 
nice job of tying his analysis to Hylton: to the extent this was a tax on real 
property, it had to be apportioned. 71 Fuller provided other justifications as 
well for rejecting the tax on income from real property. looked to how 
shiftable the tax was, a point with support in eighteenth century 
understanding: 72 
Ordinarily all taxes paid primarily by persons who can shift the 
burden upon some one else, or who are under no legal compulsion 
to pay them, are considered indirect taxes; but a tax upon property 
holders in respect of their estates, whether real or personal, or of 
the income yielded by such estates, and the payment of which 
cannot be avoided, are direct taxes. 73 
And the apportionment rule, wrote Fuller, was a response to the deficiency 
of the requisitions process: "[T]here were no means of compulsion, as 
Congress had no power whatever to lay any tax upon indivjduals."74 With 
the power to tax individuals came a check on that power-apportionment. 
As Fuller emphasized, "The men who framed and adopted [the 
Constitution] had just emerged from the struggle for independence whose 
rallying cry had been that 'taxation and representation go together. "'75 
Because it dealt only with income from real property, Pollock I left the 
status of a large part of the 1894 income tax in limbo, and the Court was 
68. Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 583. 
69. Id. at 581. 
70. See id. ("[I]s there any basis upon which to rest the contention that real estate belongs 
to one of the two great classes of taxes, and the rent or income which is the incident of its 
ownership ·belongs to the other? We are unable to perceive any ground for the alleged 
distinction."). 
71. Id. 
72. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
73. Pollock!, 157 U.S. at 558. 
74. Id. at 559-60. 
75. Id. at 556. 
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pressured to rehear the case.76 In Pollock II, heard several months later, the 
Court held (barely, 5-4) that income from personal property should be 
treated the same as income from real property. 77 It would have made no 
sense to require apportionment of a tax on rents, but not a tax on dividends 
and interest. 78 
With income from property removed from the base of an unapportioned · 
tax, and because the high exemption amount effectively exempted the 
ordinary services-provider from the scope of the law, the tax was gutted. 
The five-Justice majority therefore concluded the entire statute had to fall, 
including the part, on earned income, that the Court suggested might have 
survived constitutional scrutiny. 79 
As in Hylton, the Court did an inadequate job of explaining what a direct 
tax is, and the majority opinions in the two cases can be read in a number of 
ways. They can be read broadly: an income tax is a direct tax, and the 
Hylton dicta are simply wrong. 80 Or they can be read narrowly: given how 
the 1894 tax worked, it was primarily on income from property, and Hylton 
had said taxes on real estate must be apportioned. Or they can be seen as 
the unprincipled product of a reactionary Court, unworthy of serious 
consideration. It's this last view that has dominated academic opinion. 81 In 
Robert McCloskey's words: ''The direct tax clause, so long neglected as a 
constitutional restraint, provided the judges with an objective formulation of 
their prejudice in favor of wealth."82 
However the opinions are read, the result was of extraordinary 
importance in 1895: for the first time, a tax had been struck down under the 
direct-tax apportionment clauses. 83 And the two sets of opinions weren't 
garden-variety tax decisions, invisible to all but aficionados. The dispute 
was "the most contentious and emotion-laden of the era,' far more so than 
76. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2369. 
77. Pollock IL 158 U.S. at 618 ("[W]e are unable to conclude that the enforced subtraction 
from the yield of all the owner's real or personal property ... is so different from a tax upon the 
property itself, that it is not a direct, but an indirect tax, in the meaning of the Constitution."). 
78. See FISS, supra note 21, at 89. 
79.. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 636-37; see infra note 127. It isn't clear why earned income 
might be special, except that it's easier to fit a tax on income from property into Hylton's 
conceptual boxes. 
80. That's how I read the Income Tax Cases. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2373-75. 
· 81. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 15, at 23-24 (describing holding as "aberrational," "a 
product of its time, the beginning of the Progressive Era," a "rogue decision"). 
82. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 94 (1990). 
83. See Francis R. Jones, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 9 HARV. L. REV. 
198, 198 (1895) (stating Court "deliver[ed] an opinion in which is laid down a doctrine that is 
contrary to what has been accepted as law for nearly one hundred years"). 
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Plessy v. Ferguson."84 Indeed, it was common for critics to characterize the 
case as approaching Dred Scott in its horrible effects. 85 
But, as significant as the Income Tax Cases were at the time, . the 
resuscitation of the direct-tax clauses was short-lived. Post-1895 cases 
quickly cut back on Pollock's scope,86 and the decisions triggered the 
movement for a constitutional amendment. 87 With the 1913 ratification of 
the Sixteenth Amendment, repudiating the result in Pollock, the direct-tax 
clauses seemed to have . returned to their nineteenth-century obscurity. 
Whether the Income Tax Cases were aberrations doesn't seem to matter to 
scholars today: whether or not "taxes on incomes" are direct taxes, such 
taxes, the most significant component of the national revenue system, may 
now be imposed without apportionment. 
4. Meaning of"Direct Taxes": Making Sense of Text and 
Constitutional Structure · 
With that history, the common view about the irrelevance of the direct-
tax apportionment clauses-that they apply at most to capitation and real-
estate taxes-is understandable. Furthermore, the idea that the clauses were 
anomalies from the beginning, that no one knew how apportionment was 
supposed to work or to what it was supposed to apply (as evidenced by 
Rufus King's famous unanswered question at the Constitutional 
Convention88) has become the conventionalwisdom .. 89 
84. GoRDON, supra note 64, at 87; see also JOHN D. BUENKER, 1HE INCOME TAX AND THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA 4 (1985); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (1954). 
85. See, e.g., EDWARDS. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 209 (1938); KING, supra 
note 42, at 193; SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 589; David G. Farrelly, Justice Harlan's Dissent 
in the Pollock Case, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 182 (1951); Jos. R. Long, Tinkering with the 
Constitution, 24 YALEL.J. 573, 576 (1915). 
86. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (adhering to view inheritance tax 
isn't direct); see also Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 113 (1916) (suggesting 
Pollock based on "mistaken theory"); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1916) 
(suggesting Pollock limited to facts); Jensen, supra note 6, at 2375-77 (discussing these and 
other cases). 
87. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 208 (1996) ("The Court ... created the belief that a constitutional 
amendment offered the only responsible way to secure such a tax."). 
88. "Mr King asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation. No one answd." 2 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 350 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) 
(1911) (Aug. 20, 1787). But see Jensen, supra note 6, at 2377-80 (challenging proposition that 
silence proves lack of original understanding about meaning of" direct taxes"). 
89. The two ideas-that the clauses had a precise, limited meaning and that they meant 
nothing-are hopelessly inconsistent. In 1909, Senator George Sutherland asked the obvious: 
"If the description of the tax was so simple as that; if it simply meant a land tax and a capitation 
1074 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
Indeed, because the rule was associated with a compromise about how 
slaves should be counted for purposes of representation. and direct taxation, 
Professor Ackennan has extended the common understanding: "American 
law should leave no stone unturned in its effort to root out any residue of its 
original compromise with slavery-and the 'direct tax' clause is a small, 
but potentially damaging, stone."90 He argues that, because of slavery (as 
well as the New Deal Revolution and other constitutional moments), even 
real-estate taxes are now outside apportionment's scope.91 Suffice it to say 
that Ackerman's position relies on an idiosyncratic view of history, 92 it isn't 
supported by case law,93 and plenary-power proponents I've consulted 
disagree. 
In any event, the Ackerman twist on common understanding doesn't 
matter if the common understanding is wrong, and it is. It ignores a basic 
interpretational principle: to read the text in its most robust form, to try to 
find coherence in the most convoluted structure. The tax provisions in the 
Constitution don't mesh perfectly, but they're much more coherent than 
generally acknowledged. 
The uniformity rule and the apportionment rule make sense when applied 
to indirect taxes and direct taxes, respectively. Those two categories are 
mutually exclusive: a tax that isn't an indirect tax is a direct tax. 94 Figure 
tax, why was it that some member of the constitutional convention did not so answer the 
question propounded by Rufus King?" 44 CONG. REC. 3971 (June 30, 1909); see also 44 CONG. 
REc. 2082 (May 17, 1909): 
If it had been intended by the framers of the Constitution that those words 
"other direct tax" should include a land tax and nothing more, it seems to me 
that the plain and direct way would have been for the framers of the 
Constitution to have said so in precise words-to have simply said that "no 
capitation or land tax shall be laid, except in accordance with this rule." 
90. Ackerman, supra note 16, at 58; see also id. at 29-31, 52-53. Like some other 
commentators, Ackerman argues the compromise with slavery was the only purpose of the 
clauses. See, e.g., PAUL, supra note 84, at 51-52; SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 552. 
91. See Ackerman, supra note 16, at 56-58. 
92. The form of the limitation was affected by slavery, but the rule isn't pro-slavery in its 
intended effect. See infra note 112. And it's absurd to think that, without slavery, the founders 
would have been indifferent to the scope of the taxing power. To defend apportionment is not, 
as Ackerman outrageously suggests, to be indifferent to the "legacy of racism." See Ackerman, 
supra note 16, at 30 n.ll2. 
93. Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Co., 292 U.S. 371 (1934), suggested 
apportionment isn't dead, at least for taxes on real estate: "If the statute lays taxes on the part of 
the building occupied by the owner or upon the rental value of that space, it cannot be sustained, 
for that would be to lay a direct tax requiring apportionment." Id. at 378. 
94. Ackerman apparently thinks defining terms in this way is improper. See Ackennan, 
supra note 16, at 53-54. But we defme by exclusion all the time in the law. See Jensen, supra 
note 18, at 698. 
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out what the indirect taxes are, and every other levy is subject to 
apportionment. 
Indirect taxes (governed by the uniformity rule) are duties, excises, and 
imposts-generally levies imposed on articles of consumption. 95 The 
founders understood indirect taxes, but not direct taxes, to be "shiftable." 
The burden was assumed to fall on the ultimate purchaser: even if the seller 
is legally obligated to remit the tax, the price paid will have the tax 
embedded in it. In contrast, direct taxes (subject to apportionment) are 
imposed directly on individuals who are expected to bear the burden of the 
taxes. 96 The economic understanding behind these assumptions might have 
been imperfect, but the constitutional distinction between direct and indirect 
taxes remains.97 
The difficulty in shifting the burden is one reason direct taxes are 
unpopular. In 1885, Woodrow Wilson explained: "All direct taxes are 
heartily disliked. . . . They soften their exactions with not a grain of 
consideration. The tax-collector, consequently, is never esteemed a lovable 
man. His methods are too blunt, and his powers too obnoxious. He comes 
to us, not with a 'please,' but with a 'must. "' 98 
Indirect taxes aren't popular either, but they have characteristics that 
make them politically palatable. After a period of adjustment, the tax 
becomes part of the prices of products.99 You get used to paying a dollar 
for a widget, and you forget a few cents of the price goes to the government. 
The typical indirect tax has no equivalent to a painful April 15 filing 
95. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2393-97; Jensen, supra note 18, at 694; BEARD, supra 
note 50, at 176 ("[I]ndirect taxes must be uniform, and these are to fall upon consumers."). 
96. This distinction is familiar to British political economists. See JOHN STUART MILL, 
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICALECONOMYbk. V, ch. 3, ~ l, at 190 (Jonathan Riley ed., 1994) (1848): 
Taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one which is demanded 
from the very persons who, it is intended or desired, should pay it. Indirect 
taxes are those which are demanded from one person in the expectation and 
intention that he shall indemnify himself at the expense of another: such as 
the excise or customs. 
97. See JOHN nLEY, REVENUE LAW 18 (4th ed. 2000) ("The distinction has become less 
clear as the real incidence of taxation has been explored by economists. [But there is] a 
fundamental distinction ... between the recovery of a direct tax by a more-or-less circuitous 
operation of economic forces and the passing on of a tax in recognisable form." (footnotes 
omitted)); cf id. ("By rejecting-inevitably-the test of economic incidence which would mean 
that almost every tax was at risk of being classified as indirect, [Commonwealth] courts have 
been forced back on to a test of whether or not the general tendency of a tax can be passed 
on .... "(footnote omitted)). 
98. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GoVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERJCAN POLITICS 
100 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1981) (1885). 
99. See THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 142 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(comparing such taxes "to a fluid, which will, in time find its level with the means of paying 
them"). 
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deadline; it's easier for government to "pluck the goose without making it 
cry out." 100 
Moreover-this is a related point critically important in the founders' 
thought-indirect taxes come with built-in protections against abuse. If the 
government makes the taxes on articles of consumption too burdensome, 
taxpayers won't ignore the taxes and revenue will decline: either consumers 
won't purchase the taxed goods at all or buyers and sellers will engage in 
illegal behavior to evade the tax. 101 Taxpayers can thus decide whether to 
be subject to the tax, or so the founders thought. 102 Wrote Alexander 
Hamilton, "The amount to be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be 
at his own option, and can be regulated by an attention to his own 
resources."103 If full avoidance is impossible or undesirable, taxpayers can 
at least decide when to be subject to the tax. 104 
Direct taxes, the taxes that aren't indirect taxes, don't come with built-in 
checks, and it's therefore more dangerous to give government the power to 
100. 2 THOMAS M. CbOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 7 n.2 (Chicago, 
Callaghan and Co. 1876) (quoting Turgot). Some economists dislike the idea of a national 
indirect tax precisely because it would be easy for the government to raise revenue in an 
apparently painless way. See, e.g., Weidenbaurn, supra note 31, at 67; see also MILL, supra 
note 96, bk. V, ch. 6,,; 1, at 237: 
The unpopularity of direct taxation, contrasted with the easy manner in 
which the public consent to let themselves be fleeced in the prices of 
commodities, has generated in many friends of improvement a directly 
opposite mode of thinking to the [view that indirect taxes should be 
preferred]. They contend that the very reason which makes direct taxation 
disagreeable, makes it preferable. Under it, every one knows how much he 
really pays; and if he votes for a war, or any other expensive national luxury, 
he does so with his eyes open to what it costs him. 
Cf Dick Armey, Review Merits of Flat Tax, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1994, at Al6 (describing 
Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1994, H.R. 4585, 103d Cong., which would have 
created flat tax and eliminated withholding so as to make tax payments painful). 
101. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2393-97. In light of Professor Zelenak's pithy comment-
"It is hard to believe that ease of illegal evasion is a constitutional virtue in a tax," Zelenak, 
supra note 19, at 839-I'm willing to de-emphasize (but not excise) the reference to evasion. 
102. James Wilson said an indirect tax is safe "because it is voluntary. No man is obliged 
to consume more than he pleases, and each buys only in proportion to his consumption. The 
price of the commodity is blended with the tax, and the person is often not sensible of the 
payment." Wilson, supra note 55, at 245; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 21, supra note 99, at 
142 ("It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they contain in their own 
nature a security against excess."). But see MILL, supra note 96, bk. V, ch. 6,,; 1, at 239 ("We 
are often told that taxes on commodities are less burthensome ... because the contributor can 
escape from them by ceasing to use the taxed commodity. He certainly can ... deprive the 
government of the money: but he does so by a sacrifice of his own indulgences .... "). 
103. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 99, at 142. 
104. See MILL, supra note 96, bk. V, ch. 6,,; l, at 240 (noting as advantage of indirect taxes 
"that what they exact from the contributor is taken at a time and in a manner likely to be 
convenient to him"). 
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levy such taxes. Direct taxes are dangerous because individuals can't avoid 
them in the way indirect taxes can be avoided, and also because an 
unconstrained direct-tax power would leave states at the mercy of the 
national government. 105 The founders had perfectly good reasons to favor a 
special limitation on direct taxes in the Constitution. 
5. Why a Broad Interpretation of"Direct Taxes" Is Consistent 
with Original Understanding 
The distinction between the relatively safe indirect taxes and the 
relatively dangerous direct taxes makes the structure coherent. The 
Constitution established a system of limited government, and the limitations 
on the power of the national government need to be taken seriously. If a 
proposed tax doesn't have the built-in protections characteristic of taxes on 
articles of consumption, congressional power to impose the tax should be 
subject to the apportionment rule. 106 That was the original understanding, 
consistent with the "nature" of things: 107 cabin the dangerous taxes and 
leave the safe taxes unconstrained, except for the uniformity rule. 
Direct taxes weren't forbidden; the Constitution makes them difficult, 
not impossible, to impose. 108 After the fiscal disasters of the Articles of 
Confederation, most founders believed the government needed the power to 
levy direct taxes. But that power would seldom be used-probably only in 
emergencies like war, when the burden of apportionment could become 
temporarily tolerable.109 Direct taxation "should be within reach in all cases 
105. Apportionment was also intended to ensure the states would have a tax base. See 
Jensen, supra note 6, at 2397-98; cf W. ELLIOTT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 
12 (1996) (stating limit on "use of property taxation had far more to do with attitudes regarding 
the proper sphere of the federal government than it did with the scope of government in general 
or the proper forms of taxation"). 
106. See Jensen, supra note 18, at 697. 
107. See THE FEDERALIST No. 21, supra note 99, at 143 ("In a branch of taxation where no 
limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the nature of the thing, the 
establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer 
inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether at large."); see also Jensen, supra note 
18, at 694-95 (discussing "nature of things"). 
108. Apportionment can be done. See supra note 47; FISHER, supra note 53, at 38-44. 
109. See Socius, CARLISLE GAZETTE (Nov. 14, 1787), in FPJENDS, supra note 55, at 164, 
166 ("As the grand revenue will arise from another source, [direct taxation] may never be 
applied to, but on such occasions, as may require great exertions .... "). That followed English 
experience. See ROY DOUGLAS, TAXATION IN BRITAIN SINCE 1660, at 4 (1999) ("Unlike 
customs duties, [direct taxes] had traditionally been levied as emergency measures only, to meet 
some special need, usually a war .... "). 
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of emergency," said James Wilson, 110 but it should be used only if indirect 
taxation failed to raise sufficient revenue. It was indirect taxes-primarily 
imposts, Wilson suggested-that would fund the national government in the 
ordinary course. 111 
Unless apportionment is interpreted as a significant limitation on the 
taxing power, why is the rule in the Constitution? Why was it part of a 
significant compromise-how slaves should be counted in determining each 
state's representation and its aggregate direct-tax liability-at the 
convention? 112 I return to my interpretational premise: we should try to 
make sense of the rule if we can, and the rule makes sense only as a 
limitation on the national taxing power. 
With apportionment understood in that way, it would be anomalous not 
to apply the rule just because the founders emphasized capitation and real-
estate taxes and failed to mention other direct taxes. They discussed taxes 
they were familiar with and therefore most worried about. They didn't 
mention taxes on livestock, kitchen tables, or shirts, but surely we shouldn't 
infer that an unapportioned tax on such items would be permissible. And 
it's absurd to suggest apportionment shouldn't apply to a modem tax just 
because it hadn't been devised in 1787. The passages in Hylton limiting 
direct taxes to capitation and real-estate taxes were dicta 113-obviously the 
Court wasn't considering the propriety of taxes Justices couldn't have 
imagined114-and they should be interpreted with that basic fact in mind. 115 
110. James Wilson, Speech (State House, Oct. 6, 1787) in FRIENDS, supra note 55, at 102, 
106. 
111. See Wilson, supra note 55, at 245; Wilson, supra note llO, at 106 ("[T]he great 
revenue of the United States must, and always will, be raised by impost; for, being at once less 
obnoxious, and more productive, the interest of the government will be best promoted by the 
accommodation of the people."); see also BRO\VN, supra note 51, at 238 (discussing political 
sensitivity of direct taxation and quoting Federalists on its undesirability). 
112. The counting rule wasn't pro-slavery. It did give the slave states something: counting 
slaves as three-fifths of a person increased the South's representation in Congress over what it 
would have been if slaves hadn't been counted at all. But it also increased slave states' direct-
tax obligations. Both parts of the compromise had significance; that's the nature of 
compromise. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2387-89; see also supra notes 90-92 and 
accompanying text. 
113. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
114. In debates leading to the Sixteenth Amendment, Senator Sutherland responded to the 
argument that "direct taxes" could include only taxes understood by Blackstone to be direct: 
It may have been ... that the only form of direct taxation which was in use in 
England was that form to which the Senator has directed attention. But 
neither Mr. Blackstone nor any other writer upon English law ever intended 
to say that direct taxes were confined, at all times and under all 
circumstances, to capitation and land taxes. 
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An income tax is nothing like the classic forms of indirect taxation, and 
the Supreme Court therefore got the result right in the Income Tax Cases of 
1895: an income tax is a direct tax as that term was originally understood. 116 
It's hard for me to imagine that many founders, if the matter had been 
presented to them, would have seen the characterization of an income tax as 
a serious question. 117 Even the staunch nationalist Alexander Hamilton, 
who in his heart-of-hearts probably hoped for an unlimited taxing power, 
would have been realistic on this point. 118 
6. A Final Point on Direct Taxation 
My emphasis on the potential significance of the direct-tax 
apportionment rule shouldn't be understood as a defense of the rule on the 
merits. However desirable it is to limit governmental power, this is a 
cumbersome way to do it. We could surely come up with a better method. 
But we're not drafting a Constitution from scratch, and the apportionment 
rule is in the Constitution. We can't ignore the direct-indirect distinction, a 
rule of constitutional significance and one with a perfectly legitimate 
purpose, just because it presents conceptual difficulties. Moreover, as is the 
case with many well-intentioned rules, the apportionment rule may have 
some effects that we don't approve of; it may rule out some otherwise 
desirable revenue measures. That's life. 
Unless we believe the founders intended to leave the taxing power 
unimpeded, the apportionment rule should be taken seriously. And if we do 
44 CONG. REC. 2085 (May 17, 1909). "Mr. Blackstone could not have spoken of an income tax 
at the time he wrote, because if he had he would have spoken of something that did not 
exist." !d. 
115. !d. Dicta in Supreme Court decisions need to be taken seriously, but there are reasons 
to question Hylton as authority. The carriage tax was a product of a Federalist government's 
consolidating power; the 'justices of the early Supreme Court simply did not view their 
positions the way modem justices do." William R. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth, in SERIATIM: THE 
SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 292, 315 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 
1998). Federalist justices were supporting the Federalist government, not keeping other 
branches in check. See id. at 316. 
116. That doesn't mean all the Court's reasoning was right. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 
2370-75. 
117. The idea of taxing income wasn't totally unknown to the founders, and it became a 
reality in England in 1799. See DoUGLAS, supra note 109, at 40-42. 
118. In 1788 Hamilton argued the federal debt would be funded by indirect taxation: "The 
fund will be sought for in indirect taxation; as for a number of years, and except in time of war, 
direct taxes would be an impolitic measure." Quoted in BROWN, supra note 51, at 238. When 
Hamilton was referring to the possibility of direct taxation in the future, he didn't have income 
taxation in mind. 
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that, the term "taxes on incomes"--describing direct taxes not subject to 
apportionment-must also be taken seriously. 
III. SETTING THE STAGE FOR "TAXES ON INCOMES": CONSUMPTION 
TAXES AND INCOME TAXES 
This Article is ultimately about "taxes on incomes," and I'll soon get to a 
discussion of that term. Before doing so, however, I'll discuss some of the 
basics of income taxes and consumption taxes, and explain why the recently 
proposed flat tax and USA tax are really consumption taxes. In addition, 
I'll take a couple of issues off the table so that, from this point on, the focus 
can be on "taxes on incomes." 
A. Income Taxes and Consumption Taxes: A Primer 
As understood today, a pure income tax includes all accessions to wealth 
in the tax base and then allows deductions for decreases in wealth 
connected with income-producing activities, such as amounts spent on 
business and inve~tment. (There's no such thing as a "pure" income tax in 
the real world, of course, but the point is still worth making.) As a result, 
the tax base includes both the portion of current receipts spent on personal 
consumption and the portion saved during the taxable year. 
In contrast, pure consumption taxes are imposed only on amounts spent 
on personal consumption, not on amounts saved. Sales taxes are the best-
known example in the U.S. (The federal government hasn't tried a sales 
tax, but it has relied on other consumption taxes, such as tariffs and 
excises.) One incurs the tax when purchasing a consumable good-the 
more consumed, the higher the tax bill. To the extent earnings are saved, 
however, sales tax liability is not incurred. 
Like a tariff or excise, a sales tax is a form of indirect tax, as traditionally 
understood. Recently, a couple of forms of direct-consumption tax (a tax 
reaching only consumption but not imposed on purchases of consumption 
goods) have been floated as replacements for the income tax: the USA 
(unlimited savings allowance) tax and the flat tax. The USA tax is a form 
of cash-flow consumption tax and the flat tax consists of two parts, one of 
which is a wage tax that is itself a form of consumption tax. 
To illustrate the effects of a cash-flow consumption tax and a wage tax, 
and to contrast the effects with an income tax, I'll work through an 
example. Assume (1) Leon has $100,000 from wages to invest; (2) he can 
command interest on his investments of ten percent compounded annually; 
(3) the applicable tax rate is thirty percent; and ( 4) Leon holds the 
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investment for one year, at which time he consumes the total net return 
(income and principal after tax). 119 The assumed rate doesn't correspond to 
those proposed by flat and USA tax proponents-nor does it correspond to 
the existing tax structure-but the example nonetheless illustrates the 
differences between those taxes and an income tax. 
1. Income Tax 
First, consider what happens to Leon under a pure income tax. The 
purchase of an investment isn't a current wealth decrease and the cost 
therefore isn't deductible. Instead, the outlay creates basis, and the return 
on the investment, after subtracting the basis, is included in gross income. 
Gross Wages Available for Investment $100,000 
Tax on Wages (30%) $ 30,000 
Net Investment After Tax $ 70,000 
Gross Return ($70,000 + [.10 x $70,000]) $ 77,000 
Tax on $7,000 "Income" ($77;000- $70,000 basis)$ 2,100 
Net Return $ 74,900 
The bottom line: After paying tax on wages and the return on his 
investment, Leon is left with $74,900. 
2. Cash-Flow Consumption Tax 
In general, the workings of a cash-flow consumption tax are 
simple. While capital expenditures (additions to investment and savings, 
such as the purchase of stock) aren't deductible under a pure income tax 
because they don't represent decreases in wealth, a cash-flow consumption 
tax permits deduction of outlays unrelated to consumption. Each taxpayer 
therefore totals up all receipts during the year and then subtracts outlays that 
weren't current consumption expenditures-business and investment 
expenses as well as capital expenditures, payments of principal and interest 
on debts, and amounts added to savings (like the purchase of stock). As a 
result, the tax base includes orily amounts spent on consumption during the 
year. 
That's exactly what the USA tax would do. For individuals, it would 
generally include everything that has traditionally been treated as income in 
119. The examples, slightly modified, are taken from JOSEPH M. IbDGE ET AL, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX: DoCTRJNE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 472-83 (2d ed. 1999). 
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the first computational step, and then permit a deduction for additions to 
savings, thus leaving only consumption to be taxed. 120 • 
Assume, as before, that Leon invests his after-tax wages (in this case, the 
full $100,000, because he isn't taxed on invested amounts), and then 
consumes the full amount available at the end of the one-year period. 
Gross Wages Invested (fully deductible) 
Tax on Invested Wages (30%) 
Net Investment After Tax 









Bottom line: Leon is left with $77,000 after taxes, over $2,000 more than 
under the income tax. 
3. Wage Tax 
A wage tax is another form of direct-consumption tax. The flat tax 
proposal includes both a tax on businesses and a tax on wages. The flat tax 
as a whole would reach only consumption, but the wage tax by itself would 
also be a form of consumption tax. The wage tax would exclude all 
investment returns from "capital" (as opposed to services), such as interest, 
dividends, royalties, and gains on asset dispositions, from the tax 
base. Applied to Leon: 
Gross Wages Available for Investment 
Tax on Wages (30%) 
Net Investment After Tax 
Gross Return ($70,000 + [.10 x $70,000]) 








The outcome-$77,000 after taxes-is precisely the same as with a cash-
flow consumption tax. Put another way, a pure consumption tax in essence 
taxes only returns on labor, while a pure income tax reaches not only 
returns on labor but also returns on capital. 121 
120. See USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, l04th Cong. (1995); Weidenbaum, supra note 31, 
at 55-57. In an important twist, the USA tax would also reach spending out of savings. See 
supra note 29 (discussing letter from Stephen Land). 
121. See also infra Part IV.C. 
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A cash-flow consumption tax and a wage tax are thus equivalent means 
of reaching the same ends, at least if certain assumptions are made. 122 A 
cash-flow consumption tax provides a deduction for savings, thus leaving 
only consumption in the tax base, but a wage tax gets to the same result. 
The flat-tax proposal is more complicated than a simple wage tax. It 
would create an integrated business and wage tax, with a single rate 
applicable to all individuals (but with a high exemption amount to insure 
progressivity). 123 The key to the proposal, however, isn't the rate; the "flat 
tax" terminology is misleading. Like the USA tax, the flat tax would 
change the tax base: it's structured to reach only the consumption 
component of income. As Professor Feld puts it, "The flat tax converts the 
income tax into a national tax on consumption, whose economic effects 
resemble those of a value-added tax." 124 The "integrated" flat tax gets to 
that result in a complicated way, but get there it does. 125 
Both the flat tax and the USA tax would generally reach only part of 
what is denominated as income under the classic Haig-Simons definition-
the sum of consumption and the increase in the value of the taxpayer's 
assets. 126 The present income tax also reaches only part of Haig-Simons 
income, but it comes much closer than the flat tax or USA tax would. 
B. Assumptions 
A couple of assumptions are necessary so that the remainder of this 
Article can focus on the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment tenn "taxes 
on incomes," and show how a tax on incomes, as a constitutional matter, is 
different from a consumption tax. First, from now on I assume that, as I 
argued in Part II, an income tax is direct-that the 1895 Income Tax Cases 
122. The assumptions aren't necessarily realistic, such as no change in tax rates, no 
significant inflation, and the same investment return, see DODGE ET AL, supra note 119, at 475-
76, especially 475 n.8, but absolute equivalence isn't necessary to demonstrate that, at its core, a 
wage tax is a consumption tax. 
123. See Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060 and S. 1050, 104th 
Cong. 
124. Alan L. Fe1d, Living with the Flat Tax, in TAX POLICY IN THE REAL WORLD 95, 95 
(Joel Slemrod ed., 1999). 
125. Any business would be taxed on revenue from sales of goods and services, less costs 
of purchases from suppliers and wages paid to employees. See Hall & Rabushka, A Simple Tax, 
supra note 30, at 29-30. Individuals who aren't treated as businesses would be taxed only on 
wages, salaries, and retirement benefits. See id. at 31-32. 
126. "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of 
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights 
between the beginning and end of the period in question." HENRY C. ~MONS, PERSONAL 
INCOME TAXATION: 1HE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938). 
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were rightly decided, and the only reason a "tax on incomes" need not be 
apportioned is the Sixteenth Amendment. This assumption isn't unfounded, 
but obviously not everyone accepts it. 127 Others believe Sixteenth 
Amendment questions go away because the apportionment rule was 
properly abandoned long ago. 128 For these purposes, however, I'll assume 
the term "taxes on incomes" matters. 
A second assumption gives the meaning of "taxes on incomes" some 
contemporary significance. I assume a direct-consumption tax, like the 
wage portion of the "flat tax" or the USA tax, which would operate on 
individuals very much like a traditional income tax but which would reach 
only the consumption component of income, would be a direct tax. 
This too isn't an unfounded assumption, and it follows from the first 
assumption. A direct-consumption tax is a direct tax for many of the same 
reasons the tax at issue in Pollock was direct. Although both the wage tax 
portion of the flat tax and the USA tax are consumption taxes, they are 
different from the taxes on articles of consumption the founders viewed as 
exempt from apportionment. Neither direct-consumption tax could be 
shifted to other parties in the way the founders understood indirect taxes to 
be shiftable to purchasers of taxed goods. 129 Moreover, neither would be 
127. Professor Zelenak's recent article challenges my Sixteenth Amendment analysis, but 
he also isn't persuaded an income tax is a direct tax. He points to the Supreme Court's dictum 
that a tax reaching only earned income wouldn't have been direct. See Zelenak, supra note 19, 
at 842 (citing Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 637, which suggested tax on income from "professions, 
trades, employments, or vocations" was excise). Zelenak argues the Court did more than "hint" 
(my term, see Jensen, supra note 6, at 2343) about the treatment of earned income, a point 
"central to the Court's analysis, and ... the entire motivation for the Court's discussion of 
severability." Zelenak, supra note 19, at 843. 
Zelenak reads too much into dictum. Concluding that an income tax was direct while 
hinting that a tax on earned income might have been acceptable avoided having to repudiate 
precedent. Focusing on income from real property made the analysis fit Hylton v. United States, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. And the bow to 
earned income avoided reconsideration of Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881) 
(upholding Civil War income tax). 
128. See Johnson, supra note 19 (arguing that the Hylton Court appropriately rejected 
apportionment on cy pres grounds); cf Ackerman, supra note 16 (arguing that apportionment 
was originally limited to real-estate and capitation taxes, and that, because of "social justice," 
"American People," and New Deal Revolution, the Sixteenth Amendment shouldn't be seen as 
a limitation on taxing power). 
129. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text; Jensen, supra note 6, at 2407-08; cf 
MILL, supra note 96, bk. V, ch. 3, '1! 1, at 190 ("Direct taxes are either on income, or on 
expenditure. Most taxes on expenditure are indirect, but some are direct, being imposed rot on 
the producer or seller of an article, but immediately on the consumer."); id. at 199 ("The 
difficulties of a fair income tax have elicited a proposition for a direct tax of so much per cent, 
not on income but on expenditure .... "). 
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avoidable, except by taxpayers willing to forgo earnings or expenditures for 
consumption. 130 
In form, the direct-consumption taxes, as they would apply to 
individuals, look far more like income taxes than like traditional indirect 
taxes; that's one of the reasons they'd be direct taxes. Neither would attach 
to particular purchases of goods or services; 131 both would require taxpayers 
to file returns and make payments of any additional tax due; and both would 
use a version of the existing income-tax system as a starting point for 
computations. 
With those well-founded assumptions-that an income tax is direct and 
that a direct-consumption tax is direct-the stage is set (finally!) to consider 
the meaning of"taxes on incomes." 
IV. THE MEANING OF "TAXES ON INCOMES" 
The Sixteenth Amendment dealt with the practical consequences of the 
Income Tax Cases, but no judicial authority has explicitly repudiated the 
meaning of "direct taxes" that can be derived from those cases and from a 
study of the original understanding of the direct-tax clauses. 132 
A direct-consumption tax like the flat tax or the USA tax couldn't 
possibly be apportioned and do what it's intended to do. But if it's subject 
to the apportionment requirement-and that'll be the case if it's a direct tax 
but not a "tax on incomes"-it won't meet constitutional standards. With 
the perfectly appropriate assumption that a direct-consumption tax is a 
direct tax, the constitutionality of such an unapportioned tax is totally 
dependent on its being treated as a "tax on incomes." I now turn to the 
130. Almost any tax is avoidable at some level. Suicide takes care of capitation tax 
obligations; one doesn't pay income tax if one avoids income; and one doesn't pay a real-estate 
tax if one acquires no real property. But the "should-I-kill-myself?" or "should-I-have-
income?" or "should-I-own-property?" decisions are different from the choice inherent in the 
archetypical indirect tax: Do I buy this particular product and pay the associated tax? If all 
taxes were treated as avoidable because of a limited role for taxpayer choice, nothing would be 
left of "direct taxes," and the term was intended to have effect. 
131. Unlike, say, a value-added tax (VAT) or sales tax, neither of which, I concluded in my 
earlier article, would require apportionment. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2405-07. Now I'm 
not so sure. 
Professor Zelenak accepts my conclusion about a VAT or sales tax, and then focuses on 
what he sees as small differences between such a tax and direct-consumption taxes. If an 
unapportioned VAT would be constitutionally acceptable, he concludes, so too would an 
unapportioned direct-consumption tax. See Zelenak, supra note 19, at 839-41. I was too quick 
to concede the validity of any unapportioned VAT or sales tax. There may be important 
differences between the indirect taxes of the colonial era, avoidable because they dealt with 
targeted goods, and an all-pervasive modem tax. 
132. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2375-77. 
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meaning of that phrase, and I conclude that a direct-consumption tax might 
very well flunk the test. . 
In a recent article, Professor Douglas Kahn dismisses in passing the idea 
that "Congress cannot tax as income an item that does not fall within the 
meaning of 'income' as that term is used in the Sixteenth 
Arnendment." 133 In one sense, Kahn is clearly right. Even before 
ratification of the Amendment, no one doubted Congress could enact an 
income tax, as long as the tax was apportioned (with different tax rates 
applicable in different states). 134 
But I assume Professor Kahn means Congress can enact an unapportioned 
tax that is characterized as being on "income," even if the subject of the tax 
falls outside the meaning of the term "incomes." If that's what he means-
that the Amendment doesn't limit what Congress can tax as "income" 
without apportionment-he must believe the Amendment is surplusage. In 
short, he must believe Congress could, without apportionment, tax as 
income everything encompassed by the phrase "taxes on incomes" whether 
or not the Sixteenth Amendment is on the books. He might also believe, as 
do others, that Congress can, without apportionment, tax as income 
anything Congress says is income, that it's up to Congress to tell us what 
"income" is. 135 
Those are widely held and defensible positions, but if Kahn is wrong-if 
the Income Tax Cases were properly decided-such an argument 
necessarily entails disregarding constitutional text. On its face, the 
language of the Sixteenth Amendment suggests a different principle: 
Without apportionment, Congress can't tax as income something that isn't 
income. Lawyers don't ordinarily disregard statutory language that's 
inconvenient, and we should show at least as much respect for 
constitutional text-including the phrase "taxes on incomes"-as we do for 
language in the Internal Revenue Code. 
133. Douglas A. Kahn, The Constitutionality of Taxing CompensafOTJI Damages for Mental 
Distress When There Was No Accompanying Physical Injury, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 128, 130 (1999). 
134. See Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174 (1926) ("It was not the 
purpose or effect of that Amendment to bring any new subject within the taxing 
power. Congress already had power to tax all incomes."); 1 BORlS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE 
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS~ 1.2.2, at 1-19 (2d ed. 1989) 
(noting apportioned income tax "would have required different rate schedules for each state"); 
FORSYTHE, supra note 32, at 21. 
135. See, e.g., Thuronyi, supra note 12, at 101; Kornhauser, supra note 15, at 24. On a 
different topic, Professor Sugin makes a similar point: "[W]holesale adoption of tax expenditure 
analysis into judicial decisionmaking threatens to constitutionalize the definition of income 
.... " Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 
407, 421 (1999). But, like it or not, a constitutional term already has been constitutionalized. 
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In the following sections, I begin by discussing the relationship between 
the idea of "inherent malleability" and the nature of the Constitution. I then 
turn to the history of the 1894 income tax and the Sixteenth Amendment 
that followed the Supreme Court's rejection of that tax. I argue that 
Congress had definite ideas about what it was doing-to reorient the 
revenue system away from consumption taxes-and that the critical 
language of the Amendment was understood to create an important, but 
limited, exemption from apportionment. After a brief discussion of how 
commentators today continue to see fundamental differences between 
income taxes and consumption taxes, I turn to Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on the Amendment. I demonstrate that, for many years, the Court saw 
limits on what Congress can define as "incomes"-indeed, Congress 
accepted the idea that something isn't income just because Congress says it 
is-and the Court hasn't explicitly overturned the old cases. In the final 
section of this part of the Article, I raise a question for those who reject 
ancient teachings. Even if deference to Congress is generally justified in 
taxation, is deference appropriate under the Amendment in a case in which 
Congress would understand it's enacting a consumption tax, not an income 
tax? 
A. The Nature of the Constitution and "Inherent Malleability" 
To begin with, the notion that the term "taxes on incomes" is, in Victor 
Thuronyi's phrase, "inherently malleable"136 in Congress's hands is 
inconsistent with the idea of the Constitution, indeed of any written 
constitution. 
Yes, the Constitution was intended to increase national power and to 
make a national government possible. But, as we all know, the Constitution 
is full of limitations-it wouldn't have been ratified otherwise-and we 
don't usually think of Congress as having the final say on matters of 
constitutional interpretation. 137 It would be peculiar to interpret a document 
intended, in part, to cabin federal power as granting to Congress nearly 
unlimited authority to determine the limits of its power. 138 
136. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
137. Congress has a say, but we don't usually think of it having the only say. But see 44 
CONG. REC. 4067 (July 3, 1909) (statement of Sen. McLaurin) (arguing Congress ought to enact 
income tax without waiting for constitutional amendment: "I do not see that the Congress ... 
should be called upon to zigzag around the inconsistent rulings of the Supreme Court . . . . I 
believe there are just as good lawyers in the House of Representatives and in the Senate ... as 
there are on the Supreme Bench."). 
138. That the Sixteenth Amendment was added later doesn't change the nature of the 
Constitution. The Amendment had a limited purpose-to overturn the Income Tax Cases; it 
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If their intention was to remove all direct taxes from the apportionment 
requirement, the drafters of the Sixteenth Amendm~nt did a poor job 
indeed. Instead, it was only "taxes on incomes" that were exempted, and 
that decision appears to have been intentional. 139 "Taxes on incomes" may 
not have a precise set of boundaries-what constitutional terms do?-but 
that doesn't mean the term is an empty vessel into which Congress can pour 
whatever definition it wishes. 140 
Perhaps it's the case that, as Professor Joseph Isenbergh has said, the 
"framers [of the Sixteenth Amendment] ... rarely worked on the entire 
canvas at one time," and, as a result, they "may not themselves always have 
understood the full import of the provisions they introduced, and even less 
of the system overall."141 I don't agree that the confusion on basics was so 
great-I'll turn to the history of the Amendment shortly-but suppose it 
was. What interpretational principles would follow? As we all know, good 
(and bad) lawyers can find confusion in the origin of many legal documents, 
including the Internal Revenue Code. We don't usually assume that 
constitutional and statutory provisions become open-ended, or otherwise 
meaningless, simply because they present difficult interpretational tasks. 
In a passage I quoted earlier, Victor Thuronyi may be right, in a way, 
when he argues that "[b]ecause people have different views of tax equity, 
there is no 'true' concept of income." 142 I say he may be right because I'm 
not sure what his statement means. If it's really truth we're after, we 
wouldn't impose a unanimity requirement: one dissenter doesn't make the 
proposition 2 + 2 = 4 any less true. If he means to suggest "income" isn't 
the sort of concept that's unquestionably true or false, I agree, but I'm not 
shouldn't be interpreted to have repealed other constitutional values. As Judge Kozinski and 
Professor Volokh note: 
The notion that every constitutional amendment is a partial repeal of every 
previously-enacted constitutional provision has hair-raising implications. 
Does the Sixteenth Amendment . . . authorize a tax levied only on income 
derived from sale of antigovernment literature, or a tax only on blacks? Does 
it allow collection techniques that violate the Fourth Amendment? 
Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1639, 1650 (1993) 
(footnotes omitted). 
139. See infi·a Part N.B.2.b. The decision may not have been well thought out, but it was a 
decision. 
140. The phrase "inherently malleable" doesn't have to mean "infinitely 
malleable." Because the term has fuzzy edges, Congress inevitably has discretion in defining 
"incomes." But if that's the argument, we're back where we started: What are the limits on 
Congress's power to define something as income? Cf WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION 233 (5th ed. 1999) ("Doesn't the power to tax income necessarily include 
the power, within limits, to define it?'') (emphasis added). 
141. Isenbergh, supra note 28, at 287. 
142. Thuronyi, supra note 12, at 53. 
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sure where that leaves us. Constitutional or statutory concepts don't have to 
be "true," in this sense, to have meaning. There's no "true" concept of 
"unreasonable searches and seizures"-certainly there's no meaning 
everyone agrees on-but we must still try to· discern its legal meaning, just 
as we should have to do with "incomes." And we wouldn't necessarily 
defer to the legislature or the executive to make the final determination as to 
what constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure. 143 
Thuronyi' s missile example also misses the mark. 144 He's right that a 
constitutional challenge to deployment of a particular missile system would 
(and should) go nowhere in court. But that's an easy case. Whether or not 
it performs as it should, a missile is going to be considered an item for 
defense; no court would evaluate the extent to which a particular missile-
an item that has no possible non-defense uses-in fact contributes to the 
national defense. 
Let's get closer to reality (or as close as we can after putting standing 
issues aside). Does Thuronyi mean to suggest any expenditure would be 
constitutionally acceptable simply because Congress declared it to be for 
national defense? (The practical answer may be "Yes," in that no court is 
likely to invalidate a purported defense statute, but I want to examine the 
impractical interpretational issue.) The defense umbrella covers a lot, but 
does it cover everything-as long as a few congressmen mumble the word 
"defense" during the deliberations? If constitutional language is that 
malleable, then there are effectively no constitutional limitations on 
congressional power. 
In any event, that's not the sort of challenge that would be made to a 
direct-consumption tax. In questioning whether such a tax is on incomes, 
we wouldn't be doing the equivalent of second guess!ng Congress's 
judgment about the military capabilities of something that's unquestionably 
a weapon. We would be asking whether a purported weapon is really a 
weapon, whether a purported income tax is really a tax on incomes. In 
neither case should the answer be "Yes" just because Congress says it is. 145 
143. Individual rights and economic rights have different statuses under modem 
constitutional analysis, with deference to the legislature much more likely when economic rights 
are arguably infringed upon. Even then, however, the legislature's power to defme the scope of 
the right isn't boundless. 
144. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
145. Suppose Congress enacted an unapportioned national real-estate tax, and, in doing so, 
said it recognized that historically such a tax was considered to be a direct tax, but that the tax 
should be treated as a "tax on incomes." Would that characterization necessarily control? 
One might argue that Pollock said a tax on income from property was in substance a tax on 
the property, and the reverse should be true as well: an ad valorem real-estate tax is in substance 
on the present value of the future income stream of the property. Cf infra note 379 (discussing 
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I suppose the argument being advanced by plenary-power proponents is 
that the term "taxes on incomes" is something like "public use." Property 
can be taken under the power of eminent domain only if it will be put to a 
public use, 146 and, in the nineteenth century, the phrase was thought to have 
judicially enforceable content. But the criteria developed to distinguish 
public from private use have broken down, and there's little left of the 
public use doctrine as a limitation on legislative power. It's the legislature 
that defines what "public use" is, just as the legislature defines "general 
14~ 
welfare." 1 Phrases like these, the argument goes, have lost any enforceable 
content they might once have had. 
Whatever the merits of permitting a legislature to define public use or 
general welfare without judicial review, "taxes on incomes" is a different 
sort of term. On its face, it defines a narrower concept, and it applies to a 
form of congressional power, taxation, that is inherently coercive-and that 
comes without the built-in protections that apply to the power of eminent 
domain. 148 
At a minimum, the uncertainty about the meaning of the Sixteenth 
Amendment ought to cause us to pull back and reconsider what it means to 
say Congress can define what a "tax on incomes" is. If we say Congress 
has that power, what's the practical effect? When the Supreme Court says a 
constitutional phrase means X Congress and the executive must follow that 
definition. But when Congress does the defining, is there an effect on any 
other governmental body or on Congress itself? 149 Congress can't tie its 
own hands in the future by defining "incomes" narrowly today, or can it? 150 
Schenk article). But there's dictum calling that argument into question, see Helvering v. Indep. 
Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378 (1934), and it's not what income tax proponents had in 
mind. See infra Part IV.B.3. In any event, real-estate taxes also typically apply to property, like 
personal residences, that generate only imputed income. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2374. 
146. See supra note 1 0. 
14 7. See supra note 11. 
148. The requirement that compensation be paid for a taking constrains the legislature from 
defining "public use" in an excessively broad way. It serves the "role of surrogate assurance of 
public purpose." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 590 (2d ed. 1988). 
149. Professor Stephen Carter defended the constitutionality of the War Powers Act, 
limiting presidential power to send American troops into hostilities without congressional 
approval, by arguing, inter alia, that Congress has necessarily defined what "war" means under 
Article I. (The President is commander-in-chief, but Congress has the power to declare 
war.) Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 
101, 116-17 (1984). Courts historically refused to define "war," leaving a vacuum that had to be 
filled by another branch. Moreover, if Congress didn't define "war," presidential power to use 
military force without a declaration of war would be unchecked. In this context, there's 
inevitably an inter-branch dispute where each branch tries to define the scope of its own power, 
and thus to serve as a check on the other. No similar dispute arises in defining "incomes," and, 
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The idea that Congress can define the meaning of "taxes on incomes" 
seems to mean nothing other than that the term has no limiting content at 
all, and what Congress enacts in the taxing area is ipso facto constitutional. 
That's the plenary-power argument in its starkest form, and it's a commonly 
accepted position. But it's not mandated by constitutional text or the nature 
of the Constitution. 
B. The Income Tax as a Reaction to the Perceived 
Inadequacies ofConsumption Taxes 
In this section I argue that the history leading to the Sixteenth 
Amendment gives content to the meaning of "taxes on incomes" in this 
important respect: the move to an income tax in the late nineteenth century 
was motivated by the inadequacies of consumption taxes. Consumption 
taxes and income taxes weren't considered to be functional equivalents, and 
the term "taxes on incomes" therefore shouldn't be assumed to include a tax 
on consumption. That's why we should be skeptical the term would 
encompass a tax, like the flat tax or the USA tax, which picks up only the 
consumption component of income. 
From the beginning, supporters of the modern income tax stressed that it 
was necessary to tie taxation to ability to pay-to ensure the wealthy who 
had benefitted from the American system would pay their fair share of the 
nation's tax liability. Ability to pay was also offered as a justification for 
graduating an income tax, of course-for taxing higher levels of income at 
higher rates. 151 But even a proportional income tax-a tax imposed at a flat 
rate-was seen as consistent with ability to pay, 152 particularly when 
contrasted with the consumption taxes that had dominated the national 
revenue system through most of the nation's history. By taxing more than 
what was spent on consumption and, as a result, reaching the wealthy in a 
way that tariffs didn't, the income tax was considered fundamentally 
different from taxes on consumption. In Professor Graetz's words, "[W]hen 
this nation adopted the Sixteenth Amendment, achieving fairness in the 
in any event, courts haven't always been reluctant to grapple with the meaning of 
"incomes." See infra Part IV.D. 
150. In a sense, that doesn't happen with Court decisions either. But generally the Court 
won't change direction without explaining; it feels constrained by history in a way Congress 
doesn't. 
151. But see WALTER I. BLUM& HARRYKALVEN JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE 
TAXATION 64-70 (1953) (criticizing ability to pay as justification for progressive rates). 
152. All income taxes seriously proposed in the late nineteenth century were progressive in 
that each had a substantial exemption amount, with the nominally flat rate coming into play 
only for high incomes. 
1092 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
distribution of the tax burden was the essential reason for taxing income and 
for taxing it at progressive rates." 153 
Commentators generally see the late nineteenth-, early twentieth-century 
proponents of an income tax as trying to reorient the tax system. 154 As 
historian Gerald Eggert put it in describing the background of the 1894 
income tax, an important precursor to the Sixteenth Amendment: 
Congressional debates made i:t clear ... that the tax was, in part, a 
response to the widespread demand to equalize the tax burdens 
borne by the various classes. The tariff, which was the federal 
government's chief source of revenue, lay most heavily on the 
poorer classes-ran the argument-while the proposed income tax 
would be paid by the wealthier classes. 155 
Edward Whitney (Assistant Attorney General at the time of the Income Tax 
Cases) explained the 1894 tax in the same way: "The [Democratic] party 
controlling the House of Representatives, accepting the theory that the 
prevailing taxes on consumption bore especially hard on the smaller 
incomes, undertook to make up the deficit with a compensatory duty upon 
the larger ones." 156 
I focus on the intellectual history of the Sixteenth Amendment because 
the distinction between income taxes and consumption taxes is essential in 
understanding what the Amendment was intended to do. As is true with 
any project of this sort, I can't prove beyond a reasonable doubt that debates 
on the modem income tax support my conclusions. Moreover, I can't 
pretend debates focused on nothing but the income-versus-consumption 
distinction. For example, the 1894 income tax came into being as an 
amendment to a tariffrevision.bill, and Congressmen fought a lot over tariff 
details. Even when the focus was the income tax, there were discussions 
about what, for my purposes, are secondary points-like the extent of 
governmental intrusion into private affairs required to enforce an income 
tax. 157 
153. MICHAELJ. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 222 (1997). 
154. An exception is ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: 
0RIGINSOFTHE FEDERALINCOME TAX, 1861-1913 (1993) (characterizing tax as means to cut 
off far-reaching reform). 
155. Gerald G. Eggert, Richard Olney and the Income Tax Cases, 48 MISS. VALLEY HIST. 
REv. 24, 24-25 (1961). 
156. Edward B. Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 20 HARV. L. REV. 280, 284 
(1907). Whitney's use of the term "duty" was no accident; he believed the income tax was one 
of the "Duties, Imposts and Excises" subject to the uniformity rule but not the apportionment 
requirement. Id. at 292-93. 
157. See infra note 237 and accompanying text. 
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All of this makes it possible for critics to accuse me of having 
oversimplified historical reality. Critics can also mine the primary sources 
for arguably contrary material; I've certainly organized the materials in my 
own idiosyncratic way. I admit my limitations, but I've tried to be 
scrupulous in my use of sources. Critics can disagree with my emphases-
or with the relevance of any of this to understanding the Sixteenth 
Amendment-but I'm confident I'm not misrepresenting the historical 
record. 
1. The 1894 Income Tax and Its Predecessor 
The history of the Sixteenth Amendment began shortly after the Garden 
of Eden, I suppose, but for present purposes we can begin in the late 
nineteenth century. Arguments made in debates on the 1894 income tax 
were, in substance, no different from those that would be made, after the 
Supreme Court rejected that tax, in promoting and resisting the 
Amendment. Controversies from the early 1890s until ratification in 1913 
can be seen as a continuing discussion about the role income taxes should 
play in the United States. And that controversy illuminates the meaning of 
"taxes on incomes." 
The debate really began at the end of the Civil War, which had been 
funded in part by the first national income tax, a graduated tax applying to 
incomes over $600. 158 Enacted in 1862, the tax was an emergency 
measure. 
159 But it had some inherent appeal 160-it supplemented the 
158. See Act ofJuly 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 89-93, 12 Stat. 432, 473-75 (imposing 3% tax on 
"annual gains, profits, or income of every person residing in the United States" above $600, 
with 5% rate applicable over $10,000). In 1864, rates increased to 5, 7-1/2, and 10% for income 
ranges $600-$5000,$5000-$10,000, and over $10,000, respectively. See Act of June 30, 1864, 
ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 223, 281; see also Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) 
(upholding unapportioned Civil War income tax); SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 430-80; PAUL, 
supra note 84, at 9-15; JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX 67-70 (1985). 
159. See ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (1940); 
WITTE, supra note 158, at 69. Not until 1894 did many think such a tax might become a 
permanent part of the revenue system. Even during debates on the Sixteenth Amendment, some 
congressmen thought the tax would play a limited role, except in wartime. See W. Elliot 
Brownlee, Tax Regimes, National Crisis, and State-Building in America, in FUNDING THE 
MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 1941-1995, at 37, 59 (W. Elliot Brownlee ed., 1996). 
160. The B1akeys said "[f]ew had anything good to say for it," BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra 
note 159, at 7, but Ratner argued that "the great mass of the people were not interested in having 
the income tax repealed." SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 143 
(1967). Nevertheless, the wealthy who accepted it "as an emergency measure ... lobbied 
vigorously" for repeal, and "[1] ittle organized support emerged for permanent income 
taxation." BROWNLEE, supra note 105, at 29. 
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consumption tax system with a "tax that bore a closer relationship to 'ability 
to pay' than did tariffs and excises"161-and it survived, in modified form, 
until1872. 162 
It could have lasted longer. There was sentiment among some 
congressmen to make the income tax a permanent part of the national 
system. Ohio Senator John Sherman, for one prominent example, made 
several strong statements in the early 1870s in support of retaining the Civil 
War tax. Tothe embarrassment of Sherman, who opposed the 1894 tax, 163 
those statements were repeated by tax supporters in 1894: an income tax is 
fair, it reaches the wealthy, and it doesn't have the unfortunate effects of 
consumption taxes. 164 In one often-quoted speech, Sherman said the public 
is not yet prepared to apply the only key to a genuine revenue 
reform. A few years of further experience will convince the body 
of our people that a system of national taxes which rests the whole 
burden of taxation on consumption, and not one cent on property 
or income, is intrinsically unjust. . . . [T]he consumption of the 
rich does not bear the same relation to the consumption of the poor 
as the income of the one does to the wages of the other. 165 
Whatever its intellectual justification, the Civil War tax expired because 
by the early 1870s there was no longer an urgent need for revenue; tariffs 
were bringing in enough to keep the country going. But good economic 
161. BROWNLEE, supra note 105, at 25. 
162. Rates were reduced by the Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 478 
(imposing tax of 5% on incomes above $1000), and the Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, §§ 6-11, 
16 Stat. 256, 257-59 (imposing tax of 2-1/2% on incomes over $2000). The effect was to 
reduce the number of taxpayers from 460,170 in 1866 to 72,949 in 1872. See RATNER, supra 
note 160, at 143. 
163. See 26 CONG. REc. 6694-95 (June 22, 1894) (statement of Sherman that he agreed in 
1894 with what he'd said in the 1870s, but conditions had changed, income tax was no longer 
necessary, the exemption level proposed in the 1894 legislation was unacceptable, and so on); 
infra note 234. 
164. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REc. app. 315 (Jan. 31, 1894) (statement of Ind. Rep. Elijah V. 
Brookshire); 26 CONG. REc. 6685 (June 22, 1894) (statement of S.D. Sen. James H. Kyle). 
165. Internal Taxes ani Tariff(statement ofMar. 15, 1872), reprinted in JOHN SHERMAN, 
SELECTED SPEECHES ON FINANCE AND TAXATION, FROM 1859 TO 1878, at 336, 348-49 
(1879). In fighting repeal, Sherman regularly contrasted the income tax with consumption 
taxes. See, e.g., Receipts and Expenditures-Reduction of Taxation (statement of May 23, 
1870), in SHERMAN, supra, at 284, 291 ("The real objection to [customs duties] is that they fall 
entirely on consumption."); id. at 297 ("The only discrimination in our tax laws that will reach 
wealthy men ... is the income tax .... [T]he income tax is the only tax levied by us that bears 
upon property in any shape or manner. All the rest of our taxes, both internal and external, are 
taxes on consumption."); Income Tax (statement of Jan. 25, 1871), in SHERMAN, supra, at 317, 
318 ("[I]t is proposed to single out this tax from all others-this tax that bears most severely 
upon us and upon those best able to pay-and to repeal it, leaving undisturbed all the taxes that 
bear upon the consumption of the necessaries of life."). 
33:1057] THE TAXING POWER 1095 
times didn't last, and demands on government increased. The period 
between the 1872 expiration of the Civil War tax and the enactment of the 
1894 income tax saw several panics and depressions, including one in 1893 
(which gave a sense of immediacy to the 1894 debates). 166 That period 
nevertheless also saw an astonishing accumulation of wealth by some very 
visible Americans. The contrast between wealth and suffering was one of 
the reasons several radical political parties, including the People's 
(Populist) party, were created in the late nineteenth century. 167 
The 1894 income tax is often called a populist measure, 168 and the 
People's party was in the forefront of the income tax movement. In 1892, 
the platform of the party, meeting "'in the midst of a nation brought to the 
verge of moral, political and material ruin,"'169 proclaimed, "We demand a 
graduated income tax. "170 The reason for the plank was obvious: populists 
thought the wealthy weren't paying their fair share under the tariff 
regime. Populist Senator William A. Peffer of Kansas said bluntly: "We 
propose to equalize taxation as far as it is possible to do so, and we propose 
to make the wealth of the country bear its just and fair proportion of the 
taxes ofthe country." 171 
The income tax had populist antecedents and populist support; no similar 
plank had appeared in the Democratic and Republican platforms. But the 
People's party didn't have enough power to get its way without help, and 
166. See Ackerman, supra note 16, at 28 ("It was a moment of raging class war, catalyzed 
by the Panic of 1893, and the subsequent use of federal troops to break the Great Pullman Strike 
.... "). 
167. See RATNER, supra note 160, at 145-67. 
168. E.g., KYVIG, supra note 87, at 194-96 (1996); see also LoUIS EISENSTEIN, THE 
IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 16 (1961) ("Our income tax ... was deliberately devised as a partisan 
measure against specific segments of American society. It was born of class politics and on the 
wrong side of the street."); Brownlee, supra note 159, at 53-54 ("During the severe economic 
depression of the mid-1890s, the pressures for progressive tax reform from western and 
southern Populists became strong enough to begin to shift the position of the leadership of the 
Democratic Party."); SHELDON D. POLLACK, THE FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY 47 (1996) 
(saying enactment of income tax was "largely at the instigation of Populists"); Matjorie E. 
Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 
70 IND. L.J. 119, 137 ("The 1894 tax emerged partly as a result of the Democratic victory in the 
1892 election, the economic recession accompanying the panic of 1893, and widespread popular 
unrest, evidenced by Populist and labor movement revolts against lowered wages, growing 
'trusts,' and the rapid urbanization of the country."). 
169. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 159, at 10 (quoting THE ANNuAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
(1892)). 
170. Quoted in 26 CONG. REc. app. 601 (Jan. 30, 1894) (statement of Populist Colorado 
Rep. Lafe Pence) (emphasis added). Similar demands were made by the Greenback and Anti-
Monopoly parties, and by the Knights of Labor. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 159, at lO-
ll. 
171. 26 CONG. REC. 6634 (June 21, 1894). 
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the idea of an explicitly graduated tax fell by the wayside quickly. 
Nevertheless, the allure of an income tax was UIUJ?.istakable to many 
members of the old-line parties, particularly Democrats, who had taken 
control of both Houses of Congress and who saw an opportunity for party 
realignment. 172 Consumption taxes like tariffs were thought to be shifted to 
purchasers, 173 and, if that was right, a poor man bore the same tax burden in 
buying a bag of sugar as did a rich man. The tax burdens, that is, had 
nothing to do with respective abilities to pay the taxes, and that wasn't fair. 
The difference between an income tax and a consumption tax-one's 
consistent with ability to pay; one's not-was stressed throughout the 
debates. The legislation began in the House of Representatives 174-"A 
Populist Chicken Enters the House," wrote Randolph Paul 175-where 
Democratic Representatives Benton McMillin of Tennessee, chairman of 
the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Internal Revenue and a longtime 
proponent of income taxation, 176 and the .already legendary William 
Jennings Bryan of Nebraska recommended a two-percent tax on incomes of 
$4000 or more. That proposal, with changes in detail, in many ways 
mirrored the Civil War income tax, and it survived the subsequent 
legislative wrangling as an amendment to a major tariff revision bi11.177 
McMillin explained the income tax legislation in this way: 
I ask of any reasonable person whether it is unjust to expect that a 
small per cent of this enormous revenue shall be placed upon the 
accumulated wealth of the country instead of placing all upon the 
172. See BROWNLEE, supra note 105, at38 (arguing that Democrats "sensed an opportunity 
to use tax issues for a major realignment of the two political parties along sectional and class 
lines .... ")(footnote omitted). 
173. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REC. app. 406 (Jan. 30, 1894) (statement of Mo. Rep. David A. De 
Armond) ("A tariff is a tax, and the foreigner does not pay it. It is paid by the consumer, and is 
a tax on consumption .... And the income tax is a measure of relief to the poor, and a just 
demand upon the stores of the wealthy."). This was consistent with the founders' understanding 
of the incidence of indirect taxes. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
174. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the 
House of Representatives .... "). President Cleveland played little role. He'd called for "a 
small tax upon incomes derived from land and certain corporate investments." Quoted in 
SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 496. But while he "regarded the tax on personal incomes as just, 
[it was] politically inexpedient ... since it would antagonize the financial interests to whom 
[Democrats] looked for support of the gold standard." RATNER, supra note 160, at 173-
74. Cleveland allowed the bill to become law without his signature. !d. at 189. 
175. PAUL; supra note 84, at 32; see also BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 159, at 5 ("The 
Democratic hen hatches a populist chicken."). 
176. McMillin had repeatedly introduced income tax legislation in the 1880s. See RATNER, 
supra note 160, at 172. 
177. A lot of parliamentary maneuvering focused on whether the income tax would stand 
on its own or would be an amendment to the tariff bill. RATNER, supra note 160, at 174-75. 
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consumption of the people. . . . And yet when it is proposed to 
shift this burden from those who can not bear it to those who can; 
to divide it between consumption and wealth; to shift it from the 
laborer who has nothing but his power to toil and sweat, to the 
man who has a fortune made or inherited, we hear a hue and cry 
raised by some individuals that it is unjust and inquisitorial in its 
nature .... 178 
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The wealthy weren't paying their share because of the form American 
taxation had taken-taxes on consumption. High and low income people 
who, McMillin posited, spend about the same on necessities "pay the same 
taxes to the Government, because taxes are to be paid upon what they 
consume!" 179 
Many other congressmen, like Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado, 
made the same questionable point, that the rich were paying no more than 
the poor under the tariff system: "The man who holds millions of dollars' 
worth of property pays no more, perhaps, under the general taxes levied 
upon consumption than the man who has not any property." 180 Other 
income tax supporters went further, suggesting the rich might even have 
been paying less than the poor. Populist Senator Orner M. Ken of 
Nebraska, for example, compared a hypothetical poor man. who consumes 
his entire income providing necessities for his family to a wealthy miser 
who owns a thousand times as muqh property but spends almost nothing: 
Since each is taxed in proportion to the amount he consumes, it can 
readily be seen that this poor man will con1ribute ten times as much 
to the support of the Government as this old bachelor millionaire, 
although the latter receives from the Government protection for 
one thousand times as much property as the former. . . . Should 
not this burden be shifted from the shoulders of the man who is 
struggling to feed, clothe, and educate his family to the shoulders 
of the financial giant who is more than able to bear it? 181 
178. 26 CONG. REC. app. 413 (Jan. 29, 1894). 
179. 26 CONG. REC. app. 415 (Jan. 29, 1894). 
180. 26 CONG. REC. 6692 (June 22, 1894). Teller was at the time nominally a Republican, 
but he later became a Silver Republican and then a Democrat. 
181. 26 CONG. REC. app. 293 (Jan. 31, 1894) (discussing People's party platform); see also 
26 CONG. REc. 1656 (Jan. 30, 1894) (statement of William Jennings Bryan); 26 CONG. REc. 
6866 (June 27, 1894) (statement of Mo. Sen. George G. Vest) ("The poor man pays as much as 
the rich man, the man worth $5,000 pays as much as the man worth $100,000,000 and in some 
instances he pays a great deal more, because he buys possibly better clothing and better food."); 
Uriel S. Hall, An Income Tax: Reasons in Its Favor, 17 FORUM 14, 15 (1894) ("Under our tariff 
system its burdens are put upon consumption (the necessaries of life that the poor must have or 
perish), and a poor man with a wife and five children is forced to pay out of his small income a 
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It's hard to imagine that, on the average, the rich weren't paying far 
more in tariffs than the poor, something opponents, of the income tax 
pointed out. 182 But, silliness aside-opponents provided their absurd 
examples, too 183-the income tax supporters made an important point: a 
rich man with ten times the income or wealth of a poor man might pay more 
in consumption taxes, but he probably didn't pay anything close to ten times 
as much. 184 Assuming the burden of tariffs was shifted to consumers, the 
poor man almost certainly paid a higher percentage of his income and 
wealth in taxes than did the rich, as Senator Sherman had posited in 
1872. 185 And, said McMillin, the relative burdens on the poor had been 
growing: "The taxes having continually increased upon consumption, and 
no corresponding increase having been placed upon accumulation, we see 
such colossal fortunes amassed as were never concentrated in any other age 
or in any other country of the world."186 
Having the wealthy pay more to support the government was thought to 
be fair in and of itself.-"[M]y idea," said North Carolina Senator Thomas J. 
Jarvis, "is that, in imposing these burdens of taxation, the heaviest burdens 
should be put upon those best able to bear them, and the least burdens upon 
those least able to bear them" 187-but there were other reasons why tax 
obligations should be connected with ability to pay. For one thing, income 
tax supporters believed the rich had disproportionately benefitted from 
national policies. The rich were rich because of what government had done, 
and it was payback time to Uncle Sam. Stated Michigan Representative 
George F. Richardson: "I favor the income tax because it is asking a 
contribution of those citizens of the country who have accumulated great 
wealth and enjoy large incomes by reason of special privileges afforded by 
larger sum for the support of the government than is the average man of great wealth with a 
small family."). 
182. For example, New York Senator David Bennett Hill stated that a "tariff duty is an 
indirect tax upon consumption, and wealth pays its share of whatever it consumes. There are no 
classes exempt from its operation, and the greater the consumption the larger is the tax." 26 
CONG. REC. 6616 (June 21, 1894). Hill added, "The property of the country-its stable and 
acquired wealth-should be reached by direct taxation, while indirect taxation reaches whatever 
we consume." Id. at 6618; see also infra note 191 (statement of Rep. Cockran to similar effect). 
183. For example, Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts stated that "[u]nder this 
[income tax] plan a man who consumes all he raises in luxurious living escapes altogether, 
while the man who earns and is paid wages which he has to expend for the honest and frugal 
support and education of his family is taxed." 26 CONG. REC. 6630 (June 21, 1894): 
184. Cf BUENKER, supra note 84, at 31 (noting that, after Civil War, "[n]ot until the 
enactment of the 1909 corporate excise tax was there any federal tax which did not fall directly 
on what [Seligman] referred to as 'things men eat and wear."'). 
185. See supra text accompanying note 165. 
186. 26 CONG. REC. app. 415 (Jan. 29, 1894). 
187. 26 CONG. REC. 6717 (June 22, 1894). 
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legislation." 188 Moreover, the wealthy received more from government-
the value of protecting property, for example, goes up with the value of 
property protected, or so it was argued-and income tax proponents argued 
that the wealthy should have to pay for the extra services. 189 
Finally, the case for an income tax had a civic-virtue component. Some 
thought participation in politics by the wealthy was skewed by their 
disproportionately low tax bills. As Representative Josiah Patterson of 
Tennessee not very persuasively explained: 
It would be ideally just and equitable to make the separate incomes 
of all the citizens contribute accordingly as they have prospered, to 
make up at least in part the aggregate income required to maintain 
the Government. . . . Under the system now existing, where all 
revenues of the Government are raised by means of taxes imposed 
on articles of daily consumption, the reverse is the case. Those who 
own wealth are not only exempt from the imposition of public 
burdens, but they are reckless and extravagant in all public 
d. 190 expen 1tures. 
If the wealthy had to pay more in taxes, the argument went, they would pay 
more attention to government and help curb its excesses. 191 
To conform to ability-to-pay standards, tax law had to relieve burdens on 
consumption. That was the constant theme advanced by income tax 
supporters. The House Ways and Means Committee report on the legislation 
made the point like this: "The wealth of this country amounts to more than 
$65,000,000,000, and the question arises whether it is not just and fair that a 
188. 26 CONG. REc. app. 271 (Jan. 31, 1894); see also 26 CONG. REC. 6706-07 (June 22, 
1894) (statement of Neb. Sen. Allen). 
189. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 181 (statement of Sen. Ken). 
190. 26 CONG. REC. app. 76 (Jan. 23, 1894). 
191. Opponents responded that an income tax would harm participation by both the poor 
and the rich. New York Representative William Bourke Cockran, a Tammany Democrat, said 
democracy required those participating in government to be subject to taxation: "[EJnactment 
[of the income tax) will be the entering wedge in a system of oppressive class legislation, which 
is certain to provoke retaliatory measures and which, by excluding the majority of our citizens 
from participation in the burdens of government, will ultimately result in limiting their 
participation in the control of the government." 26 CONG. REc. app. 463 (Jan. 30, 1894); see 
also RATNER, supra note 160, at 178-79. In a dramatic response, William Jennings Bryan 
discussed the poor: "If taxation is a badge of freedom, let me assure my friend. that the poor 
people of this country are covered all over with the insignia of freemen." 26 CONG. REc. 1656 
(Jan. 30, 1894). And, responding to a letter in the New York World arguing that, with an income 
tax, the wealthy might leave the country, Bryan added: "Of all the mean men I have ever 
known, I have never known one so mean that I would be willing to say of him that his 
patriotism was less than 2 per cent deep .... If 'some of our best people' prefer to leave the 
country rather than pay a tax of2 per cent, God pity the worst .... " 26 CONG. REc. 1658 (Jan. 
30, 1894); see WITTE, supra note 158, at 72-73. 
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portion of this money should be raised by a tax on the earnings of wealth 
instead of imposing it all, or nearly all, on consumption." 192 It was this 
argument, says Professor Ronald King, that the "main body of Democratic 
representatives found convincing": 
The income tax was proposed . . . because it would bring some 
greater justice to the federal revenue system, because it was seen 
as a first step in compelling dominant classes to contribute their 
appropriate share to the maintenance of the public sector. . . . 
[T]he purpose was to compensate for the penalties placed on 
1 . 193 popu ar consumption .... 
A nice summary of the arguments in support of the 1894 income tax is 
found in an article published atthe time by Missouri Representative Uriel S. 
Hall, "often called 'the father of the income tax' because of his persistent 
pressure on behalf of the tax." 194 Why an income tax? So that "the wealth 
of this country should help to bear the burden of national taxation," 195 
something that wasn't happening "[u]nder our tariff system [where] its 
burdens are put upon consumption."196 
The evidence is overwhelming. Populist Representative T. J. Hudson of 
Kansas argued, for example, that the income tax "relieves from taxation 
very largely the necessities consumed by the poor and struggling masses 
and places at least a portion of the burdens upon superfluity." 197 The 
governing principle is that "superfluous wealth, instead of the necessities of 
life, shall pay the taxes necessary to support the Govenrment [sic]."198 Or, 
as Arkansas Representative Hugh A. Dinsmore put it, "We propose to tax 
the accumulated wealth of the country rather than the consumption .... " 199 
A sampling of quotations will demonstrate how pervasive the discussion 
about the distinction between income taxes and consumption taxes was in 
the 1894 debates: 
Representative Josiah Patterson (Tennessee): 
I have heard it said [the income tax] would be a discriminating 
tax. This can only be so on the assumption that it would be class 
legislation to tax property, and that taxes to be just ought to be 
imposed exclusively on articles of consumption. Such an 
192. H.R. REP. No. 53-276, at 3 (1894). 
193. RONALD F. KING, MONEY, TIME, & POLITICS 95 (1993). 
194. PAUL, supra note 84, at 37. 
195. Hall, supra note 181, at 14. 
196. Id. at 15. 
197. 26 CONG. REC. app. 57 (Jan. 15, 1894). 
198. Id. 
199. 26 CONG. REC. app. 275 (Jan. 29, 1894). 
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assumption is revolting alike to every sentiment of humanity and 
. . 200 JUStice. 
Representative Henry A. Coffeen (Wyoming): "The tariff method of 
tax;ation is aptly termed a tax on the wants or necessities of the people, for it 
is paid generally unconsciously in the shape of an increase of the price on 
nearly all necessary articles that the people must buy."201 But "an income 
tax is paid only by those who have large annual incomes,"202 and "Who 
would not prefer a light tax on the abundance or ability of people, rather 
than a heavy tax on the want and inability of the poor?"203 
Representative Elijah V. Brookshire (Indiana): "[The income tax] 
relieves consumption, and therefore gives relief where it should be given in 
fact." 204 
Representative David A. De Armond (Missouri): "The income tax is a 
levy upon the full purse, upon the riches in the strong-box of wealth."205 De 
Armond was "in favor of taxing wealth according to its abundance rather 
than poverty according to its necessities."206 
Representative Clifton R. Breckinridge (Arkansas): 
You can tax, as we do under our existing tariff and excise system, 
the consumption of the people, the necessaries of life, and the 
luxuries of life, and if a man be but a farthing above the point of 
starvation, under a system which taxes consumption we impose a 
burden upon him. But under this system what a man has above 
what he spends pays no Federal tax at all. In taxing incomes we 
pursue a far more enlightened policy. 207 
Senator Henry M. Teller (Colorado): "It has been asserted here and it has 
been asserted elsewhere that a tax upon consumption and consumption 
alone does not properly distribute the burdens of taxation among the 
people."208 
Senator George G. Vest (Missouri): "The theory of the income-tax law ... 
is that the citizen pays upon consumption under the present system of 
taxation in the United States. In my judgment it is an unjust and unequal 
200. 26 CONG. REC. app. 76 (Jan. 23, 1894). 
201. 26 CONG. REC. app. 289 (Jan. 30, 1894). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. 26 CONG. REC. app. 315 (Jan. 31, 1894). 
205. 26 CONG. REC. app. 405 (Jan. 30, 1894). 
206. 26 CONG. REC. app. 406 (Jan. 30, 1894). 
207. 26 CONG. REC. app. 439 (Jan. 30, 1894). 
208. 26 CONG. REC. 6692 (June 22, 1894). 
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taxation."209 He asked rhetorically, "Why should a man pay not upon his 
property but upon his wants, his consumption?"210 
Senator James Z. George (Mississippi): "If the humble are to be taxed 
for Federal purposes, as they are in the tax on consumption in all that they 
eat, in all that they wear, in all that they consume, ... the wealthy ... ought 
not to ... claim an exemption from a tax so light as this."211 
And so on. Trust me, there are many, many more examples. I'm not 
making this up. 
It's possible to lose the income-tax-versus-consumption-tax thread in the 
1894 congressional debates because there was a lot of bombast along the 
way, some of it downright personal and nasty, 212 and some of it (on both 
sides) conjuring images of class warfare and revolution. For example, 
South Dakota Senator James H. Kyle, an independent of Populist bent, 
condemned the "thirty years with Shylock in power," noting that "[t]o 
refuse to see the suppressed wrath of a country full of honest laborers is 
unstatesmanlike; nay, more, it is criminally wrong."213 He added, 
Revolutions have occured [sic] with less ferment than we see in 
the United States to-day. Nero fiddled while Rome was burning, 
and the capitalistic press of the United States to-day jeer and taunt 
the efforts of the bond-burdened serfs on the farms and in the 
workshops who attempt to rise from their pitiful condition. 214 
But the statements of the revolution-may-be-coming-if-we-don't-do-
something sort are perfectly consistent with ability to pay. For example, 
209. 26 CONG. REc. 6866 (June 27, 1894) (discussing whether there should be income 
exempt from corporate income tax). 
210. Id. ' 
211. 26 CONG. REc. 6819 (June 26, 1894) (discussing whether interest paid by state and 
local governments should be taxed). 
212. At one point, New York Representative William Bourke Cockran, a vehement 
opponent of the income tax, had referred to the tax as "an assault on Democratic institutions." 
26 CONG. REc. app. 463 (Jan. 30, 1894); see also supra note 191. George F. Richardson of 
Michigan responded that Cockran 
has become a millionaire through active operations in protected industries, 
and yet he is determined to contribute no more to the payment of his own 
salary than does the limping, limbless defender of the stars and stripes who 
has neither wealth nor income except what he can earn in broken health, 
together with the pension provided by law. What a spectacle! A member of 
Congress not only pleading for continued protection who has a large share of 
the business in his own city that yields an average profit of 24 per cent, but 
he insists that none of that income shall be taxed to liquidate the obligations 
to that roll of honor, the pension roll. 
26 CONG. REC. app. 272 (Jan. 31, 1894). 
213. 26 CONG. REC. 6686 (June 22, 1894). 
214. Id. 
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taxing on that basis is what Representative Dinsmore of Arkansas meant 
when he said "the hand of the tax-gatherer shall loosen its grasp, held so 
long and so firmly on the necks of the poor, and shall bear more heavily 
upon the rich, who are abler to meet its demands."215 So, too, with 
Representative Hudson of Kansas: "[T]he majority of the very wealthy are 
haughty, overbearing, autocratic, mean, and it is that class in particular that 
the income tax is designed to reach."216 The wealthy should pay because 
they can pay, and they weren't paying their share with only consumption 
taxes on the books. 
Because of the push for fairness, the disputes inevitably had a class-
versus-class flavor. With a proposed rate of only two percent, the charges 
of socialism seem a bit much: 217 "vicious, socialistic and un-American";218 
"the most socialistic measure which was ever enacted in this country";219 
and "a measure of purely socialistic tendency,"220 noted several 
authors. But there was a class aspect to the legislation. The tax affected 
only one percent of the population, the legislative attack on the wealthiest of 
the wealthy was no accident, and, once the principle of an income tax had 
been accepted, there was no guarantee rates would stay low.221 James C. 
Carter, representing a bank nominally defending the tax before the Supreme 
Court, conceded it was "class legislation in th[ e] sense [of distinguishing 
between rich and poor]. That was its very object and purpose."222 With 
that proposition it's hard to disagree.223 
215. 26 CONG. REC. app. 275 (Jan. 29, 1894). 
216. 26 CoNG. REc. app. 57 (Jan. 15, 1894); see also 26 CONG. REc. app. 356 (Jan. 22, 
1894) (statement of Ill. Rep. Julius Goldzier) ("When ... you make an attempt to make the 
wealthy bear a portion of the public burden they rise in holy wrath .... "). 
217. For that reason Stanley questions whether populism led to the tax, concluding it was 
"an effort to placate the grass roots without at the same time altering the mechanics of centrist 
resource allocation." STANLEY, supra note 154, at 134. Indeed, Stanley calls the tax "a 
comparatively cheap insurance policy against further imoads into centrism." Id. at 146; cf 
Edward B. Whitney, Political Dangers of the Income-Tax Decision, 19 FORUM 521, 530 (1895) 
(questioning wealthy's rejection of mild measure); Hall, supra note 181, at 18 ("[I]f this 
income-tax bill is defeated, one will be passed in the near future that will be far wider-reaching, 
and involving far greater danger of injustice toward wealth."). 
218. Amasa J. Parker, Jr., Income Tax of 1894-Its Provisions and Constitutionality, 50 
ALB. L.J. 416, 421 (1894). 
219. Current Topics, 51 ALB. L.J. 17,22 (1895). 
220. Robert Sewell, The Income Tax: Is It Constitutional?, 28 AM. L. REv. 808, 808 
(1894). 
221. See BETH, supra note 2, at 158 (suggesting opponents "were worried as much by the 
possibility that the amount of the tax would be increased in future years as they were by the 2 
per cent in itself."). 
222. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. ("Pollock I"), 157 U.S. 429, 518 (1894) (oral 
argument for appellee); see Jensen, supra note 6, at 2366 (noting parties wanted same 
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The Revolution wasn't really coming, of course, but one can understood 
how some thought it might be. 224 In any event, tax., opponents were as 
capable of exaggeration as the most populistic of Populists. For example, 
Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts intoned: "We all want if we can 
to see a time when we can get rid of the internal-revenue system altogether. 
It is odious, it is a sore, it is an irritation, it is a sting in all parts of the 
country."225 Indeed, characterizing the tax as populist would, it was hoped, 
bring the legislation down. 226 Senator William V. Allen of Nebraska, "the 
intellectual giant of Populism," 227 complained, "Every Senator that has 
spoken against the income tax has taken the occasion to say that it was 
Populistic,"228 and he was pretty much correct. For example, New York 
Senator David Bennett Hill, a staunch opponent of the tax (although a 
Democrat), stated: 
It is conceded that it is a plank, not of the Democratic or 
Republican parties, but of the newly formed Populist party. It is 
conceded that it is a war tax which was never imposed in the 
whole history of the Government except during the stress of our 
civil war, and was one of the first war taxes abolished when peace 
result). Pollock's lawyers called the tax "communistic, socialistic[,] populistic." Pollock I, 157 
U.S. at 532, quoted in BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 159, at 140. 
223. Defending Pollock's result, Professor Fiss argues "[t]he income tax [was] an 
egalitarian measure intended to put the burden of taxation on the rich. It posed a fundamental 
question about the nature of the state and its capacity to intervene in the social sphere." Frss, 
supra note 21, at 78-79. 
224. See 26 CONG. REc. 1609 (Jan. 29, 1894) (statement of Mo. Rep. Uriel Hall) ("[W]hen 
you oppose a measure of this kind, . . . you make a foundation for the argument of anarchy, 
socialism, and demagoguery, that eventually will sweep back and curse this country, as it did in 
France in the days of the French revolution."). Kens has argued that, with economic instability, 
there may have been reason for the Pollock Court's "assum[ing] the role of a bastion of 
conservatism and protector of property rights." PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING 
LIBERTY FROM THE GoLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 268 ( 1997). 
225. 26 CONG. REC. 6630 (June 21, 1894). Hear, hear! 
226. Cf 26 CONG. REC. 6688 (June 22, 1894) ("That [the idea] was borrowed from the 
Populist platform, or that it was adopted by the Populist convention, does not, I grant, 
necessarily make it popular. But the Populists represent only a small portion of public 
sentiment in favor of the income tax.") (statement of Sen. Kyle). 
227. PAUL, supra note 84, at 39. 
228. 26 CONG. REC. 6707 (June 21, 1894); see also 26 CONG. REC. app. 601 (Jan. 30, 1894) 
(discussing the complaint of Populist Rep. Pence that New York Rep. Franklin Bartlett's 
characterization of the income tax bill as Populist was intended "to frighten away from support 
of the amendment some Democratic members of this House."). Senator Nelson Aldrich of 
Rhode Island grumbled about Senator Allen of Nebraska: "Does he not understand that the 
income tax is supported by the Socialist party, ·by the Populist party, and by the Democratic 
party with a few honorable exceptions, simply as a means for the redistribution of wealth?" 26 
CONG. REC. 6366 (June 21, 1894). That language was quoted back to Aldrich in 1909. See 44 
CONG. REC. 1536 (Apr. 26, 1909) (statement of Sen. Bailey). 
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was restored. It is conceded that it has never been approved by a 
vote of the people anywhere. 229 
1105 
They may have grumbled about being used as punching bags, but the 
Populists were delighted to claim responsibility for the income tax. 
Representative Lafe Pence of Colorado said: 
It is true that the proposition to levy a tax upon incomes is a 
Populist proposition. No national platform except that of the 
People's party indorse it. 
All Populists favor it, and in the contest now being waged and 
to be continued until this or some similar law is enacted, the most 
valiant and enthusiastic of its supporters are found amongst the 
active and leading members of the People's party.230 
Although he preferred a graduated land tax-something that wasn't going 
to happen-Kansas Senator Peffer proudly noted the income tax "is a 
populist measure. It is the offspring of the Populist party."231 
Income tax opponents didn't limit themselves to questioning the populist 
origins of the tax; they also marshaled an arsenal of substantive arguments 
against the tax, and in favor of a consumption tax system. The income tax 
had historically belonged to the states, 232 they argued, and it ought to be 
used by the national government only in emergencies, if at all. 233 It was 
socialistic,234 nothing but class legislation, 235 and it was sectional in 
229. 26 CONG. REC. 6611 (June 21, 1894). Hill sarcastically congratulated Senators Kyle 
and Allen for getting a Populist position into a purportedly Democratic bill. 26 CONG. REC. 
6764 (June 23, 1894). 
230. 26 CONG. R.EC. app. 605 (Jan. 30, 1894). 
231. 26 CONG. R.Ec. 6634 (June 21, 1894); see also infra note 376 and accompanying text 
(discussing land tax proposal). 
232. See, e.g., 26 CONG. R.Ec. 6694 (June 22, 1894) (statement of Ohio Sen. Sherman). 
233. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REc. app. 207 (Jan. 26, 1894) (statement of Pa. Rep. Robert J. 
Adams, Jr.) ("An income tax! A tax so odious that no administration ever dared to impose it 
except in time of war; and you will find that the people will not tolerate it in time of peace .... 
It does not belong to a free country .... [I]t is class legislation."); supra text accompanying 
note 229 (quoting Sen. Hill). 
234. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REc. 6695 (June 22, 1894) (statement of Sen. Sherman) ("In a 
republic like ours, where all men are equal, this attempt to array the rich against the poor or the 
poor against the rich is socialism, communism, devilism .... ").Representative Hall condemned 
the charges of socialism; he and his fellow patriots, he said, "have met [the Socialist 
demagogue] manfully and fearlessly, and have been a bulwark against his progress." Hall, 
supra note 181, at 15. Many proponents of the tax agreed it was redistributive. See, e.g., 26 
CONG. REC. 6686-87 (June 22, 1894) (statement of Sen. Kyle). 
235. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REc. app. 303 (Jan. 30, 1894) (statement of Me. Rep. Seth L. 
Milliken) ("The ... income tax is clearly class legislation. It imposes barriers upon one portion 
of our people which it does not impose upon others."); see also 26 CONG. REc. 6620 (June 21, 
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purpose-aimed at the East, where the wealthy were concentrated. 236 
Moreover, it was a pernicious tax that would encourage Americans to lie 
about their economic situations and, if the tax was going to be enforced, 
require that government agents pry into the private affairs of 
citizens. "Inquisitorial" was an often used adjective.237 
Yet another argument was made against the income tax and, implicitly, 
in favor of the existing consumption taxes. Although Pollock is often 
described as having been a shock to Court-watchers in 1895, potential 
constitutional problems were raised in the 1894 debates. New York Senator 
Hill stated (with a touch of hyperbole, one imagines), "I have never talked 
with a lawver or the bench of a court who has not stated that he believes this 
is a dire~t tax, and therefore unconstitutional."238 Others agreed that 
enacting an income tax would bring serious constitutional challenges. 239 
The debates were heated, but opponents and proponents of the 1894 tax 
agreed on one basic point: the income tax was fundamentally different from 
1894) (statement of N.Y. Sen. Hill) ("The larger the exemption the more emphatically the bill 
becomes class legislation, utterly indefensible by fair-minded and intelligent men."). Hill 
scoffed at the relevance of England's income tax: its "forn1 of government is that of a limited 
monarchy, and not that of a free republic; ... she sanctions class legislation of every character 
.... " Id. at 6612. Defenders of the tax pointed to the facial neutrality of the legislation. See, 
e.g., 26 CONG. REc. app. 184 (Jan. 29, 1894) (statement of Mo. Rep. John C. Tarsney). 
236. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REc. 6627 (June 21, 1894) (statement of Del. Sen. Anthony 
Higgins). The response was simple: the bill hit the East because the large incomes were 
there. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REc. 6711 (June 22, 1894) (statement of Neb. Sen. Allen); 26 CONG. 
REc. app. 184 (Jan. 29, 1894) (statement of Mo. Rep. John C. Tarsney). Populist Senator Peffer 
of Kansas was blunt: 
We are going to make you men of the East bear your burden of taxation .... 
Men will stand here hour after hour and defend the wealth of the Eastern 
portion of this country, wealth which has been accumulated by the fostering 
care of the Government and by reaping from the other portions of the country 
what those men have never earned. 
26 CONG. REC. 6634 (June 21, 1894). Added South Dakota Senator Kyle: "We are now hoping 
to retrace our steps by relieving the masses from the burden of oppressive taxation, but at every 
step we are confronted by greedy capital which prates about 'vested rights' and 'legislation 
aimed at the East.'" 26 CONG. REC. 6690 (June 22, 1894). 
237. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REc. app. 395 (Jan. 30, 1894) (statement of N.Y. Rep. Joseph C. 
Hendrix) ("The party that fathers an income tax or any such inquisitorial form of taxation in 
times of profound peace creates against it a caucus and a source of opposition in every office in 
the land where the return for such a tax is made up."); see also supra text accompanying note 
178 (statement of Rep. McMillin ridiculing idea that income tax was inquisitorial). 
238. 26 CONG. REC. 6637 (June 21, 1894). 
239. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REc. 6629 (June 21, 1894) (statement of Sen. Hoar) (arguing 
legislation would be unconstitutional at least to the extent it applied to income from real 
property). In rebuttal, many cited cases beginning with Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
171 (1796). See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. Representative Pence reprinted the 
opinion in Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881), upholding the Civil War income tax, 
in the Record. See 26 CONG. REC. app. 602-03 (Jan. 30, 1894). 
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the consumption tax system then in existence. In the next subsection, I'll 
demonstrate that arguments about the merits of income tax legislation and 
the proposed Sixteenth Amendment made in 1909 were the same as those 
made in 1894. 240 What was said in 1894 informs what the term 'taxes on 
incomes" means: a consumption tax is not an income tax. 
2. On to the Sixteenth Amendment 
The Supreme Court struck down the 1894 income tax in the Income Tax 
Cases (Pollock).241 The reaction in many quarters was outrage. Newspapers, 
particularly in the Midwest, South, and West, condenmed the decision, 242 
and some, like former Oregon Governor Pennoyer, urged impeachment of 
the "nullifying judges."243 The decision was particularly suspect, critics 
said, because by the barest majority (5-4) the Court had rejected a century's 
worth of jurisprudence. 244 Professor Brownlee is convinced Pollock 
actually "stimulated some support for income taxation."245 
The possibility of a constitutional amendment that would clearly permit 
an unapportioned income tax was raised immediately after the Court handed 
down its decisions in 1895, but little of significance happened until 1909. 
Because the Court soon began to nibble away at the scope of its 
decisions,246 some held out hope no amendment would be necessary. In the 
meantime, Congress had found alternative means of raising revenue, 
lessening any sense of urgency about an income tax. 247 And throughout this 
period, the attention of progressives was focused on other matters, like 
antitrust. 248 
240. They were the same, that is, except for the arguments focusing on whether there 
should be a constitutional amendment in the first place. 
241. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. ("Pollock I"), 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. 
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. ("Pollock II"), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
242. See KYVIG, supra note 87, at 199. 
243. Sylvester Peunoyer, The Income Tax Decision, and the Power of the Supreme Court to 
NullifY Acts of Congress, 29 AM. L. REv. 550, 558 (1895). 
244. See Whitney, supra note 217, at 529 ("It now, by the casting of a vote of a single man, 
reverses two unanimous decisions of many years' standing, and in effect overrules a series of 
unanimous decisions reaching back for a century."). 
245. BROWNLEE, supra note 105, at 39. The effect must have been minor; the Democrats 
endorsed an income tax in 1896 and went down to resounding defeat. Id. 
246. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2375-77. 
247. To help fund the Spanish-American War, Congress enacted an "excise" tax on the 
gross receipts of companies refining petroleum or sugar. The Court upheld the tax as an indirect 
one not requiring apportiornnent. Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904). 
248. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 159, at 21 (noting that Democrats had no income 
tax plank in their 1904 platform). 
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But hopes that the Court might unequivocally repudiate Pollock were 
dashed. There was an obvious chicken-and-egg problem. If the Court were 
going to reconsider the constitutionality of an unapportioned income tax, 
Congress would have to enact such a tax, and, with Pollock on the books, 
that would be a bold step indeed. But if Congress didn't act, the Court 
wouldn't have the opportunity to reexamine its decisions-even though 
many observers thought the Court was ready to do just that. 
Despite (or maybe because of) the uncertainty about the status of 
Pollock, the movement for an income tax began to hit its stride near the end 
of the first decade of the twentieth century. Democratic Representative 
Cordell Hull of Tennessee introduced income tax legislation in 1907, and 
the Democratic party called for an income tax amendment in its 1908 
platform: 249 
[W]e favor an income tax. as part of our revenue system, and we 
urge the submission of a constitutional amendment specifically 
authorizing congress to levy and collect a tax uponindividual and 
corporate incomes, to the end that wealth may bear its 
proportionate share of the burdens of the federal government. 250 
Support for an income tax had been building among Republicans as 
well. In 1906 President Theodore Roosevelt stated that a "graduated 
income tax of the proper type would be a desirable feature of federal 
taxation, and it is to be hoped that one may be devised which the supreme 
court will declare constitutional."251 How to do that wasn't clear, however, 
and Roosevelt showed only sporadic interest in the project. 252 But the seed 
had been planted, and Roosevelt's successor, William Howard Taft, also 
appeared to accept the constitutionality and the desirability, at least in 
emergencies, of an income tax. In accepting the Republican nomination in 
1908, Taft stated, "I believe that an income tax, when the protective system 
of customs and the internal revenue tax shall not furnish enough for 
governmental needs, can and should be devised which, under the decisions 
of the Supreme Court, will conform to the Constitution."253 Furthermore, 
249. See id. at 22; BUENKER, supra note 84, at 54-55. Hull was a protege of Benton 
McMillin, a major figure in the 1894 income tax debates. See supra note 176 and 
accompanying text. 
250. Quoted in SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 591-92. 
251. Quoted in id. at 591. 
252. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 159, at 21. 
253. Quoted in id. at 23. 
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"insurgent Republicans" had come to Congress willing to join with 
Democrats and any remaining Populists to push for an income tax. 254 
Support was there, but income tax proponents had to resolve the difficult 
threshold question: whether to seek a new statute or to go first for a 
constitutional amendment. That issue was the subject of much of the 
discussion leading to the Sixteenth Amendment. In this subsection of the 
Article, I first discuss the debates on whether a constitutional amendment 
was necessary or desirable. I then turn to an analysis of the meaning of the 
Amendment, focusing on the changes in language that occurred during the 
deliberations and what those changes mean for our understanding today. 
Finally, I describe the discussions of the merits of income taxes that 
occurred in connection with the Sixteenth Amendment, discussions that 
were substantively no different from those that had occurred in 1894. 
My thesis is that the move for an amendment was intended to do what 
income tax proponents had attempted in 1894: shifting the tax base from 
consumption to income, and thereby tying tax burdens to ability to pay. 255 
That was a fundamental change, but it was limited in its effects. The 
Sixteenth Amendment didn't eliminate the concept of "direct taxes," and it 
shouldn't be read, as Professor Ackerman and others have suggested, as 
vindicating congressional plenary power in taxation. 
a. To Amend or Not to Amend 
The merits of income taxes came close to being an afterthought in 
congressional deliberations in 1909 because there was, little more to 
say. The positions on both sides had been exhaustively developed in 1894, 
and, as I'll demonstrate shortly, the substantive arguments were a reprise of 
1894-with discussion about how income taxes are different from 
consumption taxes. 
The focus of much of the debates in 1909, in form at least, was on 
whether a constitutional amendment was the way to proceed.256 Many 
income tax supporters thought no amendment was necessary. Moreover, 
254. See W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, 
in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE EcONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 28, 39 (Joel B. 
Slemrod ed., 2000). On the tension between the insurgents and Taft, see BUENKER, supra note 
84, at 65-76. 
255. In defending the income tax, Professor Graetz says, "A flat-rate tax on consumption 
would shift substantial amounts of taxes from higher- to lower-income families .... [T]he 
American people will not accept such a tax as fair. Indeed, the Sixteenth Amendment was 
added to the Constitution to redress such a situation." GRAETZ, supra note 153, at 262. 
256. Form may not have reflected what was really going on; some nominal supporters of an 
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some advocates, like Cordell Hull, resisted an amendment because, they 
worried, a few people in a few states could prevent ratification and thereby 
delay, if not altogether destroy, the movement. Without the support of 
House Speaker Joe Cannon, Hull couldn't get ,his own proposal for 
reenactment of the 1894 legislation onto the fast track, 257 but in the Senate 
there were income tax supporters ready and willing to move ahead. 
In 1909 Senators Joseph W. Bailey of Texas, a Democrat, and Albert B. 
Cummins of Iowa, a Republican, both introduced legislation to add an 
income tax provision, modeled on the 1894 statute, to a tariff bi11?58 Their 
thinking was straightforward. Hylton and other cases had read the direct-
tax clauses narrowly. 259 The Supreme Court in 1895 had rescued the 
clauses, but it had been badly divided (5-4), and it later seemed to have 
retreated.26° Furthermore, the composition of the Court had changed. Why 
bother with a constitutional amendment if the Court was likely to uphold an 
income tax anyway? In introducing his version of an amendment to the 
tariff bill, Senator Bailey said he didn't believe 
that opinion [in Pollock] is a correct interpretation of the 
Constitution, and I feel confident that an overwhelming majority 
of the best legal opinion in this Republic believes that it was 
erroneous. With this thought in my mind, and remembering that 
the decision was by a bare majority, and that the decision itself 
overruled the decisions of a hundred years, I do not think it 
improper for the American Congress to submit the question to the 
'd ' f h 'b 1 261 recons1 erat10n o t at great tn una . 
Bailey and Cummins favored the statutory route although they 
recognized the Court might adhere to Pollock and strike down a new statute. 
The status quo was unacceptable; something had to be done. As Cummins 
said, "If that opinion is to stand in its full scope and with its full vigor, then 
the United States must abandon for all time, or until the Constitution is 
amended, the exercise of a power and authority which had been recognized 
for a hundred years before the opinion was announced."262 Congress can 
257. See KYVlG, supra note 87, at 201. 
258. Bailey's proposal mirrored the 1894 act, except for exempting state and municipal 
bond interest from taxation. Cummins' proposal was for graduated rates of 2% to 6% on 
incomes over $6000. The proposals were later combined as the "Bailey-Cummins amendment" 
to the tariffbill. See WITTE, supra note 158, at 74-75; SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 592. 
259. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
260. E.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900). 
261. 44 CONG. REC. 1351 (Apr. 15, 1909). 
262. 44 CONG. REC. 1422 (Apr. 21, 1909). 
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interpret the Constitution as well as the Court, 263 Cummins said, and 
pushing for a statutory change was an obligation: "I believe it to be the 
bounden duty of Congress at this time to again invoke the deliberate 
reexamination of this question by the Supreme Court."264 The Cummins 
legislation, like that introduced by Senator Bailey, "challenges the opinion 
of the Supreme Court. " 265 
The risk of a negative decision from the Court wasn't a reason to stand 
pat. Quite the contrary. If the Court rejected a new income tax statute, the 
case for a constitutional amendment would be clear. But without a new 
judicial decision on the books, an amendment could get bogged down 
precisely because it wouldn't be clear the amendment was needed. 266 
Not surprisingly, despite ridicule from Senator William Borah and 
others, those resisting the Bailey-Cummins legislation stressed the Court's 
honor. 267 Some amendment supporters, like Nebraska Senator Norris 
Brown, had urged deference to Pollock all along. 268 Others, like Rhode 
Island Senator and Republican majority leader Nelson Aldrich, whose 
motives weren't necessarily high-minded, 269 agreed: "The imposition of an 
income tax now is not only an attempt to adopt an unconstitutional 
provision, but it is an assault, a rebuke in any way, of the Supreme Court of 
the United States.'mo 
Since commentators today almost universally reject Pollock, it's become 
easy to question the motives of those who pushed for a constitutional 
amendment rather than a new income tax statute. 271 Perhaps everyone 
263. See id.; see also 44 CONG. REC. 4067 (July 3, 1909) (statement of Sen. McLaurin), 
quoted in supra note 137. 
264. 44 CONG. REC. 1422 (Apr. 21, 1909). 
265. !d. 
266. See Harold M. Bowman, Congress and the Supreme Court, 25 POL Scr. Q. 20 (1910) 
(discussing debates on desirability of enacting statute that might violate the Income Tax Cases). 
267. See 44 CoNG. REc. 3989 (June 30, 1909) (statement of Sen. Borah): 
Where great and powerful intellects ... , each determined to arrive at a sound 
and righteous conclusion, differ by a bare margin of one, and by such 
difference overturn the precedents and practice of a century, and by such 
difference overturn the precedents upon which we had collected millions 
from the American people ... , who will tell me that ... it is an assault to the 
dignity of the court or an undermining of its confidence to ask it . . . to 
reconsider that question? 
268. See inji-a text accompanying note 288. 
269. See infra notes 276-281 and accompanying text. 
270. 44 CONG. REc. 3931 (June 29, 1909). Unconvinced, Senator Bailey responded that 
"[t)he Senator from Rhode Island and no other man in this country would have ever presented 
the Pollock case to the same Supreme Court that decided the Springer case." !d. at 3932. 
271. For example, Professor Ackerman questions Senator Brown's motives, characterizing 
him as having taken "the lead for the Republican conservatives" in drafting a narrow 
amendment, and not acting in good faith to implement the compromise of President 
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wasn't acting with the best of intentions--on that point, more in a 
moment-but it was hardly frivolous to worry about of~ending the Supreme 
Court. 272 The potential for real conflict was there, and public confidence in 
the Court may have been at stake, too. Pollock had been decided only 
fourteen years earlier; it was no old-and-cold decision of a bygone era. 
In any ·event, President Taft weighed in with support for a constitutional 
amendment, stressing, among. other things, the desirability of "stability of 
judicial construction of theiConstitution."273 The Senate Finance Committee, 
which reported out the language that became the Sixteenth Amendment, 
recommended the conservative route as well: 
The committee decided that it would be unwise to pass an income-
tax amendment [to a tariff] in form and substance like those 
introduced by the Senator from Texas [Bailey] and the Senator 
from Iowa [Cummins]. We felt that, in view of the decision ... in 
the Pollock case, if would be indelicate, at least, for the Congress 
of the United States to pass another measure and ask the Supreme 
Court ~~ pass u~7~n it, when they had already passed upon the propositiOn .... 
Other reasons, some legitimate and some perhaps not so legitimate, also 
pointed toward amending the Constitution before enacting an income tax. 
For one thing, while the Supreme Court might uphold a new statute, a later 
Court could reverse course as, it was said, had happened in 1895. Only an 
amendment would protect against future judicial usurpation of congressional 
power. Senator Thomas H. Carter of Montana, a Republican, argued that, 
"in the midst of that bewildering condition, it is infinitely better for us to 
refer the constitutional amendment to the several States, so that the question 
involving the power of Congress to levy an income tax may be forever and 
effectually put at rest." 275 
Taft. Ackerman, supra note 16, at 36. But see infra notes 311-318 and accompanying text 
(questioning Ackerman's version of events); infra text accompanying note 279 (suggesting Sen. 
Cummins accepted Brown's good faith). 
272. And it wasn't only reactionary Republicans nominally on the side of an 
amendment. See supra text accompanying note 250 (quoting 1908 Democratic platform). 
273. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, TAX ON NET INCOME OF CORPORATIONS, S. Doc. No. 61-98, 
at 2 (1909); see RATNER, supra note 160, at 286. Taft coupled his recommendation with a 
proposal for a corr>orate income tax. See infra notes 291-293 and accompanying text. Taft's 
"compromise" position may have been the result of Aldrich's manipulation. See KYVIG, supra 
note 87, at 202. Or Taft may have been manipulating Aldrich. See Ackerman, supra note 16, at 
34-35. 
274. 44 CONG. REC. 3936 (June 29, 1909) (statement of Cal. Sen. Frank P. Flint). 
275. 44 CONG. REC. 3995 (July 1, 1909). 
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And it was probably the case that some "supporters"-Nelson Aldrich is 
the culprit most often named-viewed the proposals as a way to resist the 
1909 move for an income· tax; to send the issue to the states, where the 
possibility of rejection was high (only twelve states needed to say no); and 
to use rejection to resist future income tax pressures. 276 An income tax 
might have been inevitable-today it looks that way-but not all 
congressmen wanted it to happen on their watch. 
Income tax proponents certainly thought there was something fishy 
about "support" for an amendment. 277 Idaho Senator Borah pulled no 
punches: "[T]he great, controlling, overwhelming proposition, supported by 
the unquestionable facts surrounding us, is the fact that it is here as a 
measure to defeat the income tax .... " 278 Senator Cummins said the 
amendment was "brought forward here, not by its original author, the 
Senator from Nebraska [Brown], but by its more recent sponsors, simply as 
one of the instruments to defeat the income-tax provision . . . , and I shall 
vote for it without the slightest hope that it will ever become a part of the 
Constitution. " 279 
Mississippi Senator Anselm J. McLaurin, who wanted an income tax and 
who thought an amendment unnecessary, was also pessimistic about what 
the amendment process would bring: 
Whatever may be the intention in bringing ·forward the proposed 
amendment, I think the effect will be to defer the enactment of any 
law providing for an income tax. I think the effect of it will be 
that there will be probably more than a fourth of the States of the 
Union which will refuse to ratify the action of Congress. 280 
276. See KYVIG, supra note 87, at 202-03; RATNER, supra note 160, at 307 (suggesting 
Rhode Island's failure to ratify "is a very strong indication that Senator Aldrich had sponsored 
the Senate resolution only as a means to defeat the enactment of the Bailey-Cummins income 
tax proposal"). 
277. See Ackerman, supra note 16, at 33 ("[M]ost Progressives considered [the 
Amendment] a trick aimed at diverting the [income tax] movement into a losing battle to gain 
the assent of three-fourths of the states." (footnote omitted)). 
278. 44 CONG. REC. 3992 (July 1, 1909). 
279. 44 CONG. REc. 3974 (June 30, 1909); see also 44 CONG. REC. 4424 (July 12, 1909) 
(statement of Ohio Rep. William G. Sharp) ("[T]he circumstances under which this resolution 
comes to the House smacks so much of subterfuge and disingenuous motives that a vote for it 
seemingly indorses the ruse."); 44 CONG. REc. app. 131 (July 9, 1909) (statement of Ark. Rep. 
John C. Floyd) ("The credit due the President for making this wholesome recommendation is 
also lessened by the fact that some of its supporters have openly announced that their purpose in 
supporting it was to defeat the passage of an income-tax law at this session of Congress."). 
280. 44 CONG. REC. 4067 (July 3, 1909). 
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Worse, predicted McLaurin, that failure "would be urged as a very plausible 
argument before the Supreme Court of the United Stat~s that the people are 
not in favor of an income tax."281 
Regardless of the motives of amendment "supporters," however, real 
income tax proponents had to accept reality. 282 There would be no income 
tax until the Constitution was amended. As Representative William C. 
Adamson of Georgia put it, "I do not believe it necessary to amend the 
Constitution in order to levy an income tax, but the majority will not let us 
have it any other way. It were more proper, easier, and quicker to amend 
the Supreme Court than to amend the Constitution."283 But, Adamson 
argued, if we have to do it, let's do it fast: "Let all lovers of their country 
press the matter at once and continuously before all state legislatures."284 
And history was on the side of the tax. It was going to happen-if not now, 
later: "Representatives here admit that they do not expect to pass an 
income-tax law after this amendment is adopted. If they do not, men sent 
here in their places will. "285 
b. The Language of the Amendment: Taxes on Incomes 
Discussions about a possible constitutional amendment didn't proceed in 
isolation. There was a lot going on in 1909-the Bailey-Cummins 
proposals to enact an income tax without waiting for a constitutional 
amendment, tariff revision, and a presidential proposal for a corporate 
income tax to operate at least until the Constitution could be amended to 
permit a personal income tax. Despite the confusing mass of material, it's 
possible to get a good sense of what the Sixteenth Amendment was 
supposed to do, and that was to remove only taxes on incomes from the 
apportionment requirement. 
A key player was Republican Senator Norris Brown of Nebraska. 
Senator Thomas P. Gore of Oklahoma introduced a resolution providing for 
281. Id. 
282. Not all amendment supporters favored an income tax. Some simply thought Congress 
should be able to levy one if necessary. Senator Elihu Root of New York, no friend of personal 
income taxation, said: "I do want my country to have all the powers that any country in the 
world has to summon every dollar of the public wealth to its support if ever the time of sore 
need comes upon it." 44 CONG. REc. 4006 (July 1, 1909); see PAUL, supra note 84, at 95-96 
(noting that Root favored corporate tax). 
283. 44 CONG. REC. app. 119 (July 12, 1909). 
284. Id. Once it was clear that a joint resolution would be passed, a debate ensued about 
whether the Amendment should be submitted to state legislatures or whether it should be sent to 
state conventions. In general, those who really favored an income tax wanted conventions to be 
used, to lessen the control of the political establishment. See 44 CONG. REC. 4108 (July 5, 
1909) (statement of Sen. Bailey). 
285. 44 CONG. REC. app. 121 (July 12, 1909). 
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a constitutional amendment on March 25, 286 but the important chronology 
began in late April, when Brown proposed the following language: "The 
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes and 
inheritances."287 Brown, like many others, was leery of enacting another 
statute that might be rejected by the Supreme Court: "It is for that reason, 
Senators, that I present to you to~day the imperative and commanding 
necessity for an amendment to the Constitution which will give the court a 
Constitution that can not be interpreted two ways."288 
However meritorious a constitutional amendment might have been in the 
abstract, Senator Isidor Rayner of Maryland quickly pointed out that 
Brown's language was useless. Congress already had the power to tax 
incomes and inheritances, he noted. The problem, at least with an income 
tax, was that the Court had said such a tax must be apportioned:289 "[I]f this 
amendment . . . were to go through, it would not affect the [direct-tax 
clauses] and there would still have to be an apportionment."290 Rayner was 
obviously right, and this Brown proposal went nowhere. 
A month and a half later, on June 16, President Taft gave support to a 
constitutional amendment, stressing the danger of enacting a tax based on 
the hope the Court might reverse itself. 291 Although Taft may have favored 
a personal income tax, he proposed enactment of a corporate tax (something 
thought to be permissible already92) until the Constitution could be 
amended. We don't know for sure why Taft took this position-it's been 
suggested Senator Aldrich manipulated Taft to kill any possibility of a 
personal income tax in 1909293-but the Taft proposals took the wind out of 
the sails of those who favored enacting an individual tax without first 
amending the Constitution. 
The next day, June 17, with the President now on the side of a 
constitutional amendment, Senator Brown tried again, proposing the 
286. S.J. Res. 8, 61st Cong., 44 CONG. REC. 263 (Mar. 25, 1909); see RATNER, supra note 
160, at 298. 
287. S.J. Res. 25, 61st Cong., 44 CONG. REc. 1568 (Apr. 28, 1909). 
288. 44 CONG. REC. 1568 (Apr. 28, 1909). 
289. Moreover, the reference to "inheritance" was probably surplusage because the Court 
had held that an estate tax isn't a direct tax, and had affirmed that conclusion after the Income 
Tax Cases. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 
(1874). 
290. 44 CONG. REC. 1569 (Apr. 28, 1909). 
291. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 273, at 2; RATNER, supra note 160, at 286. 
292. The theory was that a corporate income tax is an excise on the right to do business in 
corporate form. That position was upheld in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), and 
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). 
293. See supra note 273. Or maybe Taft was jerking Aldrich around. See id. Or maybe 
both actually believed in what they were doing. It's been known to happen. 
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following language: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
direct taxes on incomes without apportionment among the several States 
according to population." 294 Here we get to the beginning of some good, 
nitty-gritty interpretational issues. 
If the goal was to permit an unapportioned income tax, Brown's 
language seemed to work: it removed any "direct taxes on incomes" from 
the apportionment requirement. But Senator McLaurin wasn't satisfied. 
The impediment they were facing was the direct-tax clauses, he argued, so 
why not strike out the references to direct taxes in the Constitution, leaving 
apportionment to apply only to capitation taxes? That would "accomplish 
all that [Brown's] amendment proposes to accomplish and not make a 
constitutional amendment for the enacting of a single act of legislation. "295 
Brown said "No": "That may be true, Mr. President; but my purpose is to 
confine it to income taxes alone, and to forever settle the dispute by 
referring the subject to the several States."296 Had the McLaurin proposal 
been accepted, it would have made analysis of the taxing power far simpler 
today, but Brown's intention was unmistakable, to limit the Amendment to 
"taxes on incomes." Nothing that happened later in the amendment process 
changed that critical language or that basic intention. 
Brown didn't explain why he resisted the apparently friendly McLaurin 
suggestion. As we shall see, Professor Ackerman accuses Brown of bad 
faith. But one can imagine legitimate reasons for drafting the amendment 
the way Brown did. His proposal kept the changes narrow, limiting the 
effect to income taxes-which was, after all, what tax proponents were 
pushing for-. and a narrow proposal made ratification easier. Maybe Brown 
was leery of eliminating the apportionment rule, making an unapportioned 
real-estate tax possible. Or perhaps he was concerned about the unknown. 
If you're not sure what might be included in the category of "direct taxes," 
or what sorts of taxes might be devised in the future, you might well resist 
giving future Congresses the power to enact any tax without limitation. 
Whatever Brown's reasons, he wasn't willing to broaden the language, 
and his proposal was sent to the Finance Committee. The form of the 
Amendment that emerged in June, with an explanation of why a 
constitutional amendment should be sought, 297 read somewhat differently, 
but it was still limited to "taxes on incomes": "The Congress shall have 
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
294. S.J. Res. 39, 61st Cong., 44 CONG. REc. 3377 (June 17, 1909). 
295. 44 CONG. REC. 3377 (June 17, 1909); see infra notes 323-326 and accompanying text 
(discussing McLaurin's later attempt to change substance of amendment). 
296. 44 CONG. REC. 3377 (June 17, 1909) (emphasis added). 
297. See supra text accompanying note 274 (statement of Sen. Flint). 
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without apportionment among the several States and without regard to any 
census or enumeration."298 With a comma added, that's the way the 
Amendment now reads. 
The Committee had deleted Brown's reference to "direct taxes" and 
added the phrase "from whatever source derived," but how these changes 
occurred isn't clear. According to Professor Ratner, "These crucially 
important and liberal changes were introduced by Senator Aldrich at the 
suggestion and the insistence of Senator Knute Nelson of Minnesota .... 
Nelson, although a conservative and Standpat Republican ... , seems to 
have become responsive to the progressive upsurge in Minnesota .... "299 
The Blakeys, relying on a letter published in 1920, also named Nelson: "[I]t 
was there amended at the insistence of Nelson ... to include the phrase 
'from whatever source derived' and omit the word 'direct' .... "300 
Buenker suggested Nelson's "object was to foreclose the possibility of any 
class of income being held exempt from taxation by the Court."301 
Seligman .noted simply and accurately: "No explanation was made of the 
change, and when Senator Aldrich reported the amendment, he asked to 
have it disposed of without debate. It was indeed debated, but the 
discussion was exceedingly slight."302 The joint resolution containing the 
Amendment passed unanimously in the Senate (77-0),303 and in the House a 
week later, after about four hours' debate, by a vote of 318 to 14. 304 
The traditional understanding ofthe language change, in Ratner's words, 
is that, if the Brown version had been accepted, "the source of all income 
would have continued to be open to constitutional challenge and the source 
298. S.J. Res. 40, 61st Cong., 44 CONG. REc. 3900 (June 28, 1909). 
299. RATNER, supra note 160, at 299. 
300. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 159, at 61. 
301. BUENKER, supra note 84, at 127. Whether or not that was the goal, the language 
caused ratification difficulties in some states. Id.; see infra notes 332-337 and accompanying 
text. 
302. SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 595. Seligman added: 
In the House the discussion was a little longer, but still occupied only four 
hours, and one of the members protested ... : "I imagine that nothing which I 
may be able to say will defeat the prearranged programme ... ; but for the 
House to perform its part in such a solemn transaction as amending the 
Constitution . . . without having the form of the amendment seriously 
considered by one of its committees, strikes me as a proceeding of 
extraordinary levity." 
Id. at 595-96 (quoting 44 CONG. REc. 4391 (July 12, 1909) (statement of Mass. Rep. Samuel W. 
McCall)). 
303. 44 CONG. REC. 4121 (July 5, 1909). 
304. 44 CONG. REc. 4440 (July 12, 1909). The level of opposition was greater than the 
votes suggest, because of absences and abstentions. Nevertheless, the votes were 
overwhelmingly favorable. 
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of the income would still have been considered by the Court the object of 
the tax." 305 (I'll return to that questionable prop?sition shortly.) Senator 
Brown seemed to have accepted the Court's determination that at least 
certain types of income taxes (on income from property) are direct-hence 
his reference to "direct taxes on incomes." Unlike many income tax 
proponents, Brown was apparently willing to concede the Court had gotten 
it right, and he wanted to change the constitutional principle the Court had 
relied on. The Committee didn't want to endorse that principle, the 
argument goes, and that's why Ratner referred to the changes as "crucially 
important and liberal." 
Professor Ackerman buys into that theory, and takes it to breathtaking 
heights. Senator Brown was guilty of a "clever verbalism, [aiming] to 
transform this tactical retreat [of the amendment process] into a long-run 
conservative victory" by conceding the direct character of income taxes, 
thereby "explicitly endorsing the Pollock majority's vast expansion of the 
concept,';306 and implicitly endorsing the idea that the universe of direct 
taxes was much larger than previously thought. 307 When new language 
emerged from the Finance Committee, it was 
a major retreat from Brown's conservative ambitions. Gone was 
[Brown's] express vindication of Pollock's decision to expand the 
category of "direct" taxation; in its place we find an explicit 
repudiation of Pollock's effort to expand the category by insisting 
that an income tax, from whatever source derived, should be 
. f h lf . 308 1mmune rom t e ru e o apportiOnment. 
The Committee drafters, Ackerman says, knew exactly what they were 
doing. They "took special efforts to avoid freezing Pollock's doctrine 
concerning the scope of the 'direct tax' clauses."309 The language, in short, 
"had been revised to eliminate all explicit endorsement of Pollock's 
reasoning."310 
Ackerman's version of events is full of problems. An awful lot happens 
in his rendition that wasn't explicit at all. Ackerman presents no evidence 
of what the "draftsmen" were thinking, or what "special efforts" they were 
305. RATNER, supra note 160, at 299. 
306. Ackennan, supra note 16, at 37. 
307. Id. Ackerman says Senator McLaurin's response to Brown, see supra text 
accompanying note 295, defeated Brown's "gambit." Ackerman, supra note 16, at 37. Since 
McLaurin's suggestion went nowhere, I don't begin to understand Ackerman's point. 
308. Ackerman, supra note 16, at 38. I'm unsure whether Ackerman is making a point by 
having "from whatever source derived" modify "tax," rather than "incomes." 
309. Id. at 51 (emphasis deleted). 
310. Id. at38. 
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taking, as they "explicitly" wrote what became the Amendment. 311 Stating 
propositions boldly, without doubt, isn't evidence. 
And his rendition doesn't make sense. The result in Pollock wasn't 
repudiated by the Committee's change in language. Yes, many income tax 
supporters were reluctant to take action that would indicate acceptance of 
Pollock, and they were afraid a constitutional amendment would do exactly 
that. Nevertheless, as long as an amendment was ratified quickly, so that an 
unapportioned income tax could be enacted, it wouldn't have mattered. The 
real concern was what it would mean if a proposed amendment weren't 
ratified. That failure could be seen as acceptance of the status quo, a 
validation of Pollock-making a future income tax virtually impossible. 
But this concern arose because of the very idea of a constitutional 
amendment, not because of Brown's language. 312 Accepting Pollock was 
inherent in the decision to seek any amendment, whatever the wording. 313 
If the Amendment hadn't been ratified, the change Ackerman praises would 
have been cold comfort to income tax supporters-something Senator 
McLaurin recognized in debates on the Senate floor. 314 
I also see no reason to think the Finance Committee was doing what 
Ackerman says it was. Once the Committee reported, the changes were 
accepted with little discussion; if a seismic shift was occurring, nearly 
everyone missed it. 315 And let's remember who ran the show. The 
committee chair was Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, usually characterized 
as an anti-tax villain. (Indeed, that's how Ackerman sees Aldrich. 316) That 
Aldrich would have pushed a text meant to resurrect pre-Pollock 
understanding boggles the mind. "[T]he draftsmen of the Amendment took 
special efforts to avoid freezing Pollock's doctrine concerning the scope of 
the 'direct tax' clauses?"317 I don't think so. 318 
311. In discussing Eisner v. Macomber, see infra Part IV.D.l.a, Ackerman says the changes 
in language were well-thought-out attempts to further a particular goal. The drafters "changed 
their language in response to criticism that it might be open to the very construction that 
[Justice] Pitney was now imposing on the text." Ackerman, supra note 16, at 43. Whose 
criticism? Where? When? 
312. See supra Part IV.B.2.a (discussing debates on whether to seek amendment). 
313. See supra text accompanying note 280 (statement of Sen. McLaurin). 
314. See infra notes 323-326 and accompanying text. 
315. See supra notes 302-304 and accompanying text. 
316. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 16, at 34 (noting that plan for income tax statute 
"encountered stiff resistance from congressional conservatives, led by Nelson Aldrich of New 
York [sic] [who] was opposed to all forms of income taxation"); see also supra note 276 and 
accompanying text. 
317. Ackerman, supra note 16, at 51 (emphasis deleted). 
318. Given Ackerman's penchant for imaginative arguments, I'd have expected him to 
make Aldrich's resistance to the tax into a plus for his position, something like this: The 
language of the Amendment was drafted to vindicate pre-Pollock understanding not by friends 
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Finally, the traditional justification for the language change, whether or 
not embellished by Professor Ackerman, is full of poles. Recall Ratner's 
explanation: Had Brown's proposal succeeded, "the source of all income 
would have continued to be open to constitutional challenge and the source 
of the income would still have been considered by the Court the object of 
the tax."319 But with the Brown language-"The Congress shall have 
power to lay and collect direct taxes on incomes without apportionment 
among the several States according to population" 320-why does source 
matter? If a tax on incomes isn't a direct tax, the Brown language would 
have done nothing; the amendment wouldn't have applied. If a tax on 
income from certain sources (real property, for example) is direct, however, 
Brown's proposal would have permitted the tax without apportionment. If a 
tax on income from other sources isn't direct, the amendment wouldn't 
have been implicated, but such a tax isn't subject to apportionment anyway. 
A "direct tax on incomes," if there's such a thing, needn't be apportioned, 
and an indirect tax on incomes, if there;s such a thing, needn't be 
apportioned. Either way, Brown's version would have worked the way he 
wanted it to, without regard to source of income. 321 
But whether the final version of the Amendment made any substantive 
changes in Senator Brown's proposal is almost beside the point. The 
crucial consideration from this history is that the Amendment is limited to 
taxes on incomes, and Brown specifically rejected doing away with 
apportionment for all direct taxes. With that language, other direct taxes 
remain subject to apportionment; as Brown apparently knew,322 and neither 
version of the Amendment, Brown's or the Committee's, includes anything 
that "explicitly" changes the characterization of any taxes as direct or 
indirect. 
of the tax, but by its enemies. They realized their friend Senator Brown had produced a 
proposal that might prevail in the states. The final language was drafted, that is, by those who 
didn't believe in the tax and wanted to make ratification less likely. With ratification, the 
drafters were stuck with the results of their underhanded handiwork. 
319. RATNER, supra note 160, at 299. 
320. S.J. Res. 39, 61st Cong., 44 CONG. REC. 3377 (June 17, 1909). 
321. If source of income mattered under the Brown proposal, it's for the reason suggested 
by Professor Buenker-that Senator Nelson wanted to make sure all income (including any that 
had previously been considered off limits for an apportioned tax) could be subject to an 
unapportioned income tax. See supra note 301 and accompanying text. But if the final 
language was really intended to change intergovernmental immunity law, for example, to make 
it possible for the national government to tax interest on municipal bonds, that point eluded 
most congressmen. But see supra note 211 and accompanying text (quoting 1894 statement of 
Sen. George, arguing such interest should be subject to tax). That possible interpretation 
certainly caused consternation in the ratification debates. See infra notes 333-337 and 
accompanying text (discussing Gov. Hughes's reservations about Amendment). 
322. See supra text accompanying note 296. 
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There should be no doubt the Amendment was limited to "taxes on 
incomes." After the resolution had been reported by the Finance 
Committee, with some language changed but with the reference to "taxes on 
incomes" intact, Senator McLaurin once again suggested it would be better 
to amend the Constitution to delete references to "direct ,taxes."323 
McLaurin said his proposal would "eliminate from the Constitution every 
cause of contention over the question of the authority of Congress to levy an 
. h f c d . ,324 mcome tax, except as to t e power o ongress to gra e an mcome tax. 
Furthermore, he was worried that by passing a resolution applicable only to 
income taxes, Congress might be seen as "recogniz[ing] the income tax as a 
direct tax" 325-something that could matter if the Amendment in its 
Committee-approved version weren't ratified.326 But McLaurin didn't 
expect support for his proposal, and he didn't get it. 
Of course, Ackerman has an explanation for Congress's not taking a 
broader step, and part of it is plausible: "Why create unnecessary political 
problems by drafting a broader amendment when the Court was retreating 
to its tradition of restrained interpretation of 'direct' taxation on other 
fronts?"327 Do what needs to be done to make the tax possible. Deal. with 
the narrow holding of Pollock and nothing else. Don't create unnecessary 
issues to complicate ratification. 328 
If Ackerman had stopped there, I'd be politely applauding. Instead he 
pulls an elephant out of his hat: "[T]he decision by the People [in ratifying 
the Amendment] expressly to overrule one branch of Pollock should make 
other aspects of that decision more, not less, questionable."329 It's because 
the Amendment was purposely, narrowly drafted, and ratified in that form, 
that we should read it broadly! 
Obviously if McLaurin's proposal to do away with references to "direct 
taxes" had been accepted, Professor Acke1man would now be claiming, 
with reason, that the direct-tax clauses are dead. But it's because Congress 
didn't do that, because Congress produced a much narrower version of the 
323. See 44 CONG. REC. 4067 (July 3, 1909); 44 CONG. REC. 4109 (July 5, 
1909). McLaurin first made this point responding to Brown's proposed language. See supra 
text accompanying note 295. 
324. 44 CONG. REC. 4109 (July 5, 1909). 
325. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 281 (noting McLaurin's concern that 
failure to ratify would be used as evidence of lack of support for income tax). 
326. See supra notes 312-314 and accompanying text. 
327. Ackerman, supra note 16, at 5. 
328. See also id. at 33 ("Why stir things up unnecessarily, when the [sic] only seemed to be 
at war only with the income tax?"). 
329. Id. at 50. 
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Amendment, that the direct-tax clauses are deadl330 I have to wonder 
whether any evidence could convince Ackennan th~ result he wants isn't 
supported in the history of the Amendment. 331 
The ratification fight was often intense, but the Amendment was ratified 
quickly, in less than four years. As Randolph Paul said, "[T]he fears [that 
the] amendment would be blocked proved to be unfounded and the struggle 
for the amendment had the quality of anti-climax."332 There were bumps 
along the way, most significantly opposition from New York Governor 
Charles Evans Hughes. Hughes worried that the language "from whatever 
source derived" would permit taxing "not only incomes from ordinary real 
or personal property, but also incomes derived from State and municipal 
securities,"333 something Pollock had precluded under the doctrine of 
intergovernmental immunity. 334 If the Amendment was intended to overturn 
Pollock, Hughes's fears about New York finances weren't trivia1.335 
Opponents of the Amendment latched onto the Hughes argument, which 
delayed ratification in a few states, but Hughes received assurances that the 
Amendment was intended to remove apportionment only for income taxes 
already within congressional power, not to extend taxing power to new 
categories of income. 336 Thereafter, ratification went surprisingly fast. By 
330. "As this breach has long since been stopped up by the Sixteenth Amendment, modem 
courts should understand themselves bound to continue the otherwise unbroken tradition of 
restraint in construing the nature of 'direct' taxation." Id. at 5. 
331. "[TJhe Court's distinctive pattern of initial provocation and subsequent restraint-
Pollock, then Knowlton'-made the personal income tax, and only this tax, appear the salient 
target for constitutional reform." Id. at 33. 
332. PAUL, supra note 84, at 97; see also Ackerman, supra note 16, at 38 ("[T]he call for an 
income tax generated an enormously positive response from most Americans."). 
333. RATNER, supra note 160, at 304 (quoting SPECIAL MESSAGE FROM THE GOVERNOR, 
New York Senate, No.3, at 5 (1910)). 
334. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. ("Pollock I"), 157 U.S. 429, 584-586 (1895). 
335. See PAUL, supra note 84, at 97. That specific part of the holding in Pollock was 
overturned in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
336. See Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 260-61 (1920): 
Governor Hughes, . . . in a message laying the Amendment before the 
legislature of that State ... , expressed some apprehension lest it might be 
construed as extending the taxing power to income not taxable before; but his 
message promptly brought forth from statesmen who participated in 
proposing the Amendment such convincing expositions of its purpose . . . 
that the apprehension was effectively dispelled and ratification followed. 
See also BtJENKER, supra note 84, at 255-61. The Court recently referred favorably to this 
"legislative history." See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 522 n.13 (1988), quoted in 
infra note 485. 
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early 1913, forty-two states, including New York, had ratified the 
Amendment. 337 
c. What's An Income Tax? 
To this point in my discussion of the events of 1909, I've argued the 
Sixteenth Amendment was intended to remove only "taxes on incomes" 
from the apportionment requirement, not to abolish the direct-tax clauses. 
But even if that's "all" the Amendment did, it was quite a lot: the category 
of "taxes on incomes" was hardly trivial. It was what members of Congress 
had been talking about since 1894 (and, in some cases, since 1862). 
On the merits-in discussing both the proposed statutory changes 
introduced by Senators Bailey and Cummins and the possibility of a 
constitutional amendment-income tax debates in 1909 mirrored those of 
1894. Indeed, Representative Champ Clark of Missouri suggested there 
was nothing more to say: 
My own opinion is that there is not very much necessity for speech 
making on this occasion or on this proposition. The income tax is 
a Democratic proposition. We put it in the tariff bill of 1894. A 
very large majority of us have been in favor of it ever since. 338 
The significant debate in 1909 was about whether to seek a constitutional 
amendment. But, on the question of what an income tax is, the debates on 
the proposed statutory changes and on the proposed constitutional 
amendment were really one big debate. 
As was true in 1894, much of the discussion was about how an income 
tax would further the ability-to-pay principle in a way that consumption 
taxes didn't. It was deja vu all over again. Senator Bailey explained his 
amendment to the tariff bill: "I believe [the income tax] is the only tax ever 
yet devised by the statesmen of the world that rises and falls with a man's 
ability to pay it."339 
When Cummins introduced his bill, Senator Augustus Octavius Bacon of 
Georgia pressed him to justify it. Would Cummins favor the income tax if 
337. See BUENKER, supra note 84, at 158. Brownlee attributes ratification to convergence 
of the "single tax" movement, see inji-a note 376 and accompanying text, which "awakened the 
interest of the urban middle class in using the income tax to redistribute wealth and further 
popularized Henry George's ideal of allocating taxes according to the distribution of special 
privilege," Brownlee, supra note 254, at 40; and the 1912 campaigns of Roosevelt, Wilson, and 
Debs: "Many Americans entertained vague ideas that federal income taxation would provide a 
means either for assaulting monopoly power or for recouping some of its ill-gotten gains for the 
benefit of the republic." Id. 
338. 44 CONG. REC. 4392 (July 12, 1909). 
339. 44 CONG. REC. 1351 (Apr. 15, 1909). 
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enough revenue could be raised by tariffs? Bacon wanted to know 
"whether it was rested upon the importance of shifting the burden of 
taxation from the great masses of consumers, so far as we may be able to do 
it, to rest it in part, at least, upon the shoulders of those who have the wealth 
of the country." 34° Cummins finally answered: "[I]f I could change the 
situation I would so rearrange and readjust these schedules as to decrease 
the revenue derived from the custom-houses and place it where it should 
belong-upon those fortunate people who enjoy large incomes."341 Said 
Bacon: "Now the Senator has stated exactly the thing I wanted him to 
state. " 342 
Once again I'm going to risk overkill with a series of quotations to 
demonstrate how ability to pay dominated discussions of income tax 
proponents: income taxes are consistent with that principle, consumption 
taxes aren't. This is a representative sample; I could provide many more 
examples. 
Sen. Bailey (Texas): "Under any circumstances an income tax is more 
equitable than a tax on consumption. It is more just as between the different 
classes, and it better conforms to that sound canon of taxation which enjoins 
upon us to lay all taxes on those who can bear them .... "343 
Senator Borah (Idaho): An income tax was needed to supplement the 
tariffs "in order that we may arrive as nearly as we can, as human ingenuity 
can make it, at a tax which is levied upon a man's ability to pay and in 
accordance with what he derives as a measure of benefit from his 
Government." 344 He added, "We believe that every tax system based upon 
consumption should be supplemented by a system which taxes property and 
the wealth of the country .... "345 
Sen. Cummins (Iowa): "[A]n income tax, levied upon those who ought 
to bear the burdens of government, ... will meet even that principle more 
perfectly than to levy duties upon things that the people must use, and 
impose the weight of government only by the rule of consumption."346 
340. 44 CONG. REC. 1429 (Apr. 21, 1909). 
341. Id. 
342. Id. 
343. 44 CONG. REC. 1538 (Apr. 26, 1909); see also 44 CONG. REc. 1702 (May 4, 1909): 
I believe not that wealth ought to supplement the tax which consumption 
pays, but I believe wealth ought to bear it alL I think it is a monstrous 
injustice for the law to compel any man to wear a suit of clothes and then tax 
him for buying it. ... I believe that all taxes ought to be laid on property and 
none of it should be laid upon consumption. 
344. 44 CONG. REC. 1680 (May 3, 1909). 
345. 44 CONG. REC. 1682 (May 3, 1909). 
346. 44 CONG. REC. 3968 (June 30, 1909). 
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Rep. Ollie M. James (Kentucky): "[N]o tax was ever more unjust ... 
than a tax upon consumption . . . . A tax upon what some people eat and 
what they wear would deny them the necessities of life, while others, rolling 
in opulence ... , would not feel such a tax." 347 
Rep. Robert Lee Henry (Texas): "Equality in taxation should be the 
north star to light our pathway and direct our feet in the enactment of such 
statutes. No tax more equitably and wisely distributes the burdens of 
government than an income tax." 348 
Rep. Adam M. Byrd (Mississippi): A tariff falls "upon consumption and 
not upon wealth, upon what one eats and wears and not upon his property; it 
means that the citizen who can scarcely provide food and raiment for his 
wife and children contributes as much or more to the support of the 
Government as does the multimillionaire."349 
Rep. William Sulzer, a Democrat (New York): 
At the present time nearly all the taxes ... are levied on consumption 
-on what the people need to eat and to wear and to live; on the 
necessaries of life; and the consequence is that the poor man ... 
pays practically as much to support the Government as the rich 
man . . . . This system of tariff tax on consumption ... is an unjust 
system of taxation, and the only way to remedy the iniustice and 
d h . 1' . b d d . ~50 estroy t e mequa 1ty 1s y a gra uate mcome tax . . . . 
Sen. McLaurin (Mississippi): "I think it is fair and just that there should 
be an income tax to compel those of wealth . . . to pay some part of the 
expenses of the Government."351 
I d. 
Rep. De Armond (Missouri), a veteran of the 1894 battles: 
There is no good reason why taxation should not be according to 
ability to pay-according to wealth, according to income. Your 
tariff tax is a tax upon necessity, a tax in proportion to the amount 
you buy, a tax in proportion to what you must have, not a tax in 
. h 352 proportiOn to w at you possess. 
347. 44 CONG. REC. 4398 (July 12, 1909). 
Who is prepared to defend as just a system of taxation that requires a hod 
carrier, who for eight long hours each day wends his way to the dizzy heights 
of a lofty building with his load of mortar or brick, to pay as much to support 
this great Republic as John D. Rockefeller ... ? 
348. 44 CONG. REC. 4412 (July 12, 1909). 
349. 44 CONG. REC. 4416 (July 12, 1909). 
350. 44 CONG. REC. 4417 (July 12, 1909). 
351. 44 CONG. REC. 4109 (July 5, 1909). 
352. 44 CONG. REC. 4420 (July 12, 1909). 
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Rep. William G. Sharp (Ohio): "One of the most salient [reasons for an 
income tax] is that, upon its very face, it places the bu.rden of taxation most 
heavily upon those who are most able to bear it [rather than on 
consumers]. "353 
Rep. Martin Dies (Texas): "What form of taxation could be more unjust 
than to tax a man in proportion to what he eats, wears, and uses?"354 
Rep. Courtney W. Hamlin (Missouri): "The tariff tax is levied entirely 
upon consumption. The laboring man must expend his income for food, 
fuel, clothing, and tools of industry, and these taxes are heavier upon the 
necessities."355 He added that Democrats had always argued for shifting the 
burden of government "at least partially ... from the backs of the poor to 
those who can bear it; to divide these burdens between wealth and 
consumption; to divide them between the man who has nothing but his 
labor and the man who has incomes many times greater."356 
Rep. William R. Smith (Texas): "No one can contend that our system of 
indirect taxation [has no] objectionable features, because ... its burdens are 
measured by what the citizen's needs require him to purchase for 
consumption and not by the amount of his wealth, nor by his ability to 
pay."3s7 
Rep. Cyrus Cline (Ohio): "I believe in an income tax because it taxes 
what a man really has. It taxes wealth, not want; accumulated possessions, 
instead of consumption."358 
Rep. James B. (Champ) Clark (Missouri): "[I]t is monstrous to say that 
the accumulated wealth of this country shall not bear its just proportion of 
the public burdens."359 In fact, Clark favored a land tax, 360 arguing that, 
because the premise of the direct-tax clauses (that wealth and population 
were equally distributed) was no longer valid, "there is no reason why we 
should longer adhere to that part of the Constitution relative to a head tax 
and population."361 
Overall, the tone of the debates was more civil than in 1894. There were 
fewer populists around, and, given the reduced opposition to an income tax, 
353. 44 CONG. REC. 4425 (July 12, 1909). 
354. 44 CONG. REC. 4426 (July 12, 1909). 
355. 44 CONG. REC. 4433 (July 12, 1909). 
356. Id. "[T]ax men according to their ability to pay and the benefits received. This can be 
done under a graduated income-tax law .... " 44 CONG. REc. app. 126 (July 12, 1909). 
357. 44 CONG.REC. app. 127 (July 12, 1909). 
358. 44 CONG. REC. 4436 (July 12, 1909). 
359. 44 CONG. REC. 4392 (July 12, 1909). 
360. 44 CONG. REC. 4393 (July 12, 1909) 
361. 44 CONG. REC. 4392 (July 12, 1909). 
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less reason to debate with "agrarian ferocity." 362 But except for differences 
in tone, passages could be moved from 1894 to 1909 and back again 
without changing the nature of the debate in either year. 
Opponents made the same points that had been made in 1894. An 
income tax, it was said, was socialistic363 and inquisitorial.364 It ought to be 
available, if at all, only in emergencies.365 And, as in 1894, there were 
references about the extent to which an income tax helps, or hinders, civic 
virtue. 366 
The 1909 income tax proponents prevailed, of course, with ratification of 
the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 and enactment of an income tax law in 
that year. 367 That first statute seems quaint to modem readers-with rates 
on income above $3000 ranging from one to seven percent368-and we've 
certainly moved far beyond what anyone could have imagined in 1909 or 
1913.369 In 1909, Senator William Borah responded to the charge that an 
income tax is necessarily socialistic, by sarcastically criticizing positions 
taken by opponents: 
When the State or the Government sees fit to lay a [tariff] which 
may take 30 per cent of the income, the fruits of the labor, of the 
man of ordinary means, that is the exercise of constitutional 
power. But when you lay a tax of 2 per cent upon incomes, so 
slight a burden that it would scarcely be felt, that is socialism. 
Man's intelligence should not be so universally discredited. But 
362. BROWNLEE, supra note 105, at 38 (describing 1894 debates). 
363. See infra text accompanying note 370 (quoting Sen. Borah's response to claims of 
socialism). 
364. See 44 CONG. REc. 4390 (July 12, 1909) (statement of N.Y. Republican Rep. Sereno 
E. Payne, chair of Ways and Means Committee) ("As to the general policy of an income tax, I 
am utterly opposed to it. I believe with Gladstone that it tends to make a nation of liars .... "). 
365. 44 CONG. REc. 4391 (July 12, 1909) (statement of Mass. Rep. Samuel W. McCall) 
("[W]hy not ... limit it expressly to time of war?''); see also 44 CON G. REC. 4393 (July 12, 
1909) (statement of Conn. Rep. Ebenezer J. Hill) ("I am not in favor of giving this Government 
the power to lay an income tax in time of peace."). But Senator Bailey made it clear: "I do not 
propose the income tax as a mere means of providing for an emergency. I propose it as a 
deliberate, fixed, and permanent part of our fiscal policy." 44 CONG. REc. 2446 (May 27, 
1909). (He did, however, deny that he wanted it to be a "main basis of revenue." !d.) 
366. Senator McLaurin said an income tax would make the "wealthy ... interested in an 
economical administration of the Government instead of extravagance." 44 CONG. REc. 4109 
(May 27, 1909). 
367. Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. 
368. In form, the tax was 1% on "net income" above $3000. !d. §§ IIA.l, II.C. But 
surtaxes ranging from 1% to 6% applied to higher levels of income. !d. § II.A.2. 
369. Brownlee has argued the income tax wasn't expected to be a dominant, permanent 
source of revenue. See BROWNLEE, supra note 105, at 45; see also supra note 365 (quoting Sen. 
Bailey). One hears echoes of the assurances that direct taxes would be used only in 
emergencies. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text. 
1128 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
he says if you can levy a tax of 2 per cent you may lay a tax of 50 
or I 00 per cent. Who will lay the tax of 50 or 100 per cent? 
Whose equity, sense of fairness, of justice, of patriotism does he 
question? Why, the representatives of the American people .... 370 
How could the "representatives of the American people" do such a thing? 
Well, the marginal rates never reached 1 00 percent, but they got close-and 
they got there fast. 371 
Fights about appropriate rates will go on as long as there's an income 
tax, of course, and the constitutionality of a graduated rate structure turned 
out to be a nonissue. 372 Given the extent to which income tax proponents 
wanted to tax the wealthy, to implement the ability-to-pay principle, it did 
no textual damage to see progressivity as inherent in the grant of power to 
tax "incomes" without apportionment. Nevertheless, the Sixteenth 
Amendment covered only "taxes on incomes." The Amendment isn't 
authority for an unapportioned direct-consumption tax; it was the perceived 
failure of consumption taxes that made the income tax-and hence the 
Sixteenth Amendment-necessary. 
3. A Wealth Tax Isn't an Income Tax 
Before I leave the history of the Sixteenth Amendment, I should 
anticipatorily respond to a potential characterization of some of what was 
said, both in 1894 and in 1909, about income taxation. The income tax was 
intended to reach the wealthy (about that there can be no doubt), but the 
proposed tax wasn't a wealth tax as we have come to understand that term. 
Income tax proponents in 1894 and, to a lesser extent, 1909 routinely 
contrasted the consumption taxes they despised with taxes on wealth, which 
would meet ability-to-pay criteria, and the income tax was often 
370. 44 CONG. REC. 3999 (July 1, 1909). 
371. Marginal rates went up to 77% in 1918, see Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 210-211, 
40 Stat. 1057 (1919); Brownlee, supra note 254, at 45, but the wartime rates were 
temporary. Cf. AMITY SHLAES, THE GREEDY HAND 181 (1999) ("[T)here was a floor debate [in 
1913) on whether to put a 10 percent cap in the constitutional amendment. The answer was 
no-largely because people thought the idea that the tax might ever rise that high too absurd to 
address."). 
372. Some thought the constitutionality of progressive rates would remain an issue even 
without the direct-tax clauses. See supra text accompanying note 324. ·But the uniformity 
clause had already been limited to geography in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83-106 
(1900); see supra Part II.A, and a graduated structure passed muster in Brushaber v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). 
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characterized as a tax on wealth or property. 373 When they used those 
terms, however, supporters were talking about taxing "earnings of 
wealth"374-that's what was on the table for discussion-rather than 
measuring the tax by the value of a person's wealth:375 Indeed, some 
Populist supporters plaintively wished it were possible to impose a tax 
directly on land, following Henry George's single tax proposal,376 but it was 
generally understood such a tax wouldn't fly politically and that, in any 
event, it would present insuperable constitutional problems.377 The tax 
enacted in 1894 wasn't an ad valorem tax on wealth; nor was it like what is 
proposed today as a wealth tax. 378 If our understanding of the Sixteenth 
Amendment should be informed by the 1894 and 1909 debates, as I've 
argued, we shouldn't take from those debates the idea that a wealth tax is a 
"tax on incomes."379 
C. Consumption Taxes and Income Taxes Today 
In the prior section, I established that the Sixteenth Amendment came 
into being to permit an unapportioned income tax because the prior 
consumption tax system was thought to have serious flaws. An income tax 
was important precisely because it wasn't a tax on consumption. And the 
373. Many of the passages I've quoted have language like that. See, e.g., supra text 
accompanying notes 178 (McMillin), 190 (Patterson), 205 (De Armond), 344 (Borah), 355-
356 (Hamlin). 
374. H.R. REP. No. 53-276, at 3 (1894) (emphasis added). 
375. Not many congressmen were clear about this distinction, but some were. For example, 
Populist James G. Maguire of California recognized the income tax wouldn't reach unrealized 
appreciation in land value; he therefore proposed a direct tax on that value. 26 CONG. REc. app. 
329 (Jan. 31, 1894). 
376. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REc. 6634 (June 21, 1894) (statement of Sen. Peffer); supra note 
375 (noting Maguire plan). The single tax was advanced in HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND 
POVERTY (1879). 
377. Some said apportionment had outlived its usefulness, see, e.g., 44 CONG. REc. 4392 
(July 12, 1909) (statement of Rep. Clark); supra note 361 and accompanying text, but with 
cases from Hylton to Pollock on the books, it was hard to imagine an unapportioned tax on real 
property surviving judicial review. 
378. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 27. 
379. Professor Schenk has suggested the Supreme Court might be convinced to see the ex 
ante wealth tax she proposes as "an income tax with a base equal to the risk-free return to 
certain assets," Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REv. 
423, 441 (2000), and therefore as "a tax on income within the Sixteenth Amendment." !d. at 
442. But if so, it wouldn't be because income taxes and wealth taxes were viewed the same 
way when the Amendment was ratified. Schenk recognizes the Court might see her 
reformulation "as a mere semantic change that does not cure the constitutional infirmity of a 
wealth tax." !d. 
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understanding that income taxes and consumption . taxes are different 
animals continues today. . 
The economic literature can't be controlling in interpreting the 
Constitution, of course, but it's instructive to see how economists have 
viewed income taxes and consumption taxes. As the terms are ordinarily 
used in the literature, an income tax is the opposite of a consumption tax. 380 
At least since Irving Fisher, consumption tax advocates have complained 
about an income tax's being imposed both on the receipt of capital and on 
the income generated by the capital. 381 In contrast, a pure consumption tax 
exempts either the capital or the income from capital from tax. 382 
Despite its hybrid status, our current "income" tax satisfies the double-
tax criterion for an income tax. 383 Indeed, if the income tax didn't reach 
most sources of capital, it wouldn't have come into being. In contrast, the 
direct-consumption taxes proposed in recent years, the flat tax and USA tax, 
wouldn't satisfy the double-tax criterion; that's part of their attraction. 
Economists have promoted the flat tax and the USA tax by emphasizing 
how different those taxes would be from the existing income tax scheme. 384 
For example, Messrs. Hall and Rabushka, the intellectual fathers of the flat 
tax, state, "The flat tax converts the income tax into a tax on consumption 
as it exempts all new investment from the tax base each year."385 It's very 
different, that is, from an income tax. It's impossible to read Hall and 
Rabushka as suggesting that implementation of the flat tax is just a matter 
of tinkering with the existing system. 
I now understand, after reading Professor Zelenak's article, that I 
shouldn't overdo these modern characterizations. For every statement by an 
economist touting the flat tax.or the USA tax as a consumption tax, Zelenak 
can fmd someone who uses income tax language--even though everyone in 
the economics profession knows these would be consumption taxes. 386 
With no professional norms supporting precision in language, politicians 
380. I'm indebted to Calvin Johnson for these points. 
381. IRVING FISHER & HERBERT W. FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION: A 
PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 56-57 (1942). 
382. Fisher and, recently, Professor Strnad have said a true income tax wouldn't impose a 
double tax on capital. See id.; Jeff Strnad, Taxation of Income from Capital: A Theoretical 
Reappraisal, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1023 (1985). But see SIMONS, supra note 126, at 226 ("Fisher's 
[point is] that anything ... called an income tax ought to be a tax on what Fisher calls 
income."); Louis Kaplow & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Professor Strnad's Rejoinder: Simply 
Semantics, 39 STAN. L. REv. 419, 419-25 (1987). 
383. On the hybrid nature of the tax, see infra note 526. 
384. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2411-13. 
385. HALL& RABUSHKA, THEFLATTAX, supra note 30, at 126. 
386. Indeed, Zelenak notes the same people may use the different characterizations 
indiscriminately. See Zelenak, supra note 19, at 854. 
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advocating one direct-consumption tax or another have been even less 
careful in distinguishing between income and consumption taxes. 387 
Some of the linguistic confusion is accidental, but some gaming is going 
on too. Stress continuity when that serves your purposes-it's an income 
tax with a postcard-sized return. 388 Stress discontinuity when you want to 
emphasize how significant the effects of changes will be. 
So I'll give up trying to find order in the public characterization of 
proposed direct-consumption taxes, except for making the following two 
unexceptionable points: The flat tax and the USA tax are unquestionably 
consumption taxes, and these taxes are. being marketed, by economists and 
politicians, as fundamental changes in the revenue system. Whatever is 
going on here, it's not business as usual. 
D. The Supreme Court and the Meaning of "Incomes" 
Income taxes and consumption taxes aren't the same constitutionally, or 
so I've been arguing. In this section I'll demonstrate that there's already 
enough substance to Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Sixteenth 
Amendment to incorporate the income tax-consumption tax distinction, 
rooted as it is in the history of the Amendment. 
The Amendment isn't usually thought of as a limitation on governmental 
power, and it was hardly a staple of twentieth-century judicial 
controversies.389 Tax folks know the Court struck down a tax on stock 
dividends in Eisner v. Macomber, 390 decided in 1920, holding that receipt of 
a proportionate stock dividend wasn't the receipt of "income." But nearly 
387. See id. at 850. I concede the statement offormer Ways and Means Chair Bill Archer, 
who wanted to "pull the income tax out by its roots and throw it away," John Godfrey, Archer 
Keen on Killing Code; Full Speed Ahead on Tax Reform, 70 TAX NOTES 1431, 1431 (1996) 
(quoting Archer's comments at press conference on Mar. 4, 1996), isn't precisely on point in 
discussing direct-consumption taxes. See Zelenak, supra note 19, at 850. It nevertheless 
accurately reflects the feelings of many of those who want to move to a consumption tax in lieu 
of an income tax. 
388. The postcard return is part of the original proposal, HALL & RABUSHKA, 'IDE FLAT 
TAX, supra note 30, at 52-82, and it's been picked up on as a marketing mechanism. See, e.g., 
Armey, supra note 100; see also GRAETZ, supra note 153, at 263 ("[TJhe fear of ... backlashes 
is at least part of the reason why consumption tax proponents in the Congress have cloaked their 
proposals in income tax garb."). 
389. I put aside tax-protester cases, which often contain claims that the Amendment wasn't 
properly ratified; that particular accessions to wealth (such as Federal Reserve notes) aren't 
"income"; and so on. For example, in Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), where the 
question was wilfulness in not paying taxes, the taxpayer "produced a letter from an attorney 
stating that the Sixteenth Amendment did not authorize a tax on wages and salaries but only on 
gainorprofit." !d. at 196. 
390. 252 u.s. 189 (1920). 
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all commentators think that case would be decided differently today}91 and 
the Court soon retreated from some of its broadest statements. 
That said, I'll demonstrate the skeptics are wrong about the irrelevance 
of Supreme Court Sixteenth Amendment jurisprudence. The cases don't 
provide a comprehensive theory of what income is, of course, and I'm not 
going to try to read such a theory into the cases. But there's more than 
enough to conclude that, if my history is right and a "tax on incomes" is 
different from a consumption tax, an unapportioned direct-consumption tax 
can't be enacted under the authority of the Amendment. 
The Amendment was explicated in a number of opinions in the two 
decades after ratification, and Macomber wasn't the only case in which the 
Court concluded, or assumed, the term "incomes" has content. 392 Despite 
the assumption that "inherent malleability" is the law of the land, there's no 
evidence the current Court has a position one way or the other on that 
issue.393 For what it's worth, Macomber hasn't been overruled, and it 
continues to be cited as if it stands for something. 394 
I'll defend three basic points derived from Supreme Court cases, each of 
which is relevant to the analysis of proposed direct-consumption taxes. 
First, I'll discuss the basic point of this Article-that the concept of 
"incomes" isn't unlimited in scope or "inherently malleable"-focusing on 
Macomber. Next, I'll demonstrate that the controlling conception of 
"incomes" should be determined using an original-understanding approach 
--by discerning, as well as we can, what the outer boundaries of the 
concept were at the time of the Amendment's ratification. Third, I'll argue 
391. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 16, at 42-46. In fact, the same issue can't come 
before the Court today, because proportionate stock dividends aren't taxed. See I.R.C. § 305(a) 
(1994) (stating that, subject to exceptions, "gross income does not include the amount of any 
distribution of the stock of a corporation made by such corporation to its shareholders with 
respect to its stock"); I.R.C. §§ 305(b), (c) (1994) (noting exceptions to general rule, all 
involving distributions actually or potentially disproportionate). 
392. The Amendment didn't provide the power to impose an income tax. The Amendment 
made it possible to have an unapportioned income tax. See Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 260 
(1920): 
[T]o enable Congress to reach all taxable income more conveniently and 
effectively than would be possible as to much of it if an apportiomnent 
among the States were essential, the Sixteenth Amendment was proposed 
and ratified. In other words, the purpose of the Amendment was to eliminate 
all occasion for such an apportionment because of the source from which the 
income came, a change in no wise affecting the power to tax but only the 
mode of exercising it. 
393. The Court has faced no "taxes on incomes" question during the term of any current 
Justice. 
394. See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 563 (1991); see also 
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955); infra Part IV.D.l.c. 
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that, while the ratifiers of the Amendment knew accounting conventions 
would play a role in determining "income," all characterization questions 
aren't issues of accounting. The differences between income taxes and 
consumption taxes are for constitutional lawyers, not just the folks in green 
eyeshades, to ponder. 
1. The Notion of a Fixed Concept of Income 
The first proposition is this: The Supreme Court understood for at least 
two decades after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment that "incomes" 
has a meaning and that, as a result, Congress's power to define what could 
be covered by an unapportioned income tax was limited. 
a. Eisner v. Macomber 
In Eisner v. Macomber, 395 the issue was the taxability of a totally 
proportionate stock dividend-a dividend of stock from corporation to 
shareholder that didn't change anyone's interest in the assets or earnings of 
the corporation. 396 Before the distribution, Mrs. Macomber held a small 
percentage of the stock of Standard Oil of California; afterwards, her 
interest was exactly the same as before. 397 
The question was simple: Could Congress impose a tax on such a stock 
dividend without requiring apportionment among the states? That is, is 
such a tax a "tax on incomes" (or part of a "tax on incomes") exempt from 
the apportionment requirement that otherwise applies to direct taxes? 
The constitutional issue hadn't been squarely faced before, although 
there were hints in Towne v. Eisner, 398 decided in 1918, which held that the 
term "dividends," as used in the Income Tax Law of 1913,399 dian 't include 
a stock dividend. That case was decided on statutory grounds, but the 
Macomber Court, in an opinion by Justice Pitney for a five-man majority, 
said that the district judge in Towne, Augustus Hand, had appropriately 
treated the "construction of the act as inseparable from the interpretation of 
the Sixteenth Amendment."400 
In other words, Judge Hand had decided the income reachable under the 
1913 statute, when Congress had tried to exercise its full power, was 
identical to the constitutional concept of "incomes." Income is income. In 
395. 252 u.s. 189 (1920). 
396. !d. at 199. 
397. !d. at 200-01. 
398. 245 u.s. 418 (1918). 
399. Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, § II.B, 38 Stat. 167. 
400. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 202. 
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decades: "'the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined."'410 In contrast, said Justice Pitney, a stock dividend simply 
divides a shareholder's capital up into more pieces: without changing the 
nature of her holding. 411 Taxing a stock dividend would be the equivalent 
of taxing unrealized appreciation, and "enrichment through increase in 
value of capital investment is not income in any proper meaning of the 
term."412 
One might disagree with the Macomber Court's conclusion that a 
proportionate stock dividend isn't "income";413 there are reasons why 
receipt of a stock dividend from a corporation with undistributed earnings 
might be treated as a taxable event. 414 (That's not necessarily the right 
result-it's not dear the drafters of the Amendment would have seen this as 
income-but it wouldn't have been a ridiculous result either.) But modern 
commentators don't merely reject the outcome in Macomber; they reject the 
very idea of trying to define what is and what isn't income. That's a big 
logical leap. 
Some criticisms of Macomber are just unfair. For example, Professor 
Ackerman lambastes Justice .Pitney for accepting the proposition that 
"Pollock's unprecedented extension of the 'direct tax' category to include 
all forms of property could continue to serve as an unquestionable starting 
point."415 In particular, Pitney erred, says Ackerman, in not "consider[ing] 
any of the actual facts surrounding [the Amendment's] proposal and 
enactment-not even the fact that the draftsmen changed their language in 
response to criticism that it might be open to the very construction that 
Pitney was now imposing on the text."416 Since Ackerman's version of 
events has only the most tenuous connection to reality, 417 it's hard to 
410. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (quoting Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 
U.S. 399, 415 (1913); Doyle v. Mitchel Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918). 
411. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 203. 
412. !d. at 214-15. 
413. One might also question whether the Macomber definition of "income" was broad 
enough. In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Court concluded 
that items like punitive damages can be income even though not derived from labor or 
capital. Macomber's defmition was too narrow, given that Congress intended "to tax all gains 
except those specifically exempted." !d. at 429-30; see infra notes 468-471 and accompanying 
text (discussing Glenshaw Glass). 
414. In dissent, Justice Brandeis said a stock dividend is like a cash distribution followed by 
reinvestment, which would have been taxable. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 220-21. Or Macomber 
might have been viewed as having had a choice of stock or cash, also taxable. Cf I.R.C. 
§ 305(b)(1) (1994). 
415. Ackerman, supra note 16, at 42. 
416. !d. at43. 
417. See supra notes 306-3 31 and accompanying text. 
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imagine how Pitney could have taken advantage of those mysterious "actual 
facts." 
It was in Macomber that, in dissent, Justice Holmes wrote the line so 
many have picked up on: "The .known purpose of the [Sixteenth] 
Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as· to what might be direct 
taxes."418 As I noted earlier, Holmes provided no evidence to support his 
position-indeed, the evidence is to the contrary419-so Ackerman suggests 
we should accept this understanding because of Holmes's "lived experience" 
during ratification. 420 The lived experiences of the Macomber majority, all 
of whom interpreted the Amendment differently, apparently weren't up to 
constitutional snuff. 
If "lived experience" is the best argument for deferring to Holmes, I've 
no doubt Macomber remains the.law of the land. 421 Be that as it may, even 
Holmes felt constrained by language. He purported to be interpreting the 
word "incomes," and to be looking for. "a sense most obvious to the 
common understanding at the time of [the Amendment's] adoption."422 He 
concluded, "I cannot doubt that most people not lawyers would suppose 
when they voted for [the Amendment] that they put a question like the 
present [the taxability of proportionate stock dividends] to rest."423 
If Holmes was wrong about what people were thinking while ratification 
was underway, his conclusion was wrong. I can't imagine ratifiers would 
have thought the Amendment permitted an unapportioned tax. on all forms 
··of unrealized appreciation-a tax on property. 42 And I don't know why we 
should care only for the views of "people not lawyers." Many of those 
voting in Congress and in state legislatures were lawyers, of course, and the 
Constitution is, at least in part, a legal document. 
Ackerman likes the Holmesian view because he sees the Sixteenth 
Amendment as part of an uprising to repudiate Pollock and reestablish 
plenary taxing power. In a line I quoted earlier, he wrote, "When the 
People mobilize to overrule the Court, it seems particularly inappropriate 
418. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 219-20 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
419. Congressional debates weren't silent on the point. See supra notes 294-298 and 
accompanying text (discussing Brown- McLaurin colloquy). 
420. Ackerman, supra note 16, at 45-46. 
421. One might also wonder why there's a need to defer to Holmes's "lived 
experience." Ackerman criticizes Justice Pitney for not having examined the "actual facts" 
surrounding the drafting of the Sixteenth Amendment. See supra text accompanying note 
416. If Pitney could have cited those facts, why couldn't Holmes have done so as well? 
422. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoting Bishop v. State, 149 Ind. 
223, 230 (1898)). 
423. Id. 
424. In 1894, Representative Maguire understood that an income tax would not reach 
unrealized appreciation. See supra note 3 7 5. 
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for the Justices to respond in a niggling fashion." 425 But while an income 
tax had popular support, this was no move to validate ap unlimited national 
taxing power; the Amendment was intended to make possible a tax that 
would affect a small part of the population. 426 It was a movement to tax the 
"man behind that tree."427 
Professor Zelenak also seems to have joined the burgeoning Ivy League 
populist movement, urging us to look to the man on the street to interpret 
constitutional provisions. Quoting Holmes, Zelenak says that "'it was for 
public adoption that the Sixteenth Amendment was proposed,' and the 
public understanding of what constitutes an income tax should determine 
the constitutionality of the flat tax and the USA tax."428 I'm skeptical that 
Ackerman's American People in 1913 intended an unlimited taxing power, 
and I'm no more persuaded that today's public should be responsible for 
defining constitutional terms. If there's a popular movement to compress 
the meaning of "incomes"-that movement has always existed, but suppose 
I can get it going at fever pitch-should that affect our constitutional 
understanding? 
b. Other Cases and the Post-Amendment Congresses 
Macomber took the term "taxes on incomes" seriously, and it wasn't an 
aberrational decision. In two cases decided shortly thereafter, Weiss v. 
Stearn429 and Edwards v. Cuba Railroad Co.,430 the Court held the 
Sixteenth Amendment had controlling effect. And there were many other 
cases in which the Court took for granted its power to invalidate an 
unapportioned tax on the ground that the tax wasn't one on "incomes." 
In Weiss, the Court extended Macomber's principles to corporate 
reorganizations. If a shareholder was cashed out, he was required to 
recognize any gain, of course; no one could have thought otherwise, even 
with Macomber on the books.431 But in an opinion by Justice McReynolds, 
425. Ackennan, supra note 16, at 55. 
426. The 1894 income tax directly affected only about 1% of the population. See Jensen, 
supra note 6, at 2343 n.41; supra note 64. 
427. I refer to the ditty, attributed to .former Senator Russell Long, that characterizes the 
average citizen's view of the tax system: "Don't tax him and don't tax me, but tax that man 
behind that tree." Quoted in Charles 0. Galvin, It's VAT Time Again, 21 TAX NOTES 275, 277 
(1983). 
428. Zelenak, supra note 19, at 854. 
429. 265 u.s. 242 (1924). 
430. 268 U.S. 628 (1925). 
431. Weiss, 265 U.S. at 252. Macomber shouldn't have been understood to exempt 
anything called a stock dividend from income taxation. In two cases decided the next year, 
United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921), and Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 
(1921), the Court held that the receipt of stock dividends which changed shareholders' 
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the Court concluded that, to the extent a shareholder maintained a stock 
interest in the surviving entity (a new corporation formed under the laws of 
the same state), Macomber controlled. For a shareholder who received only 
new stock in exchange for old stock, there was no severance of income 
from capital and therefore, constitutionally, no income to be taxed. 432 Only 
Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented. 
In 1925, the Court decided another case in which "incomes" was deemed 
to mean something. Cuba Railroad considered the taxability of cash 
subsidies paid by the Cuban government to facilitate railroad construction 
in Cuba. 433 Revenue officials argued the subsidies were in effect advance 
payments made by the Cuban government for services to be performed by 
Cuba Railroad.434 The Court concluded, however, that the payments were 
similar to subsidies provided to railroads in North America: "The subsidy 
payments were proportionate to mileage completed; and this indicates a 
purpose to reimburse plaintiff for capital expenditures."435 
This conclusion had constitutional dimensions: "The subsidy payments 
taxed were not made for services rendered or to be rendered. They were not 
profits or gains from the use or operation of the railroad, and do not 
constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment": 436 
The Sixteenth Amendment, like other laws authorizing or imposing 
taxes, is to be taken as written and is not to be extended beyond 
the meaning clearly indicated by the language used .... There is 
no support for the view that the Cuban Government gave the 
r~spective interests in assets and earnings and profits was a taxable event. The rationale for not 
taxing Macomber, that her interest remained unchanged, didn't apply to a stock dividend that 
shifted interests among shareholders. 
432. See Weiss, 265 U.S. at 253 (rejecting idea that "mere change for purposes of 
reorganization in the technical ownership of an enterprise . . . followed by issuance of new 
certificates, constitutes gain separated from the original capital interest. Something more is 
necessary-something which gives the stockholder a thing really different from what he 
theretofore had."). Since the Court had collapsed constitutional and statutory analysis in 
Macomber, it's possible to see Weiss as a statutory case. But McReynolds' several references to 
the Amendment confirm Weiss's constitutional basis. (Nevertheless, struggling to understand 
reorganizations, the Court soon limited Weiss and Macomber to cases where the "business 
enterprise actually conducted remained exactly the same." Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 
540 (1925). And in Cottage Savings Ass 'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1991), the 
Court discussed Weiss and Marr with no mention of the Constitution.) 
433. CubaR.R., 268 U.S. at629. 
434. Id. at 631. 
435. Id. at 632. Land and other property had also been provided, but the government didn't 
argue that the value of those properties belonged in Cuba Railroad's income. 
436. Id. at 633. 
i 
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subsidy payments ... merely to obtain the specified concessions in 
f .c: • 437 respect o rates 10r government transportatiOn. 
The particular results in these cases, as in Macomber, are certainly open 
to criticism, 438 but the important point for present purposes is that the Court 
saw limits to the concept of income. As recently as 1961, some Supreme 
Court Justices continued to do so. 439 
In many other cases, it was taken for granted that "taxes on incomes" had 
enforceable content. Sometimes the Court made that point in throwaway 
lines, in cases where a statute was deemed to meet constitutional 
requirements. For example, in Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v. Hop-
kins,440 Justice Brandeis, no friend of Macomber, conceded congressional 
power was limited: "It is true that congress cannot make a thing income 
which is not so in fact." 441 Brandeis made this 1925 concession when it 
didn't matter, but he still felt it necessary to make the point. 
Similarly, in Taft v. Bowers, 442 a 1929 case, the Court stated, "Under 
former decisions here the settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth Amendment 
confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income without 
apportionment something which theretofore could not have been properly 
regarded as income."443 As in Burk-Waggoner Oil, that conception of 
437. Id. at 631-32. 
438. In Cuba Railroad, for example, the Cuban govermnent expected benefits to accrue 
from the expenditures. Unrelated parties don't ordinarily transfer property to profit-making 
corporations without some expectation of benefit. See I.R.C. § 118(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) 
(excepting from general rule that corporation recognizes no income on contributions to capital 
any "contribution in aid of construction or any other contribution as a customer or potential 
customer"). 
439. The principles of Cuba Railroad convinced dissenting Justice Whittaker (joined by 
Black and Douglas), in James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), that embezzled funds 
couldn't be taxed to the embezzler. While the majority had relied on the broad constitutional 
taxing power, id. at 218, Whittaker concluded that an embezzler had no income: 
Equally well settled is the principle that the Sixteenth Amendment "is to be 
taken as written and is not to be extended beyond the meaning clearly 
indicated by the language used." The language of the Sixteenth Amendment, 
as well as our prior controlling decisions, compels me to conclude that the 
question now before us ... must be answered negatively. 
Id. at 248-49 (quoting Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. at 631-32). Whittaker cited Macomber for the 
proposition that Congress can't alter the definition of "incomes," a constitutional term. Id. at 
248 n.l. But see Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1952) ("We think the power of 
Congress to tax these [illegal] receipts as income under the Sixteenth Amendment is 
unquestionable."). 
440. 269 U.S. 110 (1925) (holding Congress may impose corporate income tax on earnings 
of unincorporated joint stock company denominated a partnership under state law). 
441. Id: at 114. 
442. 278 U.S. 470 (1929). 
443. Id. at 481. 
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limited congressional power didn't prevent the tax at issue from being 
imposed, 444 but the Court made the statement about constitutional principles 
because it was an accepted, nondebatable proposition. 
Lots of other language supporting this conception can be found in early 
cases. From 1934: "The rental value of the building used by the owner does 
not constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. " 445 
From 1926: "It was not the purpose or effect of that Amendment to bring 
any new subject within the taxing power."446 From 1921: "[I]n determining 
the definition of ... 'income,' ... this Court has ... approved ... what it 
believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must 
have been in the minds of people when they adopted the Sixteenth 
Amendment .... "447 All dicta, but all reflecting a particular view about 
how the Amendment should be understood. 
In the transition period after ratification of the Amendment, even 
Congress, worried about challenges that might arise if taxing statutes were 
aggressively drafted, recognized limitations on its own power. In general, 
Congress defined income conservatively-not trying to tax distributions to 
shareholders made out of earnings from the pre-ratification period, or to tax 
gain attributable to post-1913 appreciation. 448 It was feared a tax might 
otherwise be characterized as on property or principal-and therefore as an 
unapportioned direct tax unprotected by the Amendment. 
444. The case considered whether a donee who later sold property received as a gift could 
be taxed on appreciation that occurred while the donor held the property. The tax didn't violate 
constitutional requirements: "There is nothing in the Constitution which lends support to the 
theory that gain actually resulting from the increased value of capital can be treated as taxable 
income in the hands of the recipient only so far as the increase occurred while he owned the 
property." Id. at 484. 
445. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 379 (1934). 
446. Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174 (1926). 
447. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921). 
448. For 1913, the tax applied only to "net income accruing from March first to December 
thirty-first." Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, § II.D, 38 Stat. 168. Congress didn't try to tax 
distributions from pre-1913 earnings. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 
757 (defining "dividends" as distributions "out of earnings or profits accrued since March first, 
nineteen hundred and thirteen"); I.R.C. § 316(a) (1994) (defining "dividends" as "distributions 
... out of earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913"); see also Edwards v. 
Douglas, 269 U.S. 204 (1925) (discussing why Congress limited dividend treatment); S. Pac. 
Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918) (holding distributions from pre-1913 earnings not taxable 
under statute). Nor did it try to tax pre-1913 appreciation. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 
202(a)(l), 40 Stat. 1060 (providing for "property acquired before March 1, 1913, the fair market 
value of such property as of that date" would be basis); see also I.R.C. § 301(c)(3)(B) (1994) 
(exempting non-dividend distributions exceeding basis to extent distribution is "out of increase 
in value accrued before March 1, 1913"); I.R.C. § 1015(c) (1994) (treating basis of property 
acquired by gift before 1921 as value at time of acquisition). 
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Those reservations about congressional power weren't universally 
held,449 and Congress, as it turned out, was too cautiou~ in its drafting. The 
Macomber Court suggested that pre-Amendment earnings could be taxed if 
they were realized after the Amendment was in effect. 450 But Congress's 
conservatism reflects a basic point about original understanding: no one 
thought the Amendment was an unlimited grant of power to Congress; no 
one thought "incomes" was a meaningless term. 
c. Is Macomber Dead? 
Of course, the recitation of these old cases is of merely historical interest 
if Macomber and friends are no longer of doctrinal importance. The case 
has been described as "now archaic,"451 and most commentators outside 
Cleveland, Ohio, are skeptical that the Sixteenth Amendment imposes any 
serious limits on Congress's power to define income. 452 But Lake Erie is 
alive and well, thank you very much, and some of us in Cleveland detect a 
heartbeat in Macomber. 
It's true the Court didn't give an expansive interpretation of the 
case. For example, in Helvering v. Bruun,453 the government sought to tax a 
449. Representatives John K. Shields and Cordell Hull, and Thurlow M. Gordon, an 
assistant to the Attorney General, published memoranda explaining why items realized after 
February 28, 1913, could be taxed even if the earnings were attributable to earlier periods. See 
THE INCOME TAX: OPINIONS OF HON. JOHN K. SHIELDS, HON. CORDELL HULL, AND THuRLOW 
M. GORDON ON THE PROPOSED INCOME-TAX PROVISION OF THE PENDING TARIFF BILL, S. Inc. 
No. 63-171 (1913). 
450. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 204 (1920) ("Congress was at liberty ... to tax 
as income, without apportionment, everything that became income, in the ordinary sense of the 
word, after the adoption of the Amendment .... "); id. at 203-04 ("[H]ad we considered [in 
Towne] that a stock dividend constituted income in any true sense, it would have been held 
taxable under the Act of 1913 notwithstanding it was based upon profits earned before the 
Amendment."). The Court cited Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918) (holding cash dividend 
taxable though partly paid from pre-1913 earnings), and Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347 
(1918) (holding taxable dividend from pre-1913 earnings paid in stock of other company). 
Presumably the same principle should have applied to appreciation, but the signals are 
mixed. In Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573 (1929), the Court held pre-1913 appreciation 
couldn't be taxed on statutory grounds, but suggested basis should be carefully determined to 
avoid constitutional issues. See id. at 577. While pre-Amendment appreciation was often 
characterized as "capital" in nature, see, e.g., United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 
265 U.S. 189, 195 (1924) (holding life insurance proceeds not taxable under statute), the Court 
held that recovery on a contingent claim attributable, in part, to pre-1913 lost income wasn't 
capital if the claim hadn't been accrued as of March 1, 1913. United States v. Safety Car 
Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 93 (1936). 
451. GRAETZ, supra note 153, at 285. 
452. But see Leon Gabinet & Ronald J. Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept 
of Income for Corporation-Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 895, 
920-35 (1977); Jensen, supra note 18, at 708-11. 
453. 309 U.S. 461 (1940). 
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landlord on the value of improvements made by a lessee, in the year in 
which the lessee defaulted (long before the lease was to terminate). The 
landlord argued that, while the improvements had increased the value of his 
property, this was just a case of unrealized appreciation. 454 Without 
repudiating Macomber, the Court, in 1940, interpreted its scope narrowly, 
suggesting much of the language was specific to the facts of that case: 
[Taxpayer] emphasizes the necessity that the gain be separate from 
the capital and separately disposable. These expressions, 
however, were used to clarify the distinction between an ordinary 
dividend and a stock dividend. They were meant to show that in 
the case of a stock dividend, the stockholder's interest in the 
corporate assets after receipt of the dividend was the same as and 
inseverable from that which he owned before the dividend was 
declared. We think they are not controlling here.455 
If cases involving beagles aren't precedents for similar cases involving 
terriers, it's a good indication the beagle cases aren't in favor. And in 1943, 
although the Court strained not to reexamine Macomber in Helvering v. 
Griffiths,456 it again hinted it no longer valued Macomber. 457 Congress had 
excepted from the definition of "dividends" any "distribution . . . to the 
extent that it does not constitute income to the shareholder within the 
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment."458 Congress apparently intended to 
tax whatever it could, and .it punted on defining what .is con.stitutional.459 
With that dubious statute to enforce, the government said a proportionate 
stock dividend was taxable, and asked for reconsideration of Macomber. 
The Court avoided constitutional· issues by finding no intent to tax such a 
dividend,460 but it also made nOises, as ii]. Bruun, that Macomber was 
454. The appreciation should have been taxed, he argued, only if and when he disposed of 
the land. That's effectively the law today. See I.R.C. § 109 (1994); I.R.C. § 1017 (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999). 
455. Bruun, 309 U.S. at 468-69. 
456. 318 U:S. 371 (1943). 
457. See, e.g., id. at 394 ("[T)he question of the constitutional validity of Eisner v. 
Macomber is plainly one of the first magnitude .... "). 
458. Id. at 372 (citing I.R.C. § 115,53 Stat. 1, 47 (1940)). 
459. Perhaps Congress hoped to force reexamination of Macomber, just as many had 
hoped, prior to the Sixteenth Amendment, to force reconsideration of Pollock. See supra Part 
IV.B.2.a. 
460. See also Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943) (relying on Griffiths to conclude 
that, as statutory matter, proportionate distribution of preferred stock not taxable). 
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limited to its facts. 461 Wrote frustrated dissenter William 0. Douglas, 
"Eisner v. Macomber dies a slow death."462 
The Court has let Macomber linger, but would-be pallbearers think 
Congress has pulled the plug. Congress doesn't seem to see Macomber as 
putting significant limitations on what can be included in the tax base. 
Although proportionate stock dividends continue to be excluded from gross 
income 463-Macomber survives statutorily-Congress has enacted other 
provisions that reach unrealized appreciation in special situations.464 The 
constitutionality of those provisions seems to be taken for granted, or so the 
obituaries of Macomber say. 465 
Maybe Macomber has already been interred, but I'm skeptical. The case 
remains on the books, it doesn't stand by itself, and the Court continues to 
cite it. 466 And the lack of challenges to Code provisions that arguably 
conflict with Macomber proves little. Tax lawyers generally don't think in 
constitutional terms but, when they do, they're smart enough to know that 
litigating a constitutional issue is to be resisted at almost all costs. Besides, 
you don't challenge the constitutionality of potentially ornery provisions 
that you can tum to your clients' advantages, and tax lawyers do that all the 
time.467 
Even where the Court has seemed to push Macomber to the side, there 
have been hints the case has significance. In Commissioner v. Glenshaw 
Glass Co.,468 for example, the Court in 1955 reexamined the meaning of 
income-Macomber's definition was too narrow469-concluding that 
windfalls like punitive damages are income even though not derived from 
labor or capital. Macomber's language, said the Court, "was not meant to 
provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions."470 Glenshaw 
Glass is often seen as a rejection of Macomber, and there's something to 
that view. But the 1955 Court showed respect for the old warhorse: "In that 
461. See Griffiths, 318 U.S. at 375 ("The Court in f!Coshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 
(1936), holding taxable a distribution of common stock on preferred stock] in effect limited 
Eisner v. Macomber to the kind of dividend there dealt with."). 
462. Id. at 404 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
463. I.R.C. § 305(a) (1994). 
464. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 475 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (generally putting securities dealers on 
mark-to-market method); I.R.C. § 1256 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (putting "Section 1256 
contracts" on mark-to-market basis). 
465. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 16, at 52. 
466. See Jensen, supra note 18, at 708-11. 
467. For example, provisions that put taxpayers on a mark-to-market basis, see supra note 
464, aren't so bad when the recognition oflosses can be accelerated. 
468. 348 u.s. 426 (1955). 
469. See supra text accompanying note 410. 
470. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at431. 
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context-distinguishing gain from capital-the definition served a useful 
purpose."471 It remained the case, the Court could be interpreted as saying, 
that a tax imposed on capital (rather than gain from capital) is not a "tax on 
incomes." That important point should temper the enthusiasm of those 
advocating an unapportioned wealth tax. 
In Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner,472 a 1991 case with the 
most recent citations to Macomber, the Court said Macomber "recogniz[ ed] 
the realization requirement,"473 and referred to its "classic treatment of 
realization. '>474 To Macomber supporters, all three of us, those phrases have 
a nice ring. On the other hand, the Court said the realization rule is 
'"founded on administrative convenience, "'475 By itself, that proposition 
seems to remove constitutional force from the realization concept. 
But the constitutional issues weren't before the Court in 1991-the 
issues in Cottage Savings involved statutory and regulatory analysis476-
and it's hard to tell from passing references how.today's Court would rule if 
required to reexamine the "incomes" concept. At a minimum, the 
references suggest Macomber isn't dead, and, for a Court that likes to 
reinvigorate moribund constitutional provisions,477 the apportionment rule 
and the Sixteenth Amendment could be ripe for reconsideration. 478 
471. !d. 
472. 499 u.s. 554 (1991). 
473. !d. at 562. 
474. !d. at 563. 
475. !d. at 559 (quoting Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940)). 
476. Cottage Savings sold participation interests in blocks of low-interest mortgages and 
purchased economically identical interests in other blocks. It successfully argued the sale was a 
taxable "disposition of property," I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1994), so it could recognize a loss. The 
government argued there was no disposition because, after the dust had settled, Cottage 
Savings' economic position was unchanged. Much of the discussion in the case focused on 
whether the two blocks "differ[ed] materially either in kind or in extent." Treas. Reg.§ 1.1001-1 
(as amended in 1996); see Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 560-67. 
477. See, e.g., Printzv. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Tenth Amendment); Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 609 (1996) (Eleventh Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995) (Commerce Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Tenth 
Amendment). 
478. Lower courts have seen defining "incomes" as hopeless. For example, the Seventh 
Circuit said the Supreme Court defintion was based on "'what it believed to be the commonly 
understood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of the people when they 
adopted the ... Amendment."' Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656, 657 (7th Cir. 1940) 
(quoting Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921)). The Third 
Circuit said the Supreme Court relied on "some illusory theory that the state legislatures who 
ratified the 16th Amendment had some idea of an 'ordinary meaning' for such an economic 
abstraction." Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 86, 87 (3d Cir. 1940). The Tax Court 
referred to a "long-abandoned" effort to "fashion a concept of income." Sakol v. 
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 986, 991, aff'd, 574 F.2d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 1978). To be sure, the 
Supreme Court hasn't considered "incomes" for a while, but I'm not sure the effort was 
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My point in discussing old Supreme Court cases isn't to suggest the 
reasoning or results were necessarily right one-by-one (although I do think 
Macomber was right). I'm citing the cases for the proposition that the 
Sixteenth Amendment didn't grant unlimited power to Congress. The Court 
consistently rejected the idea that the meaning of "incomes"-in the words 
of Professors Gabinet and Coffey--ought "to float freely on the shifting 
tides of tax theologies."479 I'd be surprised to have the Court today endorse 
the notion that Congress can define such a term in any way it wishes.480 If 
Congress were to enact a direct tax that reaches only consumption-· a goal 
very different from that advanced by proponents of the Sixteenth 
Amendment-that tax could be in jeopardy. 
2. Defer to Understanding of "Incomes" at Time of Ratification 
The early cases not only concluded that "incomes" has meaning; they 
also concluded the term ought to be understood as it was in 1913. In 1921, 
in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka,481 the Court had written that, 
in defining "income," it "has consistently refused to enter into the 
refinements of lexicographers or economists, and has approved ... what it 
believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must 
have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution."482 If something wasn't understood to be 
income then, it shouldn't be understood as income now. Even Justice 
Holmes, in his Macomber dissent, agreed with that basic proposition. He 
was interpreting the word "incomes," he said, looking for "a sense most 
obvious to the common understanding at the time of [the Amendment's] 
adoption. "483 
This doesn't mean that only items in fact taxed in the first post-
Amendment statute can be part of an unapportioned income tax. 484 But 
only items that could have been taxed in 1913 may be taxed in that way 
abandoned. In any event, we don't need an all-encompassing theory to decide whether a 
particular item is income. That's the genius of the common law. 
479. Gabinet& Coffey, supra note 452, at 919. 
480. "Incomes" is different from "public use." See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying 
text; supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text. 
481. 255 U.S. 509 (1921) (upholding tax on capital gains). 
482. !d. at 519; see also Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174 (1926) ("It 
was not the purpose or effect of that Amendment to bring any new subject within the taxing 
power."). 
483. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 220 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Bishop v. State, 149 Ind. 223, 230 (1898)). 
484. Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat.l66. 
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today. 485 As the Court said in Taft v. Bowers,486 "[T]he settled doctrine is 
that the Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define 
and tax as income without apportionment something which theretofore 
could not have been properly regarded as income."487 Congress can't avoid 
apportionment by expanding the definition of "incomes." 
Deference to original understanding of "incomes" is required, and the 
ratifiers of the Sixteenth Amendment were operating with the understanding 
that a tax reaching only consumption isn't a "tax on incomes." That's why 
the Amendment was important in.1913, and that's why it's important now. 
3. Accounting Conventions and the Constitution 
In this subsection I argue that characterization questions under the 
Sixteenth Amendment can't be delegated to the accountants. Income taxes 
and consumption taxes are constitutionally different, and the differences 
between an income tax and direct-consumption taxes like the USA tax and 
the flat tax aren't subconstitutional questions ofaccounting. 
The term "incomes" in the Amendment doesn't necessarily mean 
"income" as an economist would understand the term. 488 The ratifiers 
understood that some conventions, like annual accounting, were consistent 
with the Amendment. Nevertheless, permitting some deviations from 
485. One caveat: In 1913 some items couldn't be taxed because of other constitutional 
doctrines, not because the items weren't "income." If those doctrines have changed, the 
affected items can be taxed today. For example, state bond interest wasn't taxed in 1913, see 
supra notes 333-336 and accompanying text, but in 1988 the Court noted that intergovernmental 
tax immunity doctrine had changed: 
The legislative history merely shows that the words "from whatever source 
derived" . . . were not affirmatively intended to authorize Congress to tax 
state bond interest or to have any other effect on which incomes were subject 
to federal taxation, and that the sole purpose of [the Amendment] was to 
remove the apportionment requirement for whichever incomes were 
otherwise taxable .... [I]f [it] had frozen into the Constitution all the tax 
immunities that existed in 1913, then most of intergovernmental tax 
immunity doctrine would be invalid. 
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 522 n.13 (1988); see also Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 
U.S. 405, 416-17 (1938) (dealing with income of state and local officials). The Court has 
recently held that, despite the Compensation Clause, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, Congress can tax 
the salaries of federal judges, as long as the taxes aren't discriminatory. Hatter v. United States, 
121 S. Ct. 1782 (2001). 
486. 278 u.s. 470 (1929). 
487. Id. at 481; see also Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628, 631-32 (1925) ("The 
Sixteenth Amendment, like other laws authorizing or imposing taxes, is to be taken as written 
and is not to be extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the language used."). 
488. If Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), is still good law, an income tax couldn't 
reach all economic income, such as unrealized appreciation. 
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economic income for administrative reasons doesn't mean the definition is 
open-ended. There are limits, even if those limits can't be set out in a way 
that resolves every controversy in a predictable way. · , 
a. The Limits of Accounting 
Some critics of my previously published, tentative conclusion that a 
direct-consumption tax isn't a "tax on incomes" have made the following 
argument. 489 Whether taxpayers · should be entitled to deductions or 
exclusions that pull savings from the tax base is a question of accounting 
and nothing more. And it's possible to pick passages out of opinions to 
support broad congressional power in this regard. For example, the Court 
wrote in 1934, "Unquestionably Congress has the power to condition, limit 
or deny deductions from gross income in order to arrive at the net that it 
chooses to tax."490 
I agree that accounting matters, one by one, aren't of constitutional 
significance;491 LIFO accounting can't be found in constitutional penumbras. 
But that's not to say that issues are subconstitutional just because someone 
characterizes them as "accounting" in nature. 
A decision to exempt the savings component of income, as the flat tax or 
the USA tax would, goes far beyond accounting conventions. It would 
leave a tax base that isn't incom~ in any generally accepted sense,492 and it 
would leave a tax base that isn't "income" as understood in 1913, when the 
distinction between taxes on income and taxes on consumption was 
uppermost in policy-makers' minds. In fact, because a consumption tax 
may reach expenditures made from savings, rather than from current 
income, a consumption tax could apply in years in which a taxpayer has no 
income. If we're going to pay any attention to constitutional language, it's 
hard to see such a tax as an "income" tax. 493 
489, See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2407-14, 
490. Helvering v. lndep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934). 
491. Cf SIMONS, supra note 126, at 203 (arguing Macomber Court wrongly "asserted its 
prerogative of passing on every positive item which Congress may include in the determination 
of the tax base"). But I also don't mean to suggest everything included under the heading 
"Income Taxes" is necessarily constitutionaL An unapportioned tax on real-estate wouldn't 
become constitutional merely because Congress put it into Subtitle A See Indep. Life Ins. Co., 
292 U.S, at 378; supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
492. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2410-11. 
493. See supra note 29 (discussing letter from Stephen Land). The argument has been 
made that, because any tax liability will ultimately be satisfied out of income, eve1y tax is an 
income tax. That's certainly not what drafters of the Sixteenth Amendment had in mind. See 
Jensen, supra note 6, at 2413. 
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Consider another case that even more clearly strains Sixteenth 
Amendment language-a gross-receipts tax. Can a tax that permits no 
deductions at all, even for business expenses, be a "tax on 
incomes?" There's lower court authority that says yes,494 but taxing 
someone with no net income under an "income" tax shatters constitutional 
language. Permitting this deduction or that may be a matter of accounting; 
deciding whether to permit any deductions is decidedly not a simple 
accounting question. 495 
If a gross receipts tax is an income tax, it must be because original 
understanding is to be ignored. When the Court said Congress "has the 
power to condition, limit or deny deductions," it was part of determining 
"the net that it chooses to tax."496 The system as a whole is supposed to 
measure net income, as a prominent supporter of the tax, Edwin Seligman, 
stressed in 1911 : "Income is . . . to be distinguished from mere receipts or 
gross revenue . . . . By income is always meant net income, as opposed to 
gross income. In other words, from the receipts in any enterprise we must 
... deduct the expense of the enterprise ... .'1497 The goal of the Sixteenth 
Amendment was to reach higher-income, not no-income, persons, and the 
Income Tax Law of 1913 applied to "net income."498 Indeed, until 1954, 
494. See Penn Mut. Indem Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1960). In some 
cases, unapportioned gross receipts taxes have been held to be excises· on the right to engage in 
business in a particular form and, therefore, not subject to apportionment. See, e.g., Spreckels 
Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904) (upholding tax measured by gross receipts on 
persons engaged in refining petroleum or sugar, or controlling pipeline to transport oil or other 
products); Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1868) (upholding tax on insurance 
company gross premiums). 
495. C.f Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918) ("In order to determine whether 
there has been gain or loss, and the amount of the gain, if any, we must withdraw from the gross 
proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital value that existed at the commencement of 
the period under consideration."); see also Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 364 
( 1931) ("[Losses involved] were not capital investments, the cost of which, if converted, must 
first be restored from the proceeds before there is a capital gain taxable as income." (citing 
Doyle, 247 U.S. at 188.) (emphasis added)). 
496. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. at 381 (emphasis added); see supra text 
accompanying note 490. 
497. SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 19. It's been argued that net income necessarily means 
applying generally accepted accounting principles. See JohnS. Nolan, The Merit in Conformity 
ofTax to Financial Accounting, 50 TAXES 761, 767 (1972). Even I won't go that far. 
498. Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, § II.A.1, 38 Stat. 166. If a levy is an indirect tax, so 
that no apportionment is required, net income needn't be determined. See Stanton v. Baltic 
Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916) (holding, inter alia, that corporate income tax is excise not 
requiring apportionment and that mining tax need not provide adequate allowance for 
depletion). 
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the term "net income" rather than "taxable income" was regularly used in 
the taxing statutes.499 
b. Sanford & Brooks 
So "taxes on incomes" was intended to mean taxes on net incomes. But 
if that's tight, and it is, I must account for the well-known case of Burnet v. 
Sanford & Brooks Co. 500 In 1931 the Supreme Court upheld the statutory 
requirement that taxpayers report income on an annual basis even if annual 
accounting worked to convert the income tax, in a particular case, into a 
gross receipts tax. 
Sanford & Brooks Co. was party to a dredging contract that generated 
substantial losses (totaling about $176,000) from 1913 until 1916. In each 
year with a net loss, the company obviously paid no income tax. The 
company finally stopped work and sued under a breach of warranty theory, 
claiming the nature of the material to be dredged had been misrepresented. 501 
In 1920, Sanford & Brooks recovered about $193,000 on the claim. The 
company paid no income tax, taking the not unreasonable position that the 
recovery should have been offset by the earlier losses. The government 
argued that the full amount of the recovery was taxable in 1920.502 
Preliminarily, the Court concluded that the losses "were not capital 
investments, the cost of which, if converted, must first be restored from the 
proceeds before there is a capital gain taxable as income." 503 That 
conclusion wasn't self-evident. (If the company had acquired an asset for 
$176,000 and then sold it for $193,000, it would have been taxed on only 
the $17,000 gain.) One can imagine situations in which it's difficult to 
show a connection between expenditures and proceeds, but this wasn't such 
a case. Losses and recovery were unquestionably associated with the 
dredging contract. 
Which brings us to the company's constitutional argument: that most of 
the $193,000 recovery didn't represent "income" under the Sixteenth 
Amendment. In effect, the argument was that "income" means net income, 
a plausible position based on original understanding, 504 and the time horizon 
for determining whether a taxpayer has net income should be extended, at 
499. See ANDREWS, supra note 140, at 22. 
500. 282 U.S. 359 (1931). 
501. Id. at 361. 
502. It's not clear why the company thought it shouldn't have had to pay tax on the excess 
of the recovery over the $176,000 in losses-i.e., the amount that could have been characterized 
as interest. 
503. Sanford & Brooks, 282 U.S. at 364. 
504. See supra notes 496-499 and accompanying text. 
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least in some circumstances. If a store owner takes in $500,000 but has 
expenses of $500,000 in the same year, he shouldn't be subject to an 
"income" tax. Sanford & Brooks Co. was in the same position as the store 
owner, if only it had been permitted to show the relationship between the 
revenues and the expenditures over time. 505 
Sanford & Brooks Co.'s constitutional argument wasn't trivial, but the 
Court rejected it in a strikingly summary fashion. The Amendment wasn't 
to be so narrowly construed .... The net result of the two years, if 
combined in a single taxable year, might still be a loss; but it has 
never been supposed that that fact would relieve from a tax on the 
first, or that it affords any reason for postponing the assessment of 
the tax until the end of a lifetime, or for some other indefinite 
period, to ascertain more precisely whether the final outcome of 
the period, or of a given transaction, will be a gain or a loss. 506 
While Sanford & Brooks Co. was effectively taxed on gross receipts, the 
case isn't a statement of Congress's unlimited power to define income. The 
Court simply recognized, as had proponents of the Sixteenth Amendment, 
that administrative rules are necessary for a tax to function: 
It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce 
revenue ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular 
intervals. Only by such a system is it practicable to produce a 
regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting, 
assessment, and collection capable of practical operation. It is not 
suggested that there has ever been any general scheme for taxing 
income on any other basis. The computation of income annually 
as the net result of all transactions within the year was a familiar 
practice, and taxes upon income so arrived at were not unknown, 
before the Sixteenth Amendment. 507 
We're looking for the net result-that's what an income tax is-but 
taxpayers can't keep their books open forever: "It is not to be supposed that 
the amendment did not contemplate that Congress might make income so 
ascertained the basis of a scheme of taxation such as had been in actual 
operation within the United States before its adoption."508 The Constitution 
doesn't ignore practicalities, but that's not to say that accounting rules can 
convert a direct-consumption tax into a "tax on incomes." 
505. Sanford & Brooks Co. was harshly treated because tax rates in 1920, left over from 
World War I, were much higher than those in effect in the 1913-1916 period. See Brownlee, 
supra note 254, at 45. 
506. Sanford & Brooks, 282 U.S. at 364-65. 
507. !d. at 365 (emphasis added). 
508. Id.; see also id. at 363. 
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E. The Assumptionsi3ehind Congressional Power to Define "Incomes" 
To this point, I've been questioning the proposition that the term 
"incomes" is so inherently malleable that Congress can define the term 
however it wants. I'll now briefly shift gears. 
Deference to Congress in characterizing a tax as an income tax isn't a 
principle I'm happy with, but with the direct-consumption taxes proposed in 
recent years (the flat tax and the USA tax), it really doesn't matter: with 
those taxes Congress wouldn't purport to be defining "incomes." We don't 
need to defer to a congressional definition of "incomes" if Congress doesn't 
say it's defining "incomes," or if Congress says it's defining incomes but is 
engaging in a subterfuge. 
Most commentators who've stressed how broad the congressional taxing 
power is have assumed Congress would make a good-faith effort to define 
"incomes." That's true of Thuronyi and Kornhauser, the scholars I quoted 
on the "inherently malleable" point. 509 Take away that assumption, and the 
case for deference disappears.510 
Congress knows the flat tax and the USA tax aren't income taxes as that 
term has been understood for decades, or it will know that before any 
proposal gets very far along in the legislative process. We'll make sure of 
that, and we'll make sure Congress understands what the Sixteenth 
Amendment was intended to accomplish. As a result, Congress won't be 
able to rely on the Amendment as authority to enact an unapportioned 
direct-consumption tax. 
In addition, those who've argued that the term "taxes on incomes" is 
inherently malleable, or something similar, have generally assumed 
Congress would act to .broaden the definition of income. 511 Direct-
consumption taxes are such changes in conceptual direction that they don't 
fit the justifications for congressional power traditionally offered by 
supporters of that power. When Professor Kornhauser refers to a "broad 
and evolutionary" notion of income-as "congressional conceptions of 
509. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text. 
510. It's not true for Ackennan, but Ackennan thinks the Sixteenth Amendment imposes no 
limitation on the taxing power. See Ackennan, supra note 16, at 55-56; supra text 
accompanying note 17. 
511. That's not true of all. Zelenak says "the Sixteenth Amendment does not enact Dr. 
Haig's and Dr. Simon's definition of income, and the fact that a tax base is less inclusive-even 
far less inclusive-than Haig-Simons does not render it constitutionally suspect." Zelenak, 
supra note 19, at 847. Haig-Simons doesn't have constitutional status, but I disagree that a tax 
base "far less inclusive," one including only consumption, satisfies constitutional requirements. 
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income change and become more sophisticated"-she doesn't have in mind 
a shrinking tax base. 512 
For example, in a number of articles, Kornhauser sees "ability to pay" 
(as reflected in a progressive rate structure) as a defining feature of the 
income tax: "[T]he graduated rate has been integrally connected under U.S. 
tax laws to the ability-to-pay theory that underlies the income tax.'' 513 
[A] progressive rate structure has been a constant feature of the 
income tax since 1913, when the first income tax was enacted 
under the Sixteenth Amendment. At that time, most of the general 
public, politicians and economists accepted the idea of 
progressivity (though they disagreed as to the appropriate rates) 
because it conformed to their conception of "ability to pay," which 
was the basis of the income tax. 514 
Kornhauser's emphasis on ability to pay is consistent with my reading of 
the history of the income tax in the United States. A levy that doesn't have 
ability to pay as its justificatory core isn't an income tax. 
And Victor Thuronyi has commented: 
An issue that has been important in the past, and may become 
important in the future[,] is the definition of "income" .... [I]t 
may be appropriate to base the definition of income for purposes 
of the Constitution on tax equity. [Such a definition] would 
recognize that as long as Congress is striving to impose a , tax 
based on the relative annual financial positions of taxpayers, 
according to its concept offairness, the Court should not overturn 
its determinations. 515 
If Congress isn't trying to do that, the inference is, clear. If Congress 
doesn't define "income" in terms of the relative annual financial positions 
of taxpayers, then Congress isn't defining an income tax. 516 
512. See Kornhauser supra note 15 and accompanying text. This discussion illustrates the 
peculiarities that arise from treating constitutional and legislative definitions of "income" as if 
they necessarily coincide. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text. 
513. Matjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in Tax Reform Debate: An Example, 70 
TuL L. REv. 2345, 2347 (1996). 
514. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, What Do Women Want: Feminism and the Progressive 
Income Tax, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 152 (1997) (footnotes omitted). 
515. Thuronyi, supra note 12, at 99-100 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
516. Congress could enact an income tax while labeling it as something else: "It is not 
necessary to uphold the validity of [a) tax ... that the tax itself bear an accurate label." Penn 
Mut. Indem Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1960). But the direct-consumption 
taxes aren't income taxes as Amendment ratifiers understood such taxes. Some writers have 
used terms like "cash flow personal income tax" to describe a direct-consumption tax, see, e.g., 
Williatn D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Persona/Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. 
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The proposed direct-consumption taxes are driven not by ability to pay, 
but by other considerations. Those considerations might have merit, but 
merit doesn't make a tax into a "tax on incomes." Treating direct-
consumption taxes as "income" taxes requires ignoring the explicit-and 
implicit-goal of proponents of these taxes: to change what is seen to be 
wrong in the income tax system. 
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY BY ACCRETION AND THE "GoTCHA" 
READING OF THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT 
I now turn to the most serious argument against my position: Maybe there 
was an original understanding about the distinction between consumption 
taxes and income taxes, but we've moved far beyond the point where such a 
constitutional distinction can be implemented. 
I've no doubt much of the modem income tax would amaze all, and 
appall many, of those who participated in ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment. If we accept the idea that the Amendment should be 
interpreted as the drafters and ratifiers understood it-not all will accept 
that, of course-it could well be we'd have some major rethinking of the 
income tax to do, or we'd be rushing to amend the Constitution to do away. 
with the direct-tax clauses. A serious critic therefore might wonder whether 
I understand the implications of questioning the constitutionality of existing 
and proposed tax systems. 
Such a serious critic is Professor Lawrence Zelenak, who wrote a 
thoughtful response to my prior article. Among other things, Zelenak 
presents an endless set of questions. Can this proposed taxing provision be 
seen as unconstitutional when it's substantively not very different from this 
other provision that's been around for years?517 If we conceptualize the flat 
tax as two separate taxes (a business tax and a wage tax), something I didn't 
do in my first article, wouldn't each meet constitutional requirements? 518 
How about this? How about that? The mind (my mind) reels. I'm not 
going to respond to each of Professor Zelenak's points; in some cases, I 
have to admit, I can't. 
In addition to his understandable reluctance to evaluate every Internal 
Revenue Code provision to see whether it meets constitutional standards, 
Zelenak worries that the whole income tax system might hit a "tipping 
REV. 1113 (1974), but that was for purposes of comparing an expenditure tax with the existing 
income tax. 
517. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 19, at 843 (comparing wage tax portion of flat tax with 
Social Security wage tax). 
518. See id. at 844. 
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point." All of a sudden, if the system gets too close to a pure consumption 
tax and too far from a pure income tax, it could become unconstitutional 
under my analysis.519 The legitimacy of the nation's revenue system can't 
be at such risk, Zelenak argues. He calls this a "'gotcha' reading of the 
Sixteenth Amendment[, which] is unappealing, and [not] required by text or 
history. "520 
At bottom, I think Professor Zelenak is arguing that it's too late in the 
day to worry about any ofthis.521 We've had a complex tax system in place 
for years without worrying about constitutional questions, and, if we now 
suddenly try to recapture the original understanding of the direct-tax clauses 
and the Sixteenth Amendment-even if that crazy man Jensen is right-
we'll tie ourselves up in knots. Worse, we'll wreak havoc with the 
American revenue system and therefore with American government. No 
court is likely to overturn a major national taxing statute, 522 and we 
shouldn't expect legislators to be historians. Because the revenue system 
has changed so much from 1789 and 1913 that the originally understood 
system of constitutional limitations can't be recovered, a conscientious 
legislator can vote for a direct-consumption tax without worrying about 
abstract constitutional questions. 523 
519. See id. at 848 ("Continued incremental movement in that direction might one day 
result in an unconstitutional tax system, under Jensen's analysis."). Indeed, Zelenak suggests 
we might already have reached that point at one time or another in the history of the "income" 
tax. See, e.g., id. at 848-49. 
520. Id. at 849. 
521. At one point, Professor Zelenak uses the "late-in-the-day" phrase for Social Security: 
Given the complete absence of judicial support for the proposition that a 
wage tax is direct, it is very late in the day to challenge the Pollock view. It 
is especially late considering that Social Security taxes are unapportioned 
wage taxes; if Pollock is wrong about wage taxes, then billions of dollars of 
Social Security taxes may have been unconstitutionally collected over the 
past six decades. The constitutionality of the Social Security wage tax has 
not been seriously questioned, however, for many years. Either it is not a 
direct tax . . . or it qualifies as an income tax under the Sixteenth 
Amendment, or both. 
Id. at 843-44 (footnotes omitted). Since the wage tax might be treated as a ''tax on incomes," 
I'm not sure why it's too late to "challenge the Pollock view" about direct taxes. In any event, 
let's evaluate the tax under the Amendment. The Joint Committee estimates that, for 2001, 
those making over $200,000 will pay 47.5% of the total income tax collected; the top l% will 
pay 35.9% of the total. But factor in payroll taxes, and the top 1% will pay only 22.6% of the 
total. See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG, DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN 
FEDERAL TAX LIABILITIES BY INCOME CLASS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2001 (Comm. Print 
2001). That turns the Amendment on its head! 
522. A point I concede. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 2414. But the probability isn't zero, 
something a conscientious legislator voting for an unapportioned direct-consumption tax should 
take into account. 
523. See Zelenak, supra note 19, at 837-38. 
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The tax system can thus be seen as a prime example of constitutionality 
by accretion: although the point we've reached might not have been 
considered constitutional had it been evaluated in 1913, say-imagine the 
Supreme Court in 1913 pondering the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 !-we 
began with a basically constitutional income tax, and each incremental step 
along the way seemed constitutionally acceptable. 524 (Indeed, because of 
that, we eventually stopped worrying about whether additional steps were 
consistent with the idea of a "tax on incomes.") Once paper money was 
accepted, it became impossible to tum back the clock to treat the 
constitutional reference to "coin[ing] Money" as having effect, 525 and we're 
in the same situation with the national taxing system. 
I hate sounding reasonable, but I'm sympathetic to those concerns. 
Nevertheless, we shouldn't revel in the idea of constitutionality by 
accretion. Taking limitations on the taxing power seriously should've been 
part of the process all along. We may have passed the point of no return, 
but let's not defend what has come to be on the ground that it's necessarily 
consistent with a close reading of constitutional text, with constitutional 
structure, or with the history of the Sixteenth Amendment. There's value in 
respecting text, structure, and history, even when they lead to results we 
disapprove of. If we're going to discard parts of the Constitution, let's at 
least be open about what we're doing. 
In any event, the constitutionality-by-accretion standard shouldn't affect 
our evaluation of proposed direct-consumption taxes. Even if we accept 
that what we now have is constitutional, if only because the world would 
otherwise collapse, we needn't look the other way when we're evaluating a 
proposed substitute for the existing system. We needn't worry about how 
hypothetical incremental changes could bring the system down with a cry of 
"Gotcha!" when we're talking about replacement tax systems rather than 
incremental changes. At that point, we can go back to first principles in our 
constitutional analysis. 
It's a common strategy in legal discussions to point out the difficulty of 
drawing lines. When we draw lines, we wind up with difficult cases at the 
margin, inevitably, and it's almost always possible to see some arguable 
inconsistency in the results of those cases. Therefore (the argument often 
goes) meaningful distinctions can't be made at all. Because some people 
have trouble distinguishing Playboy and Penthouse for First Amendment 
524. I don't mean the system would necessarily fail constitutionally if evaluated by 1913 
standards; I simply want to raise the possibility for purposes of argument. 
525. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 5 (granting Congress power to "coin Money"); see Knox v. 
Lee (The Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 
Wall.) 603 (1869). 
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purposes, many wind up deciding that no line can be drawn between the 
New York Times and Hustler. "Where do you draw the line?" is supposed 
to be the clincher in many discussions, and Professor Zelenak's "Gotcha" 
principle is the equivalent of that question. 
But the difficulty of making distinctions at the margin shouldn't blind us 
to our ability to distinguish quite different phenomena. The proposed 
direct-consumption taxes aren't difficult, marginal cases: they're taxes on 
consumption. If a consumption tax isn't an income tax, and my reading of 
the Sixteenth Amendment convinces me on that point, the validity of an 
unapportioned direct-consumption tax won't come from the Amendment. 
Conscientious legislators should know that. Even if they can, in good faith, 
vote to adopt incremental changes in the existing system, they have every 
reason to be concerned when the proposal is for something fundamentally 
different from a "tax on incomes."526 
Yes, we ought to respect congressional determinations of what's to be 
included in the tax base, but that doesn't mean Congress can define 
anything as income. That's not the way the Supreme Court looked at the 
matter in the two decades after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, 
and it's not the way things have to be today. Zelenak's rule of thumb-
"When Congress is the final arbiter of constitutionality, if enough 
legislators believe the provision is probably constitutional, and vote for it, 
then it is constitutional"527-has a certain legal-realist truth to it, but it's not 
a principle I'd go to war for. 528 
A final point: I understand that the base of the USA tax and the flat tax 
would be far broader than the tariffs and excises of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Furthermore, high exemption amounts could 
make these taxes different from taxes on "necessities"-the common 
526. It's often remarked that our current system is a hybrid income-consumption tax, not a 
pure income tax. It's a consumption tax for the poor and lower middle class because either they 
have no savings or the savings can be sheltered through mechanisms like I.R.C. § 121 (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999) (providing for nonrecognition of gain on sale of principal residence), the 
exemptions affecting life insurance cash value and proceeds, and the deductibility or excluda-
bility of contributions to retirement plans. Only those with discretionary income left after 
meeting basic consumption needs and contributing the maximum allowable to tax-favored 
retirement plans end up with saved amounts taxed in a"pure" income tax. 
None of this affects my basic points. These aren't two, severable systems. People 
move in and out of the consumption and income tax regimes at different times in their lives. In 
some years, they may be taxed only on consumption, but the larger system would have been 
recognizable, in broad outline, to ratifiers of the Sixteenth Amendment. The system's 
consistent, that is, with ability to pay. 
527. Zelenak, supra note 19, at 838. 
528. On the other hand, I wouldn't nnrch for the direct-tax clauses either. See supra Part 
II.B.6. 
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complaint of nineteenth-century consumption tax critics-and the USA tax 
could be graduated, meeting one of the objections of flat-tax critics. But 
these proposed taxes still wouldn't tie taxpaying obligations to ability to 
pay, and that's what the Amendment was all about. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In his article, Professor Zelenak states: "To [Jensen's] argument that the 
flat tax and the USA tax are consumption taxes, and therefore are not 
covered by the Sixteenth Amendment, (politicians, the general public, and 
many experts] would respond with the classic demurrer, 'I get it all except 
the therefore. "'529 This Article provides the therefore. 
I've presented evidence that, in the debates culminating in the Sixteenth 
Amendment, participants thought of income taxes and consumption taxes as 
fundamentally different. The Amendment came into being because the 
consumption taxes used throughout American history were thought to be 
flawed, and a significant change was needed. The term "taxes on incomes" 
should be interpreted with that distinction in mind. It's for that reason I 
question the assumption that a direct-consumption tax like the flat tax or the 
USA tax could be enacted, without apportionment, under the Amendment's 
authority. 
Of course, this conclusion is only as good as the assumptions I made for 
purposes of discussion. If a direct-consumption tax isn't a direct tax, within 
the meaning of the Constitution, or if the direct-tax apportionment rule is a 
dead letter, then any debate about the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment 
is irrelevant to the consideration of direct-consumption taxes. 
But if direct-consumption taxes are direct taxes-as I think they are-
and if the apportionment rule still has effect-as I think it does-the 
constitutionality of direct-consumption taxes hinges on the meaning of 
"taxes on incomes" in the Sixteenth Amendment. If nothing else, I hope 
I've shown why it's not self-evident that a direct-consumption tax is exempt 
from apportionment. 
Goodness and constitutionality often get collapsed in the popular mind. 
If something is bad (or arguably bad), it must be unconstitutional; if it's 
good (or arguably good), it must satisfy constitutional requirements. 
Neither proposition is necessarily true. It may be that a major revamping of 
the revenue system is necessary. But any effort to tear up the current 
income tax and start over shouldn't proceed without serious discussion 
about whether what follows will satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. 
529. Zelenak, supra note 19, at 855. 
